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This paper analyses bank exit (ie reorganisation and liquidation) legislation in
selected financial centres: New York, London, Frankfurt, Helsinki and Tokyo.
The focus is on bank exit legislation applicable to commercial banks. The
legislation is analysed from the perspective of bank stakeholders, ie bank
creditors, depositors and bank shareholders. The analysis is restricted to those
legislative provisions that provide security and rights for stakeholders in case of
bank exit. In addition to current conditions, the paper covers the main legislative
changes of the latter part of the 1990s.
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Pankkien uudelleenjärjestely- ja
likvidaatiolainsäädäntö Yhdysvaltain, Euroopan ja
Japanin rahoituskeskuksissa




Tässä tutkimuksessa tarkastellaan pankkien uudelleenjärjestely- ja likvidaatiolain-
säädäntöä New Yorkin, Lontoon, Frankfurtin, Helsingin ja Tokion rahoituskes-
kuksissa. Tarkastelun kohteena on liikepankkeja koskeva lainsäädäntö. Lainsää-
däntöä arvioidaan pankkien eri sidosryhmien näkökulmasta. Sidosryhmiä ovat
pankkien luotonantajat, tallettajat ja osakkeenomistajat. Painopiste on niissä sää-
döksissä, jotka sääntelevät sidosryhmien oikeuksia ja sijoitusten turvallisuutta
uudelleenjärjestely- ja likvidaatiotilanteissa. Tutkimus kattaa ensisijaisesti nykyti-
lanteen ja toissijaisesti lakimuutokset 1990-luvun puolivälistä saakka.
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The aim of this paper is to describe bank exit regimes in some of the world’s
financial centres. The financial centres concerned are New York (USA), London
(UK/EU), Frankfurt (Germany/EU), Helsinki (Finland/EU) and Tokyo (Japan).
The paper is the first part of a larger study aiming to evaluate different bank exit
regimes in respect of their effects on financial centre competitiveness. In this first
paper, the bank exit regulation of the financial centres is closely analysed. In a
later, second paper the bank exit regimes will be evaluated in an comparative
manner using legislation evaluation methodology. – Since this first paper may be
linked to a tradition of economic evaluation of law provisions a number of
arguments supporting an economic interest in bank exit regulation, are presented
below. Further on, the main features of this analysis are discussed.
One can distinguish at least five groups of arguments supporting an
economic interest in bank exit regulation. One group of arguments is value-
based. Though it often may be difficult to distinguish these arguments from the
other groups, these arguments concentrate on the fact that the interest in economic
assessment of features of society has increased. On a more detailed level, the
interest in economic issues may eg result in a focus on certain aspects of the
markets or transparency issues. Moreover, ambitions to eliminate sources of
“moral hazard” problems in market activities derive from an economic market
perspective. – Arguments supporting an economic interest in bank exit regulation
also stem from the eventual systemic effects of bank failures. In the case of bank
failures, substantial economic problems may emerge due to systemic effects in the
form of a) widesspread losses for bank stakeholders or, b) protective stakeholder
behaviour in relation to all or similar banks. Following this logic, large bank
failures are a bigger problem than small ones. From a judicial perspective, all
banks should preferably be equal under the law. – Another group of arguments
supporting the economic interest in bank exit regulation is linked to the
foundation of the European Union (EU) and more specifically its internal market
dimension. Creating conditions for the free flow of utilities between member
states, economic assessment of the legislation of the states is important. Focusing
on the financial sector, a need to assess rules and practices also for bank8
rehabilitation and dissolution arises.
1 – Furthermore, the position of the taxpayers
in bank exit proceedings may be used as an argument for analysing bank exit
legislation on economic grounds. Experience indicates that the cost of bailig out
troubled banks has often been high in relation to the country’s GDP. Focusing on
costsk, history has shown that poorly designed bank exit mechanisms have been
worse than ineffective in the prevention of banking distress. If countries use
taxpayers’ money ineffectively, taxpayers may vote by switching tax regimes.
2 –
In this analysis, the concern for the competitiveness of financial centres directs the
interest in bank exit. In an increasingly international world, one could assume that
competition between banks also implies competition between the terms that
various financial centres may provide banks. The banks’ stakeholders should be
interested in assessing the terms for bank activities since these constitute the terms
for their investments. If the jurisdiction that a financial centre can offer its banks’
stakeholders is significantly worse than the jurisdiction of other centres, this may
influence the decision where to establish a bank.
3
Another entity requiring further attention is the main features of this
analysis. As for the subject of the analysis, the immediate aim is to compare bank
exit regimes in some of the world’s financial centres. Bank exit is defined in a
broad manner including both voluntary and compulsory reorganisation and
liquidation of banks. Financial centers covered are New York (USA), London
(UK/EU), Frankfurt (Germany/EU), Helsinki (Finland/EU) and Tokyo (Japan).
The term bank is restricted only to commercial banks in the form of limited
liability companies. – In the comparison of the bank exit legislation the
perspectives are the ones of the banks’ creditors, depositors and shareholders. The
perspectives reflect such aspects of the legislation that matter in an economic
sense. In other words, the focus is on the level of security (financial assistance to
banks, depositor protection, authority supervision etc.) that the legislation
provides bank stakeholders. In addition, the amount (or lack) of powers (right to
commence bankruptcy, risk for capital loss in bank reorganisation etc.) that the
legislation transfers to bank stakeholders is also analysed. The emphasis in the
                                                
1 A number of regulative steps have been taken by the EU/EEA that affect the reorganisation and
liquidation of banks. A Recommendation concerning Deposit Guarantee Schemes (87/63/EEC)
and a Directive concerning Deposit Insurance Systems (94/19/EEC) have been issued and
implemented into the jurisdictions of the member states. The latest Parliament and Council
Directive concerning the Reorganisation and Liquidation of Credit Institutions (2001/24/EEC) is
supposed to be implemented before May 2004. This directive does not unify the procedures for the
reorganisation and liquidation of EU/EEA banks, it merely directs which national jurisdiction
should be applied in the reorganisation and liquidation of banks.
2 According to Milhaupt (1999), the cost has often been between 20 and 50% of the affected
country’s GDP to bail out troubled banks.
3 One step reflecting a concern about the international competitiveness of regulatory regimes is the
work by the World Bank on global unification of insolvency criteria.9
analysis is on the provisions most relevant when estimating the risk for
stakeholders’ capital loss. – Another feature of importance in the analysis is the
fact that legislation may not be assessed without considering the authority
practice linked to it. Some bank exit regimes may be characterised by significant
differences between the formal procedures and the procedures used. As a
consequence, also bank exit practice in the financial centres is described. –
Moreover, the analysis comprises a time dimension. Though the analysis focuses
on current conditions, most of the 1990’s regulatory development and changing
practices have also been dealt with. – The structure of this analysis is as follows.
First, in chapter 2, general viewpoints on the legal frameworks and the
supervision of banks in each financial centre are presented. This sub-analysis is
meant to provide an overall picture of the regimes. In chapter 3, the reorganisation
and liquidation legislation is focused on from the creditors’ perspective. The
different bank exit regimes are presented and compared in a way relevant to the
bank creditors. In chapter 4, the legislation is analysed according to the
depositors’ interests. Deposit insurance systems with similarities are analysed
together. The angle in chapter 5 is the shareholders’. Considerable differences
exist between the jurisdictions. Shareholders may or may not lose their capital in
authority-administered bank rehabilitation. Finally, in chapter 6 legally oriented
conclusions concerning the various regimes are made.
2 Viewpoints on the legal frameworks for bank
exit and the supervision of banks in five
financial centres
2.1 Legal frameworks for bank reorganisation and
liquidation
In order to create a basis for the assessment of bank exit regimes in New York
(the US), London (UK/EU), Frankfurt (Germany/EU), Helsinki (Finland/EU) and
Tokyo (Japan), the legal frameworks for the bank exit regimes are analysed
below. When analysing bank exit regimes one important question is whether
reorganisation and liquidation of banks is carried out under specific or general
laws. Specific laws are laws applicable to banks only. General laws are laws that
apply to all companies including banks. Specific laws may be better suited to deal
with the specific problems that bank failures represent. On the other hand, one
could question if the differences between banks and other companies are
sufficient to legitimate specific legislation for banks. In this respect, the US bank
exit regime is unique. It is the only regime that provides for specific legislation10
both in the case of bank reorganisation and liquidation. The other extreme is the
UK. General reorganisation and liquidation laws also apply to banks. Germany,
Finland and Japan represent different types of compromise. In Germany,
reorganisation is to a large part regulated in the Banking Law. On the other hand,
the German general Insolvency Law comprises reorganisation means as
alternatives to liquidation. The reorganisation of banks in Finland follows the
general Law concerning the Reorganisation of Companies. Finnish banks are
wound up pursuant to the general Law concerning Limited Liability Companies or
the general Bankruptcy Code. In Japan, reorganisation is regulated both in the
Deposit Insurance Law and general reorganisation laws. General procedures exist
for the liquidation of banks. – Another important question concerns bank exit
practice. Often, national bank exit practices are limited to one or a few of the
avenues that the formal bank exit regimes provide. Sometimes, formal bank
reorganisation or liquidation is not considered to be an alternative. In these cases,
problems are dealt with in a “voluntary” manner beforehand. In the US,
liquidation is actually used as an alternative to reorganisation (at least for other
than large banks). In the UK, problems have usually been dealt with through
mergers and acquisitions. Germany has a history of preventive action, especially
what comes to large banks. In Finland, it does not seem probable that large banks
would be liquidated in a way that severely would harm creditors. The same
principle has been applied to bank failures in Japan.
4
When analysing the legal frameworks for bank reorganisation and liquidation
in each financial centre, the focus is on the following topics. First, legislation
directing bank activities is listed. Second, laws for supervision of banks are
shortly presented. Finally, the regulations concerning bank reorganisation and
liquidation are shortly discussed. – Studying the US banking system more
closely, this system is characterised by three distinct legislative parts, ie federal
legislation, state legislation and legislation relating to certain options. In principle,
federal legislation creates the foundation for national banking. State legislation
represents a high degree of variety and is primarily applied to banking carried out
in a particular state. The options referred to above are regulatory alternatives that
banks may choose from. Being a member of the Federal Reserve System (FRS) or
being insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) specific
legislation will then apply. Federal regulations concerning banks and banking are
included in the US Code title 12 (12 U.S.C.). Title 12 comprises the most
                                                
4 This paper focuses on the various national regulations concerning bank exit only. Still, bank exit
as a phenomenon also actualises a number of related legal topics. Competition law constitutes such
a legal topic. Bank reorganisation in the five financial centres is subject to national competition
legislation. For many (mainly larger) banks in EU-countries, articles 85–86 of the Treaty of Rome
also direct the measures taken. Moreover, an integral part of competition law concerns state aid.
National state aid to banks seldom contradicts with national legislation. In some cases, EU mem-
ber state aid to banks has not been consistent with articles 92–94 of the Treaty of Rome.11
important acts incorporated in a cumulative manner into 49 chapters. Central US
banking acts are – the National Bank Act of 1864, the Federal Reserve Act of
1913, the McFadden Act 1927, the Banking Acts of 1933 and 1935, the Federal
Deposit Insurance Act of 1950, the Bank Holding Company Act 1956 (BHCA),
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 (FDICIA),
the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994 and the
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999.
5
The supervision of US banks is dependent on the applicable legislation and
the options chosen. In case of national banks, the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency (OOC) is in charge of the supervision.
6 If the national bank has been
granted FDIC insurance the FDIC is entitled to certain supervisory action.
7 For
the state banks the supervisory authority is the state banking agency in question.
The FRS supervises state banks that are members of the system.
8 A state bank that
is not a member of the FRS but has been granted FDIC insurance is supervised by
the FDIC.
9 Additionally, the responsibility for controlling bank and financial
holding companies rests with the FRS.
10 To promote consistency in the
examination and supervision of financial institutions the Federal Financial
Institutions Examination Council was established in 1978.
11
The applicable legislation and the chosen options also guide the
reorganisation and liquidation of US banks. To begin with, the 12 U.S.C. chapter
2 regulates the reorganisation and liquidation of national banks. The
reorganisation and liquidation of state banks is regulated by state legislation.
Moreover, if a national or state bank has received FDIC insurance the provisions
concerning reorganisation and liquidation in 12 U.S.C. chapter 16 will apply.
Accordingly, the membership of the FRS for national or state banks actualises the
small number of reorganisation and liquidation provisions of 12 U.S.C. chapter 3.
– In other words, the federal banking legislation provides for an independent and
exclusive scheme for dealing with the reorganisation and liquidation of banks.
The regulations of the US Bankruptcy Code chapter 7 (liquidation) and 11
(reorganisation) do not apply.
12
In the EU, there are several directives and recommendations concerning bank
activities and supervision. The most central directives are the 1
st Banking
                                                
5 Central parts of the 12 U.S.C. consist of chapter 2 “National Banks”, chapter 3 “Federal Reserve
System”, chapter 16 “Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation” and chapter 17 “Bank Holding
Companies”.
6 12 U.S.C. chapter 1 and 2.
7 12 U.S.C. chapter 16.
8 12 U.S.C. chapter 3.
9 12 U.S.C. chapter 16.
10 12 U.S.C. chapter 3 and 17.
11 12 U.S.C. chapter 34.
12 11 U.S.C. s. 109.12
Directive and the 2
nd Banking Directive, both issued by the Council.
13 The 1
st
Banking Directive includes the basic rules for the free establishment of banks and
other financial institutions and the abolition of the barriers to the free supply of
services. The 2
nd Banking Directive aims to harmonise the laws and regulations
concerning the establishment and activities of banks. EU authorities have also
issued directives and recommendations applicable to the liquidation and
reorganisation of banks. The Commission Recommendation concerning Deposit-
Guarantee Schemes and the Parliament and Council Directive concerning Deposit
Insurance Systems deal with depositors in the case of bank failure.
14 The latest
Parliament and Council Directive concerning Reorganisation and Liquidation of
Banks is supposed to be implemented before May 2004.
15 This directive mainly
directs which national reorganisation and liquidation legislation should apply to
banks with activities in several EEA countries.
In 2000 the Financial Services and Market Act (FSMA) was introduced in the
UK, changing the basis for the regulation of financial markets. As a result of the
reform banks became one of several groups of financial institutions regulated by
the same comprehensive legislation. The FSMA replaced the Banking Act of
1987. The primary aim of the Banking Act was to regulate the deposit-taking
business of banks. The FSMA also replaced the Financial Services Act of 1986.
This legislation regulated other types of financial services offered by banks and
other financial institutions. – The Financial Services Authority (FSA) is in charge
of the supervision of UK banks. The supervision of banks is currently regulated in
the FSMA Part I. The Bank of England Act of 1998 transferred the responsibility
for banking supervision from the Bank of England to the FSA. The Securities and
Investment Board was to a large extent responsible for the supervision based on
the former Financial Services Act of 1986.
The  reorganisation and liquidation of UK banks are regulated in the
Insolvency Act of 1986 and the FSMA part XXIV. To the extent that reorganisation
may include business transfers there are special provisions in the FSMA part VII
concerning the control of business transfers. The Companies Act of 1985 also
affects the reorganisation and liquidation of banks. Depositor protection is
regulated in the Financial Services Compensation Scheme (FSCS) issued by the
FSA. Reorganisation and liquidation of banks before the FSMA were based on the
                                                
13 73/183/EEC and 89/646/EEC, respectively.
14 87/63/EEC and 94/19/EEC, respectively.
15 01/24/EEC.13
Insolvency Act of 1986, the Banking Act of 1987 and the Companies Act of
1985.
16
German banks have been regulated by the Banking Act (Kreditwesengesetz,
KWG) since the beginning of the 1960’s. Since then the Banking Act has been
amended six times, mostly as a result of EU directives implemented into the
German jurisdiction. In addition to the Banking Act, most German banks are, as a
result of their activities in the area of investment services, regulated by the
Securities Trading Act (Gesetz uber den Wertpapierhandel, WpHG) of 1994. The
Securities Trading Act replaced a system of self-regulation. – The supervision of
German banks is currently the responsibility of the Financial Supervisory
Authority (FSA) (Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungs aufsicht, BAFin). The
qualities and activities of the FSA are regulated in the Law concerning the
Financial Supervisory Authority (Gesetz über die Bundesanstalt für
Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht, FinDAG) and in the Banking Act part I, division 2.
Before 1.5.2002 banks were supervised by the Federal Banking Supervisory
Office (FBSO) (Bundesaufsichtsamt für das Kreditwesen, BAKred). Supervisory
measures against the banks initiated by the Securities Trading Act were handled
by the Federal Securities Supervisory Office (FSSO) (Bundesaufsichtsamt für den
Wertpapierhandel, BAWe). The role of the German Central Bank (Deutsche
Bundesbank) in the supervisory system is central.
17
The reorganisation and liquidation of German banks are regulated in the
Banking Act part III, division 4 concerning “Measures in special cases”.
Moreover, banks are not excluded from the Insolvency Act (Insolvenzordnung,
InsO) of 1999. The Insolvency Act comprises both reorganisation and liquidation
measures and was preceded by the Bankruptcy Act (Konkursordnung) and the
Composition Act (Vergleichsordnung). The reorganisation and liquidation of
sound banks are regulated in the German company-legislation. Questions relating
to deposit guarantees and investor protection are in turn regulated in the Deposit
Guarantee and Investor Compensation Act (Einlagensicherungs- und
Anlegerentschädigungsgesetz) of 1998. Alongside this legislation the Association
                                                
16 The most important parts of the FSMA comprise provisions on I) The regulator (ie the FSA),
II) Regulated and prohibited activities, III) Authorisation and exemption, IV) Permission to carry
on regulated activities, V)  Performance of regulated activities… VII)  Control of business
transfers… X)  Rules and guidance, XI)  Information gathering and investigations, XII)  Control
over authorised persons… XIV) Disciplinary measures, XV) The financial services compensation
scheme, XVI) The ombudsman scheme… XXII) Auditors and actuaries… and XXIV) Insolvency.
– The FSMA is supplemented by a substantial amount of secondary legislation. The secondary
legislation comprises statutory instruments and regulations issued by authorities.
17 The Banking Act part I, division 2, s. 7.14
of German Banks (Bundesverband Deutscher Banken) administers a more
comprehensive, voluntary deposit protection scheme applicable to its members.
18
Two laws regulate Finnish banks in an institutional sense, the Law
concerning Credit Institutions (1607/1993) and the Law concerning Commercial
Banks (1501/2001). The Law concerning Credit Institutions also applies to other
banks than commercial banks. The former Law concerning Commercial Banks
(1269/1990) was valid until the end of year 2001. The Financial Supervision
Authority (FSA, Rahoitustarkastus) is in charge of the supervision of banks and
FSA activities are regulated in the Law concerning the Financial Supervision
Authority (503/1993). The Ministry of Finance (MoF) handles questions related to
the licensing of banks.
19
Compulsory reorganisation of Finnish banks is regulated in the Law
concerning Reorganisation of Companies (47/1993). The Law concerning
Temporary Suspension of the Activities of a Deposit Bank (1509/2001) directs an
eventual suspension of bank activities. Provisions for voluntary reorganisation,
through mergers etc., are found in the Law concerning Limited Liability
Companies (734/1978). Before 2002, banks were only reorganised on a voluntary
basis. The liquidation of Finnish banks may be actualised pursuant to the Law
concerning Limited Liability Companies (734/1978) and the Bankruptcy Code
(31/1868). The former Law concerning Commercial Banks also established an
additional, separate liquidation procedure for banks. The new Law concerning
Commercial Banks (1501/2001) only comprises complementary provisions on the
reorganisation and liquidation of banks. A Law concerning the Government’s
Guarantee Fund (379/1992) also exists. The fund’s aim is to assist voluntary
guarantee funds and banks in crises.
20
                                                
18 The structure of the German Banking Act distinguishes six different parts of the legislation. Part
I (concerning general provisions) deals with the character of regulated institutions and the
activities of the FSA. Part II concerning provisions for institutions, regulates own funds, liquidity,
lending business, advertising, special duties of institutions and managers and accounting. Part III,
ie provisions on the supervision of institutions, comprises rules on licensing, the protection of
certain designations, information and audits, measures in special cases and enforceability and
sanctions. Parts IV, V and VI focus on cross-border matters, penalties and fines and transitional
questions. The last (6
th) major amendment of the Banking Act was made in 1998.
19 From 2002 onwards, the Finnish jurisdiction also comprises a new Law concerning the
Supervision of Finance and Insurance Conglomerates (44/2002).
20 The Law concerning Credit Institutions includes provisions on eg a)  the establishment and
ownership of a bank, b) bank activities, c) annual reports, more frequent reports and the auditing
of accounts, d) deposit banks, e) voluntary guarantee funds, f) deposit guarantee funds and g) the
solvency of banks. – The structure of the new Law concerning Commercial Banks is the
following. Chapter 2 regulates mergers, chapter 3 covers division and the decrease of share capital,
chapter 4 concerns the transfer of activities, chapter 5 comprises provisions on bank-initiated
withdrawal of the license and chapter 6 directs liquidation and bankruptcy.15
During the 1990’s, the Japanese financial regulatory system has undergone
several major changes as a result of the crises confronting the country’s financial
sector. In principle, the current banking legislation comprises the Banking Law of
1981 and the Long-Term Credit Bank Law of 1952. The Banking Law applies to
“ordinary” banks. As a consequence of the historical separation between short-
and long-term financial institutions long-term credit banks are regulated in their
own law. Moreover, the Commercial Code of 1938 is applicable to both types of
banks. The Securities and Exchange Law regulates certain bank activities. The
Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade (Control) Law restricted foreign exchange
transactions until 1998. Transactions were only possible for and through
authorised banks. – The supervision of Japanese banks is currently handled by the
Financial Services Agency (FSA) pursuant to the Banking Act chapter IV. The
FSA was established in 2000 in order to replace the former Financial Supervisory
Agency. In turn, the Financial Supervisory Agency was a substitute of supervisory
functions of the Ministry of Finance (MoF).
21
There are two legal entities governing the reorganisation and liquidation of
Japanese banks. First, there are specific laws applicable to banks as a category of
financial institutions. Second, there are general laws regulating company
(including bank) reorganisation and liquidation. – The specfic laws concerning the
reorganisation and liquidation of banks cover the Deposit Insurance Law of 1971
and the Banking Law chapter VI. As the problems of the Japanese financial sector
have grown, new legislation has also been implemented alongside the Deposit
Insurance Law and the Banking Law. The Law concerning Special Treatments to
Reorganisation Procedures for Financial Institutions of 1996 increased the
authorities’ powers to manage bank reorganisation. The temporary Financial
Reconstruction Law of 1998 provided special measures for financial institution
(including bank) bankruptcy. The temporary Financial Function Early
Strengthening Law of 1998 introduced emergency measures to re-capitalise
financial institutions. Before the Financial Function Early Strengthening Law
capital injections into banks were possible to a limited extent in accordance with
the Financial Stabilisation Law. In 2001 the temporary laws were incorporated
into the Deposit Insurance Law. The Banking Law chapter V and the Law
concerning Amalgamation and Conversion of Financial Institutions of 1968 also
regulate certain reorganisation measures (ie mergers, transfers and acquisitions of
business) of Japanese banks.
As a consequence of the applicability of the general laws concerning
company rehabilitation and bankruptcy to banks several reorganisation and
liquidation procedures exist for banks. Reorganisation may be carried out
                                                
21 The Bank of Japan is not a supervisory body per se, but it conducts inspections in order to keep
a safe and sound financial system. Today, these inspections are based on the Bank of Japan Law of
1998, but were previously based only on agreements with the banks.16
pursuant to the Corporate Reorganisation Law of 1952 or the Commercial Code
of 1938. Composition as a means to rehabilitate the company activities is
available under the Composition Law of 1922 or as compulsory composition
under the Bankruptcy Law. Liquidation of a bank may follow the Bankruptcy Law
of 1922 or the Commercial Code.
22
2.2 Banking supervision in New York, London, Frankfurt,
Helsinki and Tokyo
23
As previously mentioned the structure for supervising the US banks is
dependent on the applicable legislation and the options chosen (Federal Reserve
System (FRS) membership or Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC)
insurance). As a result, national banks are directed by supervisory action a) based
on  the 12 U.S.C. chapter 2 “national banks”, b) because of FRS membership
through 12 U.S.C. chapter 3 “Federal Reserve System” and c) in case of FDIC
insurance by 12 U.S.C. chapter 16 “Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation”.
While 12 U.S.C. chapter 3 s. 222 states that a national bank automatically is a
FRS member and all significant national banks are FDIC insured, supervisory
accountability for authorities in relation to national banks derive from all three
legislative sources. – Starting with the 12 U.S.C. chapter 2 the powers to
supervise national banks are given to the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency (OCC). According to 12 U.S.C. chapter 3 the supervisory powers of the
FRS against singular national banks are few. Chapter 3 regulations often refer to
or entitle the OCC. Supervisory means deriving from the 12 U.S.C. chapter 16
grant both the OCC and the FDIC certain powers. Usually OCC action is primary
and FDIC action secondary. Supervision of bank (and financial) holding
companies (which are very common) is the responsibility of the FRS.
24 The
supervision covers the bank (and financial) organisation as a whole.
Considering the supervision of US banks both in a judicial sense and in
practice one could say that the emphasis in supervision is on the identification of
potential problem banks. On the other hand, all insured banks are to be frequently
                                                
22 The Japanese Banking Law comprises the following main elements. Chapter I deals with general
provisions, chapter II with the banks’ business and chapter III with accounting principles.
Supervision, mergers, transfers and acquisitions of business and the quitting of business including
the banks’ eventual dissolution are the subjects of chapter IV, V and VI, respectively. Chapter VII
concerns branches of foreign banks and chapters VIII–IX include miscellaneous provisions and
provisions regarding penalties.
23 For global viewpoints on banking supervision since the beginning of the 1990’s see Mayes,
Halme & Liuksila 2001.
24 12 U.S.C. chapter 17.17
inspected. The supervisory authorities are clearly more of controllers than
consultants. To assess the supervision of US banks one could distinguish between
authorities’ channels for receiving information about the banks and methods for
influencing banks. Moreover, as a consequence of the special feature of the
“prompt corrective action” –scheme, this supervisory scheme will receive special
attention below.
When it comes to the channels for the authorities to receive information about
the banks there are two types identified by the US code. Information is received
through reports and inspections. Reports of conditions (RCs) constitute the main
information flow to the OCC on supervisory matters. RCs are collected quarterly
from all banks.
25 Another avenue for receiving information about the banks is the
bank examination. Bank examinations are used to collect on-the-spot information
that will indicate the current financial condition of a bank and its compliance with
applicable laws and regulations. An insured bank should be inspected at least once
during a 12 month-period. Since late 1990s, inspections are risk-focused and
usually limited to the bank’s records. The risk-focused inspections require
examiners to perform a risk assessment first before beginning any on-site
supervisory activities. Federal supervisors review six aspects of a bank’s
operations and condition in their CAMELS-risk rating procedure. These are
capital adequacy, asset quality, management and administrative ability, earnings
level and quality, liquidity level and sensitivity to market risk.
26
Apart from the regulations concerning the information flow to the OCC/FDIC
methods for influencing the banks also constitute a separate group of supervisory
means. In principle these methods do not deviate from international standards and
may be divided into two groups, a) rule-making powers and b) enforcement
actions. General rule-making powers of the OCC stem from the 12 U.S.C. chapter
2 s. 93a and for the FDIC from the 12 U.S.C. chapter 16 s. 1820. According to the
12 U.S.C. chapter 3 the Board of the FRS has the right to issue minor regulations
in specific areas. – The OCC/FDIC can initiate a number of enforcement actions
and penalties to direct banks and their management to correct problems and
prevent further deterioration. As a primary supervisor the OCC has the authority
to pursue enforcement actions. The FDIC has two-dimensional backup
enforcement powers for any insured bank. First, it may recommend that an
institution’s primary supervisor take enforcement steps. Second, the FDIC may
initiate such steps itself, provided that the primary supervisor fails to act and an
emergency situation exists.
27
                                                
25 12 U.S.C. chapter 2, 161–164 and 12 U.S.C. chapter 16 s. 1817a.
26 Examinations of US national banks may be executed on behalf of 12 U.S.C. chapter 3 (the FRS)
ss. 481–486 or chapter 16 (the FDIC) s. 1820. The first provisions recognise special examinations
while the latter provisions deal with both special and regular examinations.
27 12 U.S.C. chapter 16 s. 1818t.18
The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 created
a new supervisory framework linking enforcement actions closely to the level of
capital adequacy.
28 The framework, known as prompt corrective action (PCA),
introduces a timely, detailed and progressive legislative concept for supervisory
action in case of capital declines. PCA standards currently are the primary
regulatory means influencing bank capital levels. In the framework banks are
assigned to five possible capital categories: well capitalised, adequately
capitalised, undercapitalised, significantly undercapitalised and critically
undercapitalised banks. Assignment is based on three capital ratios.
29 The PCA
framework establishes mandatory and discretionary action for the supervisor in
different capital categories. Well and adequately capitalised banks will not be
subject to mandatory action. For undercapitalised and significantly
undercapitalised banks the focus is on submitting and implementing an acceptable
plan to restore capital. Critically undercapitalised banks are those with tangible
equity equal to or less than 2 percent of their total assets. Critically
undercapitalised banks should face receivership within 90 days (unless their
condition improves quickly) and consequently activities that might increase their
risk exposure are restricted or require approval by the authorities.
In the case of the UK, major changes have taken place both in the legal
framework for supervision and in supervisory routines. To begin with, the
responsibility for banking supervision was transferred from the Bank of England
to the FSA in 1998. Before, the Bank of England supervised banks in accordance
with the Bank of England Act of 1946. Furthermore, the Financial Services and
Market Act (FSMA) totally changed the legal base for bank regulation in 2000.
Prior to the FSMA, banks in the UK were regulated by the Banking Act of 1987.
On a general level, the regulatory powers of the FSA have increased relative to
former Bank of England powers. Moreover, the historical and close relation that
existed between the Bank of England and the supervised banks has been cut off.
The new FSA has announced supervision to focus on problem banks.
30
One of the objectives for the supervisory reform was to improve the flexibility
of regulatory action. Legislators stressed the need to anticipate and to adjust to the
rapidly changing nature of the financial services industry. In practise this meant
that the FSMA received the structure of an enabling regulative framework, giving
                                                
28 12 U.S.C. chapter 16 s. 1831o.
29 These are total capital to risk-weighted assets (total risk-based capital ratio), tier 1 capital to
risk-weighted assets (tier 1 risk-based capital ratio) and tier 1 capital to total average assets
(leverage ratio).
30 Preceding the FSMA, some of the banks’ more recently developed activities were regulated in
the Financial Services Act of 1986. The Securities and Investments Board (SIB) was mainly
responsible for the supervision on behalf of the Financial Services Act of 1986.19
the regulator, the FSA, considerable regulative powers to reach its objectives.
31
Measures relating to the regulative function of the FSA in respect of banks are
based on the FSMA part X and the provisions concerning market conduct in the
FSMA s. 64. The regulative powers of the FSA are large in relation to the powers
of supervisory authorities in most European countries. Rules, in the form of issued
statements and codes, and guidance are the primary means to enforce the
regulative function. Rules are usually required to be supported by guidance.
Closely related to the FSA’s regulative function is the authority’s supervisory
function. In turn, the supervisory means do not differ significantly from other
countries. The flow of information concerning banks to the FSA is in theory
fourdimensional. The FSA is entitled to require information, demand specific
reports to be made, appoint investigators and require information from auditors
and actuaries. The systematic flow of information mostly includes data on capital
adequacy, liquidity and large exposures.
32 Mechanisms for steering the banks in
terms of sanctions comprise a) disciplinary measures, in the form of public
censure  and financial penalties, b) the new market abuse scheme, c) notices in the
form of injunctions and restitution, d) withdrawal of authorisation and
cancellation of permission, e) prohibition orders against individuals, f) the
approval procedure for particular arrangements and g) traditional offences.
33
Another area where basic structural differences to other countries are found is
the legal comprehensiveness of the FSMA. The FSMA introduced a single,
coherent regulative system that did not make unnecessary distinctions between
different financial actors. The scope of regulated activities is indicated in general
terms in the FSMA part II s. 22, specified in schedule 2 and supplemented by
secondary legislation. Most of the activities of banks are defined as regulated
activities. Dealing and arranging deals in investments, taking deposits,
safekeeping and administering assets, managing investments, giving investment
advice and establishing investment schemes are classified as regulated activities.
The foundation for the supervision of German banks is fairly
straightforward. Supervision is based on the Law concerning the Financial
Supervisory Authority (Gesetz über die Bundesanstalt für
Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht, FinDAG) and the Banking Act (Kreditwesengesetz,
KWG). From 1.5.2002 the Financial Supervisory Authority (Bundesanstalt für
Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht, BAFin) is in charge of the supervision. Earlier the
Federal Banking Supervisory Office (FBSO) (Bundesaufsichtsamt für das
                                                
31 The objectives comprise a) market confidence, b) public awareness, c) the protection of
consumers and d) the reduction of financial crime. The objectives are listed in the FSMA part I
s. 2.
32 The FSMA part XI s. 165–168 and part XXII s. 342.
33 The FSMA part III s. 33 and part IV s. 45, part V s. 56 and 59, part VIII, part XIV s. 205–206,
part XXVI s. 380 and 382, the FSMA part XXVIII.20
Kreditwesen, BAKred) was in charge of the supervision. The FSA cooperates
closely with the German Central Bank (Deutsche Bundesbank). Much of the
information received by the FSA about the state of banks constitutes reports
transmitted to the Central Bank. Formally, co-operation is put into effect through
the Forum for Financial Market Supervision (Forum fur Finanzmarktaufsicht).
Bank activities in the area of investment services are regulated by the Securities
Trading Act (Gesetz uber den Wertpapierhandel, WpHG) of 1994. In this respect
supervision of banks is handled by the FSA also. Before 1.5.2002 this supervision
was handled by the Federal Securities Supervisory Office (FSSO)
(Bundesaufsichtsamt fur den Wertpapierhandel, BaWe).
The aim of the FSA in terms of the supervision of German banks is
characterised in the Banking Act part I, division 2, s. 6 using a negative
description. Pursuant to these provisions the FSA shall counteract undesirable
developments that may endanger the safety of the assets entrusted to institutions,
impair the proper conduct of banking business or involve serious disadvantages
for the national economy.
34 In sum, the information flow to the FSA relies heavily
on reports. The weight put on reports distinguishes the German supervisory
system from other systems.
35 Moreover, the obligations of the German auditors in
relation to the FSA are quite wide by international standards. The auditor shall eg
examine the financial circumstances of the institution when auditing the accounts
and report on facts that might impair the bank’s development to the authorities.
On site inspections of German banks are rare though legal conditions for
inspections exist. The FSA may also require specified information, carry out
special audits and attend shareholders’ and other meetings at the bank.
36 Another
important source of information, both for the FSA and any bank, is the credit
register concerning loans of EUR 1,5 million or more. These provisions stipulate
that banks must report issued loans in line with the above-mentioned sum to the
Central Bank, which adds the loans for each individual borrower and subsequently
notifies the lenders of the total indebtedness of borrowers and the number of
lenders involved.
37
FSA powers to intervene in bank activities do not deviate from the powers of
corresponding authorities in other countries. The most important ones are listed
below. The FSA may issue instructions to the bank and its managers that are
appropriate and necessary to prevent or overcome undesirable developments. The
                                                
34 The Banking Act part I, division 2, s. 7.
35 The legislation requires monthly reports on own funds, liquidity and returns (the Banking Act
part II, division 1, s. 10–10a, 11 and part II, division 5, s. 25 respectively). Quarterly reports
should be made on loans of or exceeding DEM three million (the Banking Act part II, division 2,
s. 14). The audited accounts of the banks shall be transmitted to the FSA on a yearly basis (the
Banking Act part II, division 5).
36 The Banking Act part II, division 6 and part III, division 3, s. 44.
37 The Banking Act part II, division 2, s. 14.21
Ministry of Finance (MoF) has been given the right to issue regulations
concerning the specification of several topics regulated in the Banking Act. These
include large exposures, reporting and auditing.
38 The Banking Act entitles the
FSA to revoke banks’ licenses on certain grounds and dis-miss managers when
specified conditions are met. Measures taken by the FSA are usually immediately
enforceable despite objections or appeals made. The FSA may also impose
sanctions. Revocation or expiry of the licence entitles the FSA to request
liquidation of the bank.
39
Similarly, in respect of the scope of banking legislation, provisions on
licensing, capital requirements, liquidity and restrictions on activities, it is
difficult to find significant differences between German and international
supervisory standards. As in other countries, Basle recommendations and EU
directives form the regulatory foundation for banking supervision.
In Finland, as a result of the banking crisis in the beginning of the 1990s,
organisational measures were taken in order to promote the efficiency of banking
supervision. The Financial Supervision Authority (FSA) (Rahoitustarkastus, Rata)
was transferred from the MoF to become an independent part of the Bank of
Finland. FSA supervision of Finnish banks is mainly based on the Law
concerning the Financial Supervision Authority (503/1993) and the new Law
concerning the Supervision of Finance and Insurance Conglomerates (44/2002).
The MoF still makes many of the major decisions concerning banking
supervision.
As a consequence of the small number of banks, the strategic choice between
focusing on risky banks or closely keeping track of all banks is not as central as in
countries with many banks. Accordingly, the aims of the Finnish FSA deviate
from those of eg the UK FSA. The Finnish FSA aims towards an insight in all
banks, in spite of recent announcements that lack of resources may direct the
attention only to the larger ones. The emphasis in Finnish banking supervision
may best be described as varied. The focus in banking supervision will be on the
topics that the FSA considers most relevant at that time. The small number of
supervised banks also creates conditions for close relations between the
supervisors and the supervised. In theory, this may lead to a situation where the
supervisor will become more of a consultant than a controller. On the other hand,
Finnish banks have been very likely to act in accordance with directives given.
                                                
38 The Banking Act part I, division 2, s. 6, part II, division 2, s. 22, division 5, s. 24 and division 6,
s. 29.
39 The provisions also define other, more neutral grounds for measures against the banks. In certain
situations the FSA may prohibit banks’ acquisitions of shares of non-financial companies or the
use of voting rights in relation to these shares. In case of inadequate own funds, liquidity and
insolvency or dangers for creditors, entrusted assets and the national economy several severe
means may be applied.22
The Law concerning the Financial Supervision Authority (503/1993) provides
the FSA with control measures that in a general sense correspond to international
standards. The formal means for receiving information about the banks comprise
four channels according to the law. The FSA has the right to attend and convene
banks’ administrative meetings, carry out inspections and access data. Auditors
are obliged to inform the authority about specific events and the authority may
require a special audit to take place.
40 Most provisions on continuous reporting (ie
capital adequacy, liquidity etc.) to the FSA are included in the Law concerning
Credit Institutions (1607/1993). Practices for receiving information comprise both
reports and frequent inspections. The formal avenues for influencing banks’
behaviour are several. Still, the FSA has no general regulatory powers. The FSA
has the right to recommend change or withdrawal of the banking licence (to the
MoF). There is the possibility for the supervisor to hinder the implementation of
decisions, to issue auditing instructions and induce restrictions on the use of
profits. The FSA is also entitled to authorise an agent to control the operation of
the bank and prohibit or restrict the collection of deposits.
41 Furthermore,
provisions for the establishment and ownership of a bank and the activities of a
bank are quite similar in comparison with other countries.
In identifying the main features of the supervision of Japanese banks that
distinguish it from its US and European counterparts there are several paths to
follow. The legal base for Japanese banking supervision is the Japanese Banking
Law of 1981 chapter IV. The Financial Services Agency (FSA) is responsible for
the supervision since 2000. Its predecessor was the Financial Supervisory Agency.
In 1998 it replaced the Ministry of Finance (MoF) as a banking supervisor. –
Analysing the strategy for FSA supervision, supervision may best be undertaken
by concentrating on actual aims of authority action. In practice, the changes to
FSA supervision have been thorough. The period until 1996 was characterised by
what was known as the “convoy” style of banking administration, ie an integrated
supervision policy. During this period the Japanese MoF was in charge of the
supervision. The MoF collaborated closely with the banks and other financial
institutions and exercised moral persuasion to ensure compliance with policy
guidelines. The role of the MoF was mere the role of a consultant than that of a
controller. There was no explicit legislation concerning supervisory practices and
no history of law enforcement. The starting point for a new supervisory era was a
statement made by the MoF in 1996 on measures to improve banking supervision
as a result of the Jusen crises. The MoF’s relation to the supervised banks was
                                                
40 The Law concerning the Financial Supervision Authority 10–12§§.
41 The Law concerning the Financial Supervision Authority 13–16§§.23
modified. The MoF and its successors had to meet demands for authority
integrity.
42
Another area of interest when describing supervision is the character of FSA
data collection. With regard to the formal reporting requirements and factual
bank reports aimed at collecting information before 1996 there was no significant
difference to means used in the US and many European countries.
43 The
legislative base for banks’ reports consisted of the Banking Law chapter IV s. 24.
The formal reporting requirements and actual bank reporting situation has only
partly changed since 1996. In 1998 a “prompt corrective action” scheme (PCA)
was introduced to improve identification and monitoring of failing banks.
Accordingly, the informational measures have been shaped to improve the
identification of variation in capital adequacy. MoF and FSA inspections are
another central device aimed at receiving information about banks.
44 As a
consequence of the new emphasis in supervision after 1996 inspections have
concentrated on the internal control structures and functions and to a lesser degree
on pure asset value. Originally, the MoF aimed to inspect major banks every three
to four years, with smaller banks being inspected every two years. Since 1998 its
successors’ aim is to inspect problem banks every 12 to 18 months. During the
last years, inspections have been pre-announced. An additional, related topic is the
role of the auditors. Ambitions to use external audit to a greater extent in
MoF/FSA assessment of bank status derive from the statement made by the MoF
in 1996. The increasing interest in external audit results from the shift in FSA
supervision from the examination of loan books to validation of banks’ self-
assessments. For the external audit to fulfil its aims the auditing should meet
several requirements. The decision taken in 1997 (revoked in 2001) to allow
banks to choose between acquisition cost or market value when valuing
investment securities did not promote the quality of external audit.
The formal measures to monitor banks in Japan do not significantly differ
from other jurisdictions. The Japanese Banking Law chapter IV ss. 26–29 lists the
variety of authority measures. First, the FSA is entitled to request a plan for
improvement to secure healthy operations for the bank, and to order revisions of
the plan. Second, the FSA may on a temporary base, suspend a bank’s business
partly or totally, order a bank to deposit its assets and order such other supervisory
                                                
42 The formal aims of regulation and supervision have not changed since the beginning of the
1990’s. The Banking Law chapter I s. 1 states that. “The law shall have as its objective… together
with the maintaining of trustworthiness and the securing of the protection of depositors… the
smooth facilitation of finance… via the fixing of healthy and appropriate operations in the banking
business and thus the promotion of the healthy development of the national economy.”
43 Measures were applied and reports made in order to assess capital adequacy (the Banking Law
chapter II s. 14–2), liquidity, loan exposures, licenses (the Banking Law chapter I s. 4) and deposit
insurance fees.
44 The Banking Law chapter IV s. 25.24
measures that it finds necessary.(!) Third, directors and auditors may also be
ordered to resign and the bank’s licence may be recalled on certain grounds.
Fourth, a special means may be applied to protect the interest of depositors or the
public interest, ie the ordering of a bank to hold its assets in Japan. Additionally,
penalties in the form of penal servitudes, penal fines or non-penal fines may be
linked to the above-mentioned orders. – The introduction of the PCA-scheme in
1998 was by far the most important single factor concerning supervisory
procedures against banks for a long time. It was also a cornerstone in the sense
that it constituted an objective scheme for action that did not take into account
other than certain specified quantitative data. For the FSA it was not only an
entitling scheme but also an obligating one.
45
3 The banks’ creditors and bank exit in the US,
UK, Germany, Finland and Japan
3.1 Bank reorganisation and liquidation in the US
46
The US bank exit regime is unique in many senses. General insolvency laws do
not apply. Both the initiative for starting the proceedings as well as the
administration of the insolvency procedures rest entirely with the supervisory
authorities. Two proceedings exist, ie conservatorship and receivership.
Conservatorship corresponds to reorganisation and receivership to liquidation.
The conservator’s goal is to reorganise the bank while securing its “going-
concern” value. The receiver’s aim is to maximise the return of realised assets
and minimise any loss to the Deposit Insurance Fund. The procedures are quite
similar – the only thing distinguishing them is the fact that receivership enables
liquidation. In practice, conservatorship is rarely used. Organisationally, the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) handles the reorganisation and
liquidation of US national deposit banks.
                                                
45 The Banking Law chapter IV article 26. Benchmarks for action comprised both BIS standards
on capital adequacy as well as national Japanese standards. Levels generating supervisory action
include the situation when a bank’s capital adequacy ratio falls below eight percent (BIS standard,
or four percent national standard), four percent (two percent) and zero percent. Suspension of
operations is required when the capital adequacy level reaches zero. Ratings are not public. –
Other supervision related factors that may be relevant to bank stakeholders are the restrictions on
bank activities in the Banking Law chapter II. Though several risk-motivated restrictions have
existed for banks to engage in ancillary business most of the restrictions have been abolished.
46 This study concentrates on federal US legislation, ie legislation applicable to US national
(federal) and (deposit) insured banks. Though state banks primarily are regulated by state
legislation most of the legislation presented here invariably applies when insured state banks face
reorganisation or liquidation.25
The legislation concerning the reorganisation and liquidation of US national banks
identifies two formal procedures, one relating to the reorganisation and the other
connected to the liquidation of a bank. Reorganisation of a bank is executed
through conservatorship, a procedural means originally created during the Great
Depression by the Emergency Act of 1933.
47 Liquidation of a national bank is
carried out through receivership.
48 In the US, the initiative for both commencing
insolvency proceedings and the administration of the insolvency rests with the
banking supervisory authorities. If not satisfied with the actions taken by the
authorities creditors may, on certain narrow grounds, appeal to the court.
49
Conservatorship as a procedure may be described by referring to the 12
U.S.C. chapter 16 s. 1821d. According to these regulations a conservator
appointed by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) may a) take
over the assets of and operate the insured bank with all the powers of the
shareholders and the directors, b)  collect all obligations and money due to the
bank, c) perform all functions of the bank in the name of the bank and d) preserve
and conserve the assets of the bank. The above-mentioned measures are taken in
order to put the insured bank in a sound and solvent condition.
50 – Criteria for the
appointment of a conservator are several and quite varied. Grounds for
appointment may be characterised as status-related, environmental, violations-
oriented and consensual. Status-related grounds comprise capital adequacy
(insufficient assets, losses and under-capitalisation), liquidity (inability to meet
obligations) and cessation of insured status. Environmental aspects consist of
unsafe or unsound conditions to transact business. Violations-oriented criteria for
appointment include violations of cease and desist-orders or legislation, money
laundering offences and concealment. Consensual grounds refer to the consent of
the bank’s board of directors or its shareholders in appointing a conservator.
51 In
practice, the “Prompt Corrective Action” (PCA) scheme and the CAMELS-risk
classification system are linked to the commencement of conservator- and
receivership. Critically undercapitalised banks must be placed under
conservatorship or receivership within 90 days unless the FDIC concur that other
action would better achieve the purposes of PCA. A ratio of tangible equity to
                                                
47 12 U.S.C. chapter 2 ss. 201–213 and chapter 16 s. 1821.
48 12 U.S.C. chapter 2 ss. 191–200 and chapter 16 s. 1822.
49 For additional analyses of the US bank exit regime see Spong 2000 p. 138ff, Hüpkes 2000 p.
64ff and Macey, Miller & Carnell 2001 chapter 10.
50 Secured creditors are protected as a result of the fact that security interests in the assets of the
problem bank should be respected by the conservator/receiver pursuant to 12 U.S.C. chapter 16 s.
1821e. Only under extreme conditions secured creditors are not protected.
51 The criteria are listed in the 12 U.S.C. chapter 16 s. 1821c and chapter 2 s. 203.26
total assets equal or less than two percent constitutes the limit when defining
critically undercapitalised banks.
52
Procedurally, the conservator is appointed by the OCC.
53 Exclusively, the
conservator appointed has been the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(FDIC). In case of under-capitalisation, the OCC should not appoint a conservator
without giving the FDIC the opportunity to appoint a receiver.
54 Moreover, the
FDIC may appoint itself as conservator on certain grounds specified in 12 U.S.C.
chapter 16 s. 1821c. After consultation with the OCC the FDIC may appoint itself
as conservator if this reduces the risk for losses for the Deposit Insurance Fund.
The FDIC should also consider providing the bank direct financial assistance
before the appointment of a conservator.
55 Not later than 20 days after the initial
appointment of a conservator the bank (not the creditors) is entitled to appeal to
the court for an order requiring the OCC to terminate the appointment. The OCC’s
decision to appoint a conservator will be set aside only if the court finds that the
decision was arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with the law.
56
The powers and duties of the FDIC as conservator are regulated in the 12
U.S.C. chapter 16 s. 1821d and s. 1823. First, the FDIC has administering powers
to carry out the activities of and represent the insured bank. Second, the FDIC has
contractual and supportive powers to make agreements with the insured bank, eg
buying assets or taking over liabilities from the bank. – The regulations
concerning the administering powers deal with both more general capacities and
more specified ones. While the general ones were considered above the most
important specific ones relate to the FDIC’s right to merge the insured bank or
transfer any asset or liability of the bank to third parties. Relating to the
administering powers the FDIC as conservator also has the power to request a
stay, ie suspension, of legal action against the bank, at the proper court. The stay
should not exceed 45 days. – The FDIC’s contractual and supportive powers in
relation to the insured bank mainly stem from 12 U.S.C. chapter 16 s. 1823. The
FDIC is authorised to make loans to, make deposits in, purchase the assets or
securities of, assume the liabilities of or make contributions to insured banks to
restore the bank to normal operation or to lessen the risk for the FDIC in case of
systemic instability. In order to facilitate a) a merger or consolidation with another
bank, b) the sale of any or all of the assets of an insured bank to another bank,
c) the assumption of any or all of a bank’s liabilities by another bank or d) the
                                                
52 12 U.S.C. chapter 16 s. 1831o.
53 12 U.S.C. chapter 2 s. 203.
54 12 U.S.C chapter 16 s. 1821c.
55 12 U.S.C. chapter 16 s. 1823c. These options should be separated from the lender of last resort
channel (LLR) available for member banks of the Federal Reserve System (FRS).
56 12 U.S.C. chapter 2 s. 203.27
acquisition of the stock of a bank by another bank the FDIC may in turn purchase
such assets of, assume such liabilities of, make loans to, make contributions to,
make deposits in, purchase securities of or issue guarantees to such another bank.
The FDIC may also provide any other person than a bank acquiring control of,
merging with, consolidating with or acquiring the assets of an insured bank with
such financial assistance as it could provide the insured bank itself. Additionally,
there are several provisions regulating FDIC powers relating to contracts entered
into before the conservatorship (12 U.S.C. chapter 16 s. 1821e).
57
The powers and duties of the FDIC as conservator are restricted in two
significant ways. The regulations concerning the FDIC’s disposition of assets
require the FDIC to take certain factors into account when selling or disposing
assets. The FDIC shall conduct its operations in a manner which a) maximises the
NPV return from the sale or disposition, b)  minimises the amount of any loss
realised in the resolution of cases, c) ensures adequate competition and fair and
consistent treatment of offerors, d)  prohibits discrimination and e)  to certain
extent promotes the situation for low and moderate income individuals. Before
taking any measures as conservator, the FDIC should carry out a number of
impact assessments. Considerations of local economic impact, actions to alleviate
adverse economic impact and analysis of impact on the financial services industry
are all required before measures are taken. – The grounds for reviewing decisions
made by the FDIC are also of interest to creditors. Judicial review of agency
decisions is available under the Administrative Procedure Act except in cases
where statutes preclude judicial review or agency action is committed to agency
discretion by law.
58 The Administrative Procedure Act directs the reviewing court
to set aside agency actions, findings and conclusions that are a)  arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with law,
b) contrary to constitutional right, power privilege or immunity, c) in excess of
statutory jurisdiction, authority or limitations or short of statutory right, d) without
observance of procedure required by law, e) unsupported by substantial evidence
or f) unwarranted by the facts to the extent that the facts are subject to trial de
novo by the reviewing court.
59
Conservatorship is a means to introduce a period during which the problems
of the bank should be sorted out. In principle, there are no restrictions on the
maximum length of conservatorship. Regulations state that in the termination of
conservatorship two aspects should be considered.
60 According to these
                                                
57 FDIC funds are primarily used to pay off depositors. Direct FDIC support (ie financial
assistance) to insured banks has usually taken the form of debt or subordinated debt. Though the
provisions enable the FDIC to provide support in the form of contributions to banks such an
alternative would not emphasise bank shareholder responsibility.
58 5 U.S.C. chapter 7 s. 701a.
59 5 U.S.C. chapter 7 s. 706.
60 12 U.S.C. chapter 2 s. 205.28
provisions termination is possible when this is in the interest of the public and it
safely can be done. The OCC decides on the termination of conservatorship. The
OCC may a)  terminate the conservatorship and permit the involved bank to
resume the transaction of its business, subject to such terms and limitations that
the OCC may prescribe, b)  terminate the conservatorship upon a sale, merger,
consolidation, purchase and assumption, change in control or voluntary
dissolution or c) terminate the conservatorship upon the appointment of a receiver.
The bank is entitled to bring an action in the proper court for an order requiring
the OCC to cancel its terms and limitations on the continuance of the bank’s
activities.
61
The procedure more often used to deal with the problems of US banks is
receivership. Contrary to conservatorship, receivership comprises an element of
finality, ie compulsory liquidation. In many other senses the powers of the
receiver are quite similar to the powers of the conservator. Restricting the analysis
to the general powers of a receiver, ie powers to act as a successor to the bank (eg
take over the rights of shareholders) and powers to operate the bank, the
differences in relation to the conservator are few. In addition to these powers the
receiver “may place the bank in liquidation and proceed to realise upon the assets
of the bank, having due regard to the conditions of credit in the locality”.
62 – The
criteria for the appointment of a receiver are the same that are listed above for the
appointment of a conservator.
63 As a supplement, a receiver may be appointed if
shareholders do not pay any deficiency in capital within three months of
notification by the OCC or if the bank’s board of directors consists of fewer than
5 members.
64 – The procedure for appointing the receiver differs to some extent
from the appointment of the conservator. As for the conservator the OCC is
entitled (but not obliged) to appoint the receiver when criteria are met. If the
national bank is an (deposit) insured bank the FDIC must be appointed receiver.
In this sense significant differences prevail in relation to the appointment of a
conservator. The FDIC may appoint itself receiver under the condition that the
appointment will reduce the risk for losses for the Deposit Insurance Fund.
65 The
FDIC should also, as a more inexpensive alternative, consider providing the bank
direct financial assistance before the appointment of a receiver.
66
                                                
61 The final stage of the conservatorship is the distribution of proceeds to depositors, creditors and
shareholders stemming from the sale, merger, consolidation, purchase and assumption, change in
control, voluntary dissolution or liquidation of the bank. The conservator shall deposit the
proceeds, less any outstanding expenses of conservatorship, in the proper court and cause notice to
the above-mentioned parties. The court shall distribute the funds equitably.
62 12 U.S.C. chapter 16 s. 1821d.
63 12 U.S.C. chapter 16 s. 1821c, see also 1831o.
64 12 U.S.C. chapter 2 s. 55 and 12 U.S.C. chapter 2 s. 191 respectively.
65 12 U.S.C. chapter 16 s. 1821c.
66 12 U.S.C chapter 16 s. 1823c.29
As mentioned, most of the powers and duties of the receiver resemble those
of the conservator. The powers and duties of the receiver are regulated in the 12
U.S.C. chapter 16 ss. 1821d-w, 1822, 1823 and chapter 2 ss. 197–198. The most
significant differences in relation to the conservator’s powers and duties are the
following. – The receivership of an insured bank often involves the organisation
of either a “new bank” or a “bridge bank”.
67 Establishing a new bank may be done
if it is advisable and in the interest of the depositors or the public. In case a new
bank is established it should assume the insured deposits of the bank in default
and otherwise perform those temporary functions provided in law. Unless the
stock of the new bank is sold to or its assets taken over and liabilities assumed by
another bank, the FDIC should wind up the new bank within two years after the
date of its organisation. – The purpose of a bridge bank is less formal and
detailed. The establishment of a bridge bank is based solely on the FDIC’s
discretion and usually bridge banks are founded in order to take over the
operations of a failed bank and preserve its “going-concern” value while the FDIC
seeks to arrange a permanent resolution of the bank failure. Bridge banks are
national banks and should be chartered by the OCC. Bridge banks shall terminate
upon merger, consolidation or sale of the bank or the assumption of certain of its
assets. If such measures are not taken the status of a bridge bank shall terminate at
the end of the two-year period following the date it was granted a charter. The
FDIC may extend the status of the bridge bank for three additional one-year
periods. – In case of receivership the receiver may request a suspension of legal
action against the bank for a maximum of 90 days, ie twice the time compared to
conservatorship. The proper court will grant the suspension.
68
A separate regulative entity relating to the receivership is the regulations
concerning the determination and payment of claims.
69 In general, the FDIC may,
as receiver, determine the claims held by creditors and corresponding parties
against the insured bank (determination authority). The FDIC may also prescribe
regulations regarding the allowance or disallowance of claims, the providing for
administrative determination of claims and the review of such determination
(rulemaking authority). There are two types of procedures for the determination of
claims. In both cases the receiver is obliged to notify the claimants about the
forthcoming liquidation. In turn, the claimants shall provide the receiver
information about the claims and proof hereabout. According to the main
procedure the FDIC shall, in 180 days from receiving information and proof,
determine whether to allow or disallow the claim and notify the claimant of the
determination. The applicability of the expedited procedure for the determination
of claims is quite narrow. Expedited determination is possible for claimants who
                                                
67 12 U.S.C. chapter 16 s. 1821m and 1821n, respectively.
68 12 U.S.C. chapter 16 s. 1821d.
69 12 U.S.C. chapter 16 s. 1821d.30
a)  allege the existence of legally valid and enforceable or perfected security
interests in assets of the insured bank and b) allege that irreparable injury will
occur if the routine claims procedure is followed. The time limit for determination
of claims and notification using the expedited procedure is 90 days.
70
One aspect significant to US bank creditors is the fact that banks may receive
direct financial assistance from the FDIC. This assistance is usually in the form
of debt or subordinated debt. Restrictions oblige the FDIC to choose the least-
cost alternative (eg paying off depositors rather than giving financial assistance
to banks) when faced with bank problems. – Bank creditors are not entitled to
initiate or influence bank reorganisation in any way. Reorganisation may not be
used to cut creditor claims while improving shareholder position. – The
supervision of banks is based on the “prompt corrective action” (PCA) scheme
and the CAMELS risk-classification system with yearly onsite inspections.
          Creditors have no right to initiate bankruptcy or liquidation. – Critically
undercapitalised banks should face receivership (or conservatorship). A ratio of
tangible equity to total assets equal or less than two percent constitutes the limit.
     Depositors’ claims are in priority in relation to other creditors. As a result of
the subrogation of depositor rights in the case of depositor pay-off, FDIC claims
are also in priority. – The FDIC should protect the “going-concern“ value of the
bank. Several judicial concepts aiming to secure the “going-concern” value of
the bank exist.
Finally, a few words may be said about the restrictions on the receiver’s powers
and duties, judicial review of the FDIC’s decisions and actions and the eventual
resumption of the closed bank. What comes to the restrictions on the receiver’s
powers and duties the restrictions are the same as in the case of conservatorship.
The FDIC should among other things maximise the NPV return and minimise the
costs when administering the assets and liabilities. Moreover, the FDIC should
carry out a number of impact assessments in connection with its decisions and
actions.
71 Judicial review of the FDIC decisions and actions may be characterised
as two-dimensional. First, a court may, as mentioned above, review FDIC
decisions and actions on grounds specified in 5 U.S.C. chapter 7 s. 706. Second,
relating to the determination of claims, the FDIC is obliged to introduce internal
procedures for administrative review of the determination.
72 The US legislation
                                                
70 The receiver handles the payment of claims in accordance with traditional priority principles.
The order of priority for non-secured claims comprises a) administrative expenses of the receiver,
b) any deposit liability of the institution, c) any other general or senior liability of the institution,
d)  any obligation subordinated to depositors or general creditors and e)  any obligation to
shareholders.
71 12 U.S.C. chapter 16 s. 1821d.
72 12 U.S.C. chapter 16 s. 1821d.31
also recognises a procedure for the resumption of the business of a closed bank.
The OCC may, when certain conditions are met, permit a bank in receivership to
resume business. The permission requires that the resumption a)  is to the
advantage of the depositors and unsecured creditors and b)  75 percent of
unsecured depositors and creditors consent to such a retention of liabilities.
73
3.2 Bank creditors and the administration of problem
banks in the EU
In the EU, recommendations and directives with consequences for the
reorganisation and liquidation of banks have been issued. In part,
recommendations and directives focusing on bank exit have concerned depositors.
On the other hand, the recent Parliament and Ministry Council Directive
concerning the Reorganisation and Liquidation of Credit Institutions (Deposit
Banks) (2001/24/EEC) affects all bank stakeholders.
74 The directive does not
create a uniform procedure for bank exit. The directive mainly regulates which
national jurisdiction should apply to the reorganisation and liquidation of
member-state banks with activities in several member-states. Similarly, the
directive regulates which jurisdiction should apply to foreign problem banks with
activities in one or more member-states. In addition, the directive sets out certain
minimum requirements for national legislation and lines to deal with the practical
matters generated. The rule states that for member-state banks, the legislation of
the bank’s home country should apply to the bank as a whole. For foreign banks,
the rules state that the authorities starting the reorganisation or liquidation
procedure against the foreign bank should inform and co-operate with the
authorities of other EEA-countries. The directive should be implemented before
May 2004.
75
3.2.1 London-based banks’ creditors and UK laws on bank exit
The reorganisation and liquidation regulations applicable to UK companies in
general represent several procedural alternatives. Winding ups, administration
orders, arrangements and receiverships etc. all reflect different ways to
rehabilitate or cease company activities. The regulations concerning companies
overall also apply to banks. In the judicial debate, there have been few motives for
                                                
73 12 U.S.C. chapter 2 s. 197a.
74 In the EU, the Brouwer-report 2000 concerning financial stability also pointed out the
importance of functional bank exit regimes.
75 For a 1999 review of EU (federal) rules concerning bank insolvency see Clarotti 1999.32
deviating from general procedures when confronted with the reorganisation and
liquidation of UK banks.
76 – In order to transmit a picture of UK reorganisation
and liquidation alternatives for banks there are many ways to proceed. In this
section 3.2.1, the analysis is restricted to the procedures regulated in the
Insolvency Act (and related provisions in the Financial Services and Markets Act
(FSMA) 2000 and the former Banking Act 1987). The Insolvency Act is the
legislative source that most strongly affects bank creditors. Certain reorganisation
and liquidation measures are regulated in the Companies Act and are covered in
section 5.2.1. These measures also have implications for bank creditors. The
reorganisation and liquidation measures defined in the Insolvency Act comprise
”the proposal”, voluntary winding up, compulsory liquidation, the receiverships
and the administration order.
77
The UK bank exit regime is characterised by two main features. First, bank
reorganisation and liquidation follows the general procedures applicable to all
limited liability companies facing financial problems. Second, both
reorganisation and liquidation proceedings are court-based, not FSA-
administered. In theory, a number of alternatives to handle problem banks exist.
The Insolvency Act comprises reorganisation measures in the form of “the
proposal” and the administration order. The law also establishes procedures for
both voluntary and compulsory liquidation. Certain reorganisation means are
included in the Companies Act (but no reorganisation or bankruptcy regime
specific to banks exists.) In practice, problem banks have been dealt with using
the administration order, creating a moratorium against legal action. During this
period, eg sales of the banks’ businesses have been negotiated and a solution
presented to the market. The fact that the procedure is court-based, ie slow, has
resulted in judges cutting corners to secure the “going-concern” value of the
banks’ assets and eliminate systemic conse-quences.
Following this categorisation, the proposal is a reorganisation measure by which
creditors may be bound by the decision of the creditors’ meeting even without
their consent. The aim of the measure is the composition of the bank’s debts or the
arrangement of its affairs.
78 – The initiative for the proposal is the directors’. The
                                                
76 The UK insolvency regime is systematically covered in Wadsley & Penn 2000 chapters 23–24,
in the UK Insolvency Overview / Global Insolvency Law Database at www.worldbank.org/legal
and in Phillips and Tamlyn in Oditah (ed.) 1996.
77 The administration order is the most frequently used means to handle UK bank failures. The
functionality of the order as a reorganisation measure was eg shown in the case of Barings Bank. –
“Administration also proved its worth in the rescue of Barings Bank. When attempts by the Bank
of England to organise a voluntary rescue of the bank failed, it was placed under administration.”
(Hüpkes 2000, p. 77).
78 The proposal is regulated by the Insolvency Act part I and the FSMA part XXIV s. 356.33
creditors are not entitled to initiate a proposal. The procedure starts with an
insolvency practitioner reporting to the court about the forthcoming creditors’
meeting. Every known creditor should be summoned to the meeting. The meeting
should decide on the directors’ proposal. No secured creditor or holder of
preferential debt may be harmed by the proposal. The decision should be reported
to the court and the creditors affected. A creditor may challenge the decision made
by the meeting on two grounds. If the decision unfairly prejudices the interests of
the creditor or there has been some material irregularity in relation to the meetings
an application to the court may be made. The court may revoke or suspend the
proposal or give direction to consider any revised proposal.
79 – In the FSMA the
Financial Services Authority (FSA) is given the right to participate in the
proceedings concerning the proposal. More specifically, the FSA may make an
application to the court concerning the proposal and may also attend any hearing
held by the court relating to an application.
80
The liquidation (winding up) of a UK commercial bank may be carried out in
two ways. First, the bank may be wound up voluntarily and second, the court may
wind up the bank. The latter case is known as compulsory liquidation. Voluntary
winding up consists of two main alternatives. There is the creditors’ winding up
and the members’ winding up. – Regulations concerning the creditors’ winding up
comprise the Insolvency Act part IV mainly chapter II and IV and the FSMA part
XXIV s. 365.
81 The creditors’ winding up starts with a resolution passed by the
bank at a general meeting. The winding up is deemed to commence at the time of
the passing of the resolution. Within 14 days of the resolution a meeting of the
bank’s creditors should be summoned. The directors are obliged to lay a statement
of affairs including the balance sheet data in specified form before the creditors at
the creditors’ meeting. The creditors and the bank’s general meeting may appoint
a liquidator for the purpose of winding up the bank’s affairs and distribute its
assets. Similarly, the creditors may nominate a liquidation committee to supervise
the liquidation. On the appointment of a liquidator the directors’ powers cease. An
account of the liquidation should be presented to the creditors’ final meeting prior
to the dissolution of the bank.
82 – The FSA is entitled to refer any question arising
in the winding up of a bank to the court. The court may entitle the FSA to exercise
the powers of the court in respect of the voluntary winding up. Moreover, a person
appointed by the FSA is entitled to attend any meeting of the bank’s creditors.
83
                                                
79 The Insolvency Act part I ss. 2, 3, 4 and 6.
80 The FSMA part XXIV s. 356. – In the case of “the proposal” the former Banking Act gave the
Bank of England fewer powers. At that time, the Bank of England was not entitled to make any
applications to the court or attend any hearings organised by the court.
81 The members’ winding up is covered in section 5.2.1 concerning UK bank shareholders.
82 The Insolvency Act part IV chapter II ss. 84–87, chapter IV ss. 98–101, 103, 106 and 165–166.
83 The FSMA part XXIV s. 365 and the Insolvency Act part IV chapter V s. 112. – Under the
former Banking Act, the Bank of England had no powers relative to the voluntary winding up.34
As mentioned above, compulsory liquidation means that the court winds up
the bank. One of the main types of compulsory liquidation is bankruptcy, ie
compulsory liquidation on financial grounds (usually initiated by creditors).
Regulations concerning compulsory liquidation comprise the Insolvency Act part
IV chapter VI and the FSMA part XXIV ss. 367–371. The starting point for the
compulsory winding up is the petition to the court. Petitions may be made on
several grounds, the most important being a) the bank’s inability to pay its debts
and b) the court being of the opinion that its just and equitable that the bank
should be wound up.
84 An application for winding up may be presented by the
company, the directors, a creditor or contributory. The Secretary of State may in
specific cases present a petition for the winding up of the bank on grounds of
public interest. At the hearing of the petition the court may make a winding up
order or any order it thinks fit. In reaching its decision the court may regard the
wishes of the creditors and contributories. The court also has the power to appoint
a provisional liquidator to prevent the assets being dissipated or to protect a public
interest. In compulsory winding ups the commencement of winding up is the time
of the presentation of the petition. After the commencement the business ceases,
except to the extent required by the winding up of the bank. The official receiver
is ex officio liquidator until the liquidator has been nominated. The liquidator may
be nominated by the Secretary of State on the initiative of the official receiver or
by the creditors’ and contributories’ meeting. The liquidator has wide powers.
During the liquidation the court is entitled to make an order staying or sisting the
proceedings on the initiative of a creditor or any other part.
85 – According to the
FSMA part XXIV ss. 367–371 the FSA has a number of powers relating to the
compulsory winding up of a bank. First, the FSA may present a petition to the
court for the winding up of a bank. The court may wind up the bank on the above-
mentioned two grounds. Second, the FSA has the right to be heard at a hearing of
the petition or any other court hearing. Finally, a person appointed for the purpose
by the FSA is entitled to attend any meeting of creditors or any meeting of a
committee established relating to the liquidation of the bank.
86
Other means applicable to problem banks comprise the receiverships and the
administration order. – The receiverships constitute a right for a secured creditor
to enter the bank, realise assets that form the security and pay off the debt. In
practice, this is done by the appointment of a receiver or an administrative
receiver. The regulative base for the receiverships is the Insolvency Act part III
                                                
84 The Insolvency Act part IV chapter VI s. 122.
85 The Insolvency Act part IV chapter VI ss. 124–125, 129, 135, 137–139, 143, 147, 167 and
chapter VIII s. 195.
86 Formerly, the Banking Act 1987 part VI s. 92 laid the foundation for the Bank of England’s (ie
FSA’s predecessor’s) powers to issue a petition to wind up the bank. The rights of the Bank of
England in compulsory winding ups of banks did not differ significantly from the current FSA
rights.35
and the FSMA part XXIV ss. 363–364. The laws acknowledge the receivership as
an instrument relating to the reorganisation of a company but the rights of the
creditor (and the receiver) are to a large extent contractual. The less regulated of
the two receiverships is the simple receivership. The administrative receivership
gives the administrative receiver such powers that a clearer legislative foundation
is needed.
87 UK banks use simple receiverships more often than administrative
ones. – The receiver or administrative receiver is nominated by the creditor or by
the court.
88 The terms of the debt usually include the criteria for the appointment
of the receivers. To receive the right to appoint an administrative receiver the
security of the creditor should cover most of the bank’s functions. The wider
powers of the administrative receiver comprise both a)  powers to manage and
realise the security and b) powers to run the bank’s business. An administrative
receiver’s powers to manage the bank cease on liquidation. The powers relating
more directly to the secured assets are unaffected by the winding up.
89 –
According to the FSMA part XXIV concerning liquidation the FSA has few
powers to affect the activities of the receiver. The most explicit right of the FSA is
the right to be heard when the receiver eventually applies to the court for
directions.
90 An administrative receiver running the bank is directed by the
regulations concerning any person running a bank.
91
The last of the measures listed in the Insolvency Act a) that a creditor may use
to protect his investment or b)  that may affect bank creditors is the
administration order. The administration order is the most frequently used
reorganisation measure to handle problem banks. The administration order is
designed to help in rescuing ailing companies by giving a breathing space. The
breathing space may be used to facilitate the rehabilitation of a company in
difficulty or to improve the prospects of beneficial realisation of its assets. The
administration order issued by the court places the management of the bank in the
hands of an administrator for a certain period. Administration orders are regulated
in the Insolvency Act part II and the FSMA part XXIV ss. 359–362. – A petition
for an administration order may be made by the bank, the directors or by a
creditor. The petition and the order freeze most legal steps against the bank,
including any resolution to wind up the bank. The bank’s activities continue. The
administrator has wide powers relating to the ascertainment and investigation of
the bank’s affairs. The administrator should give a proposal of how to proceed
with the bank’s financial problems that should be considered at the creditors’
                                                
87 The Insolvency Act part III chapter I ss. 42–49 and Schedule 1.
88 The Supreme Court Act 1981 s. 37.
89 The Insolvency Act part III chapter I s. 44.
90 The FSMA part XXIV s. 363 and the Insolvency Act part III chapter I s. 35.
91 Under the Banking Act, the Bank of England had a different role in the receiverships. The Bank
of England did not have the right to be heard if the receiver applied to the court for directions.36
meeting. The proposal should be made in three months’ time. In case the
creditors’ meeting dismiss the administrator’s proposal the court may discharge or
change the order or make any other order that it thinks fit. The court may also
give directions overriding the creditors’ views.
92 – The FSA has some powers in
connection with the issuance of an administration order. The FSA is entitled to
present a petition to the court on the making of an administration order.
93 The
FSA has the right to attend the hearing of an eventual petition or any other hearing
in relation to the bank. The FSA may apply to the court for the discharge of or
changes in an already issued administration order.
94 Furthermore, the FSA has the
power to appoint a person to attend any creditors’ meeting considering the bank’s
affairs.
95 The issuance of an administration order does not automatically revoke
the bank’s authorisation, while such a consequence would affect the “going
concern” value of the bank and harm creditors. Still, the issuance entitles the FSA
to withdraw the authorisation.
96
As a result of the fact that the courts have the powers to decide on the
administration proceedings, even by overriding creditor or other stakeholder
rights, judges set the factual principles for the reorganisation of UK banks. In a
diachronic sense, the courts may be quick in issuing the orders and the FSA fast in
identifying eventual buyers of the bank’s assets. Today, many bank problems
emerge suddenly, eg due to unforeseeable events in the trading rooms. This
                                                
92 The Insolvency Act part II ss. 9–11 and 21–25.
93 The FSMA part XXIV s. 359.
94 The FSMA part XXIV s. 362 and the Insolvency Act part II s. 27.
95 The FSMA part XXIV s. 362. – The Insolvency Act part II s. 9 entitled the Bank of England to
petition an administration order before the introduction of the FSMA. The Banking Act did not
establish any other authority powers relative to administration orders.
96 The criteria for revoking the authorisation for a bank in accordance with the FSMA are general.
The FSMA part III s. 33 regulates the withdrawal of an authorisation and states that a ground for
withdrawal is the cancellation of permissions to carry out the specified, regulated activities. In
turn, criteria for the variation of permissions on the FSA’s initiative (ie among other things the
cancellation of the permission) is regulated in the FSMA part IV s. 45. The provisions define the
conditions for cancellation in the following manner. The FSA may cancel the permission if, a) the
bank fails, or is likely to fail, the threshold conditions (see section 2.2), b) the bank fails to carry
on a regulated activity for which it has a permission or c) it is desirable to exercise that power in
order to protect the interests of consumers. Grounds for revoking the authorisation under the
Banking Act were similar.37
usually leaves the courts and the FSA with little time to realise the assets or find
an alternative solution in the form of arrangements or liquidation.
97
Seen from the creditors’ perspective, the most apparent feature of the UK bank
exit regime is the absence of an authority-directed separate reorganisation
procedure for banks. On the other hand, several voluntary and court-based
reorganisation procedures exist. In the court-based procedures, the courts may
infringe creditor interests. – In case of financial assistance to banks, the UK
regime acknowledges only one type of capital transfer. The Bank of England
lender of last resort-function may provide banks with liquidity in the form of
loans or subsidies. – FSA supervision of banks is based on continuous reporting
and ad hoc inspections. Powers have been concentrated to the supervision of
risky banks.
     The bank’s creditors may apply for the winding up of the bank to the court.
The court decides on and supervises the liquidation. – The criteria for the
initiation of the liquidation comprise a) the bank’s inability to pay its debts and
b) the court being of the opinion that it is just and equitable that the bank should
be wound up.
     No priority for deposit claims exists in the realisation of the bank’s assets.
Payoff of depositors results in Financial Services Compensation Scheme (FSCS)
subrogation of depositor claims. – There are no special procedures protecting the
“going-concern” value in the reorganisation and liquidation of failed banks.
3.2.2 The reorganisation and liquidation of Frankfurt (German)
banks
Several German laws apply to the reorganisation and liquidation of German
banks. The main provisions of relevance to the banks’ creditors are found in the
Banking Act part III, division 4 concerning “Measures in special cases”.
98 Though
the legislation in principle distinguishes between reorganisation and liquidation
measures the regime has been criticised for not being constructive. Furthermore,
banks are not excluded from the associated provisions of the Insolvency Act and
the German company laws. The Banking Act part III, division 1, s. 38 states that
the Financial Supervisory Authority (FSA) may issue general instructions
regarding the liquidation of a bank. Such instructions have not been issued by the
                                                
97 An additional aspect of interest when discussing the UK bank exit regime is the Bank of
England’s (BoE) lender of last resort (LLR) role. The procedure concerning financial assistance to
banks is not regulated in the law, but the Memorandum of Understanding agreed upon by the BoE,
HM Treasury and the FSA specifies the conditions for LLR-assistance. During the years,
assistance both in the form of loans and subsidies has been given to eliminate probable systemic
market effects.
98 The German banking provisions are eg found in Deutsche Bundesbank 2000 “Banking Act”
(Banking Regulations 2)38
FSA. Due to its wide scope, the Voluntary Deposit Protection Scheme
administered by the Association of German Banks may also protect creditors of
the bank (though they are not depositors) (see section 4.2.2).
99
The German bank exit regime is a regime that leaves some questions
unanswered. The Banking Act covers the period until the commencement of the
liquidation. The exact extent to which the general Insolvency Act should apply to
banks is somewhat unclear. The Banking Act focuses on three types of
reorganisation and liquidation measures, ie pure protective measures, means with
a constructive element and actual liquidation measures. The measures provided
by the Banking Act are almost all FSA initiated and administered. In addition to
these measures German banks may be reorganised or liquidated pursuant to the
German company laws. Overall, the regime has been criticised for creating a
standstill. During recent decades Germany has not experienced large bank
failures.
In order to receive a picture of the main provisions affecting the bank’s creditors
a)  the Banking Act and b)  the Insolvency Act inclusive the acts preceding the
Insolvency Act (ie before the year 1999) are discussed below. German company
laws are dealt with briefly in section 5.2.2 concerning the shareholders’ position
in connection with the reorganisation and liquidation of banks.
The provisions of the Banking Act applicable to the reorganisation and
liquidation of banks may be characterised by focusing upon the provisions’
theoretical aims. Contrary to many other jurisdictions, the protective (prohibitive)
element of the German regime is quite apparent. As a result, there are three
categories of procedural provisions controlling the reorganisation and liquidation
of German banks. These categories comprise a)  pure protective measures,
b)  means with a constructive element and c) actual liquidation measures. In
practice, all measures (regulated in the Banking Act) despite their theoretical
aims, are FSA-initiated and -administered.
100 – Pure protective measures may be
applied to most financially related problems confronting the bank. Pure protective
measures are prohibitions and limitations on the activities. Problems confronting
the bank include inadequate own funds or liquidity, dangers (for creditors,
entrusted assets or efficient supervision) and insolvency. In case of inadequate
own funds or liquidity the FSA may prohibit or limit withdrawals by the
proprietors, the distribution of profits and the granting of loans.
101 The FSA may
issue the orders only if the institution has failed to remedy the deficiency within a
                                                
99 For a number of viewpoints concerning the German bank exit regime see Hüpkes 2000 pp. 57
and 117.
100 The Banking Act part III, division 4.
101 The Banking Act part III, division 4, s. 45.39
period set by the FSA. Measures associated with danger also include several
prohibitions and limitations on the bank’s activities. Under the condition that
a) the discharge of a bank’s obligations to its creditors and b) especially the safety
of the assets entrusted to it are endangered or c) there are grounds for suspecting
that effective supervision of the institution is not possible, the FSA may take
temporary measures to avert the danger.
102 In particular, the FSA may prohibit the
taking of deposits and the granting of loans and prohibit proprietors and managers
from carrying out their activities or limit such activities. If the above-mentioned
conditions are met the FSA is given even further means (in the form of
prohibitions and limitations) to avert insolvency proceedings. In this case the FSA
may temporarily issue a ban on sales and payments by the bank, or order the bank
to be closed for business with customers.
103 Moreover, the FSA may prohibit the
acceptance of payments not intended for the discharge of debts to the bank. If the
deposit guarantee scheme undertakes to satisfy in full all creditors the bank may
enter into certain new transactions during the ban. As mentioned initially, the
German Voluntary Deposit Protection Scheme may cover ordinary creditors (not
only depositors). Still, the Voluntary Scheme has no legal obligation to pay off
the bank’s depositors (and creditors). The Scheme may decide on its own behalf
whether it provides protection or not. During FSA-measures to avert insolvency
proceedings judicial enforcement on, seizures of and temporary injunctions
against the assets of the bank are not permissible.
104 The Federal Government may
(after consultation with the Central Bank) in case of danger to the national
economy by regulation order that banks be temporarily closed for business with
customers. In this situation the banks may neither make nor accept payments and
credit transfers connected with such business. The period for which banks are
closed may not exceed three months.
105
Means with a constructive element in the reorganisation of German banks are
measures that either a) direct the proprietors or managers of the bank, b) create
conditions for the appointment of representatives to administer the bank or
c) constitute a buffer against the claimants of the bank. Means with a constructive
element are only applicable in case of danger. – In case of danger to creditors,
entrusted assets or efficient supervision the FSA may on a temporary basis as
constructive means issue instructions on the management of the bank’s business
or appoint supervisors.
106 These measures may complement or exclude any
prohibitions or limitations made. If managers have been prohibited from carrying
out their activities the proper court shall, at the request of the FSA, appoint the
                                                
102 The Banking Act part III, division 4, s. 46.
103 The Banking Act part III, division 4, s. 46a.
104 The Banking Act part III, division 4, s. 46a.
105 The Banking Act part III, division 4, s. 47 and 48, respectively.
106 The Banking Act part III, division 4, s. 46.40
necessary persons to manage and represent the bank. The persons’ authority to
manage the bank’s business, unless the appropriate governing bodies of the bank
extend it, is limited to the execution of the measures necessary to avert insolvency
proceedings and protect creditors.
107 The Banking Act includes no special
provisions on forced mergers or purchase and assumption transactions by persons
appointed like its US counterpart. Finally, if the national economy is endangered,
the Federal Government may by regulation grant a bank extension of time to
discharge its obligations and create a judicial buffer for the period in question.
108
The liquidation of German banks is regulated in the Banking Act to a
marginal extent.
109 Four criteria to request liquidation of a bank exist. If the FSA
revokes the banking license or the license expires the FSA may rule that the bank
be liquidated. Similarly, if a bank becomes insolvent or over-indebted the
managers shall report this fact immediately to the FSA, which will then initiate
insolvency proceedings. The duty to report is sanctioned.
110 No further definitions
of insolvency or over-indebtedness are presented in the Banking Act. Another
feature of importance is the fact that the petition for the initiation of insolvency
proceedings over the bank’s assets may be filed by the FSA only. In other words,
the bank’s creditors have no powers to initiate the liquidation of the bank. The
FSA or the Court of Registration appoints the liquidators for the bank. Generally,
judicial appeals may be made to the Administrative Court of First Instance to
review decisions and measures made by the FSA.
111 In principle, the appeal may
concern the invalidation or the execution of a decision or a measure. The review is
restricted to the legality of the decisions and measures. Legality may be a question
of the FSA exceeding the bounds of discretion or making wrongful use of
discretionary powers.
112
The provisions concerning the liquidation of banks in the Banking Act mostly
cover  the period until the request on liquidation is made. The provisions
concerning liquidation in the Insolvency Act and German company laws mainly
cover the period from the commencement of the liquidation onwards. The
abovementioned general laws do not exclude banks as possible objects for
liquidation. Several individualised provisions of the Insolvency Act also explicitly
supplement the liquidation provisions of the Banking Act. Still, there is some
uncertainty to what extent the Insolvency Act is applicable to banks. German
company laws apply to voluntary liquidation of sound companies and the
Insolvency Act applies when a company is unable to meet its obligations or if its
                                                
107 The Banking Act part III, division 4, s. 46a.
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109 The Banking Act part III, division 1, s. 38 and division 4, s. 46b.
110 The Banking Act part V, s. 55.
111 Rules of the Administrative Courts s. 68.
112 Rules of the Administrative Courts s. 114.41
liabilities exceed its assets. – Anyway, a framework for all the later stages of the
liquidation of an insolvent bank is provided by the Insolvency Act. In particular,
principles for a) the classification of creditors, b) identification of steps in the
insolvency procedure and c) certain other issues may be concretised by analysing
the Insolvency Act.
113
When it comes to the classification of creditors the Insolvency Act recognises
three classes of creditors’ claims, ie secured claims, unsecured priority claims and
unsecured non-priority claims.
114 Secured claims are in most cases not part of the
insolvent entity since the claims’ securities may be realised independently. Claims
secured by moveable or non-moveable collateral are parts of the insolvent entity
but they are objects of a preferential settlement. Secured creditors with
preferential settlement may, however, not sell their collateral themselves anymore.
This was only possible before 1998 under the former Bankruptcy Act. The
appointed trustee is, according to the current main rule, entitled to sell the
collateral.
115 Moreover, unsecured priority claims are primarily costs of case
administration and other credits are classified as unsecured non-priority claims.
Internal priorities in the classes of creditors’ claims are abolished. In the old
Bankruptcy Act priorities existed between claims after the costs of case
administration had been satisfied. Salaries, pensions and social insurance costs
were in priority in relation to ordinary credits.
116
The liquidation procedure pursuant to the Insolvency Act comprises several
stages.  Between the filing and opening of the case the court has to take all
measures appropriate to prevent a decrease of the debtor’s assets.
117 Once a case
is opened the court is required to appoint a trustee and issue an adjudication order.
As a consequence of the order civil law suits against the debtor are stayed.
118 In
the order the court will schedule two creditors’ meetings. In the validation
meeting the creditors will prove their claims and in the report meeting they will
decide upon the objective of the further proceedings. At the first meeting creditors
may elect their own trustee. All creditors with proven and accepted claims except
the unsecured non-priority creditors are allowed to vote at the creditors’ meetings.
Decisions at the creditors’ meetings require a simple majority. Voting is
proportional. Creditors may appoint a creditors’ committee to support, advise and
monitor the trustee.
119 At the report meeting the trustee should make a statement
                                                
113 For a comprehensive analysis (in English) of business bankruptcy in Germany and the new
Insolvency Act see Ziehmann 1997.
114 The Insolvency Act part II, division 2.
115 The Insolvency Act part II, division 2, ss. 49–50 and part IV, division 3, ss. 166–169.
116 The Insolvency Act part II, division 2, ss. 55 and 39, respectively.
117 The Insolvency Act part II, division 1, s. 21.
118 The Insolvency Act part II, division 1. s. 27 and the Law for Civil Law Suits
(Zivilprocessordnung) part I, division 3, s. 240.
119 The Insolvency Act part II, division 1, s. 29, division 3, s. 57, ss. 76–77 and s. 69, respectively.42
comparing the implications of different alternatives, ie liquidation with total or
partial reorganisation, on the repayment to creditors. The creditors should decide
on the trustee’s statement. The trustee may also, with the permission of creditors,
close the debtor’s business before the report meeting. Obtaining loans and other
measures of extraordinary importance require the consent of the creditors’
committee or the creditors’ meeting. If liquidation is chosen the trustee should
start  the realisation of assets. All unsecured creditors are paid the same
percentage from the asset sales.
120
Other issues of interest when analysing the provisions of the Insolvency Act
and preceding acts relate to the eventual reorganisation of a company. Both the
Insolvency Act and preceding acts established separate reorganisation procedures
that (at least in theory) applied to banks. – According to the Insolvency Act the
court-supervised reorganisation process begins when creditors during the report
meeting decide that a reorganisation plan should be implemented and
consequently the business should continue. Only the debtor and the trustee are
entitled to present a reorganisation plan to the creditors. The plan usually consists
of a descriptive part, a structural part and an appendix. The descriptive part
comprises a description of former and future measures and the structural part
reflects the arrangements in the legal relations of the participants. The court will
set a hearing during which the plan is discussed and a creditors’ meeting for
voting on the plan. Adoption of the plan requires confirmation by the debtor and
the court. If the failure to reach creditors’ approval of the plan is regarded as
obstructive, the court may disregard the creditor’s vote and confirm the plan. If
the plan is not confirmed, the debtor will go into liquidation. After repayment of
the allowed claims in an accepted reorganisation plan all the debtor’s unsatisfied
claims are discharged.
121 – Pursuant to the former Bankruptcy Act the debtor was
entitled to file a proposal for composition. The composition enabled the debtor to
satisfy the creditors by partial discharge or by extension of payment. For the
composition to succeed, the majority of non-priority creditors at the creditors’
meeting, representing at least two-thirds of the total claims had to support it. –
The composition proceeding according to the old Composition Act had to result in
that at least 35 percent of the claims were paid to creditors. As before, only the
debtor was given the powers to initiate such a proceeding. The composition was
linked to a courtsupervised reorganisation of the company. The majority of the
                                                
120 The Insolvency Act part IV, division 2, s. 156–158, s. 160 and s. 159, respectively.
121 The Insolvency Act part IV, division 2, s. 156, part VI, division 1, ss. 218 and 227, part VI
division 2, s. 235, s. 245 and ss. 247–248.43
creditors at the creditors’ meeting and at least three-quarters of the total claims in
amount as well as the court had to accept the composition.
122
The position of secured creditors of German banks is strong. No authority
directed or other measures may infringe their rights. For the unsecured creditors
the situation in bank failures is more uncertain. – Still, financial assistance to
German banks is possible. There are two avenues for capital injections into
banks. First, the Voluntary Deposit Protection Scheme may assist banks directly
and second, the Liquidity Consortium Bank (handles the Central Banks LLR-
function) may grant loans only to banks of unquestioned soundness. Assistance
from the Voluntary Deposit Protection Scheme may be in any form. – Decisions
on the reorganisation of banks according to the Banking Act are made by the
FSA. Reorganisation measures are mainly conservative and should not endanger
creditor interests. – The ongoing FSA supervision of German banks is largely
based on reports addressed to the German Central Bank. On site inspections of
banks are rare.
   The banks’ creditors have no rights in initiating liquidation. The decision to
start insolvency proceedings is made by the FSA only. – The criteria for
initiation of liquidation on financial grounds comprise insolvency and over-
indebtedness.
   Depositors’ claims are not in priority in the realisation of the banks’ assets. The
same applies to eventual Deposit Protection Scheme subrogation of depositor
claims due to the payoff of depositors. – According to the Insolvency Act the
court should take all measures appropriate to prevent a decrease in the debtors’
assets. On the other hand, measures listed in the Banking Act do not promote the
preservation of the banks’ “going-concern” value.
3.2.3 The new Finnish procedures for bank exit
During most of the 1990s, the formal (legislative) Finnish bank exit regime did
not face any substantial reforms. In the beginning of 2002, the bank exit regime
was thoroughly reformed, providing new reorganisation measures and liquidation
proceedings. Currently, the reorganisation and liquidation procedures applicable
to Finnish banks are regulated in a) the Law concerning Commercial Banks
(1501/2001), b) the Law concerning Temporary Suspension of the Activities of a
Deposit bank (1509/2001), c) the Law concerning Reorganisation of Companies
(47/1993), d) the Law concerning Limited Liability Companies (734/1978) and
e) the Bankruptcy Code (31/1868). In order to analyse the Finnish bank exit
regime the presentation below focuses both on compulsory and voluntary means
to handle problem banks. To describe the complexity of means a differentiation is
                                                
122 Of interest to bank creditors is also the fact that the German Central Bank has no explicit lender
of last resort (LLR) function. Liquidity assistance to banks is directed through the Liquidity
Consortium Bank (LCB). Assisted banks should be solvent and their liquidity needs temporary.44
made between a) suspensive action, b) genuine reorganisation measures,
c) liquidation proceedings and d) other actions.
123
In case of suspensive action, the judicial base for action changed almost
totally in 2002. Provisions in the Law concerning Temporary Suspension of the
Activities of a Deposit Bank replaced the regulations on suspensive action in the
former Law concerning Commercial Banks (1269/1990) 28–31§§. – Due to the
new legislation the Ministry of Finance (MoF) was given the right to suspend the
activities of a bank if the continuation of its activities would a) endanger the
depositors’ or other creditors’ position, b) risk the stability of the financial
markets or c) cause severe disturbances on the market. Suspension is possible for
a maximum period of one month. The suspension may be continued, but can
never aggregately exceed six months.
124 The Financial Supervision Authority
(FSA) should appoint a representative to supervise the bank during the
suspension. The suspension creates both restrictions for the activities of the bank
and a buffer for legal action against the bank. During the suspension the bank is
not entitled to receive deposits without MoF permission and borrow or lend
money or deal in derivatives without the permission of the FSA-appointed
representative. During the suspension the bank has to make a plan for recovery or
discontinuation of business. If no plan is made or proper measures not suggested,
the MoF is entitled to withdraw the bank’s licence. During the suspension, the
MoF (only) has the right to apply to the court for reorganisation of the bank in
accordance with the Law concerning the Reorganisation of Companies. The
suspension has to be cancelled if the preconditions for the suspension do not exist
anymore, ie if the bank is able to continue its business.
125
Seen from the bank’s creditors’ perspective, some changes relative to the
preceding regime have occurred though this regime provided a similar
suspension. The criteria for action have been transformed. Before 2002, action
was taken when the bank’s own capital had diminished to less than half of its
book value and the level of capital adequacy was too low or the bank could not
fulfil its liabilities. Moreover, it was required that the bank, within the timeframe
given, was not able to come up with acceptable means to increase its capital.
Now, action may be taken only if the above-mentioned market effects are
expected to emerge.
126 – Both suspensions were and are administered by the MoF.
                                                
123 For an analysis of the legal reform (in Finnish) see Government Proposal 180/2001 to the
Parliament (Hallituksen esitys 180/2001). – Until the end of 2001 the laws regulating
reorganisation and liquidation of banks were restricted to the former Law concerning Commercial
Banks (1269/1990), the Law concerning Limited Liability Companies and the Bankruptcy Code.
124 The Law concerning Temporary Suspension of the Activities of a Deposit Bank 3§.
125 The Law concerning Temporary Suspension of the Activities of a Deposit Bank 5, 7, 9–11,
13§§.
126 The starting points for suspension according to the former Law concerning Commercial Banks
were listed in the 27§ of the law.45
But the suspension according to the new law opens up the possibility of
reorganisation of the bank in line with an established judicial scheme. As we will
see later, this scheme gives the creditors of the bank certain voting and other
rights. On the other hand, the scheme usually cuts creditor claims. Earlier, the
whole reorganisation context was the affair only of the authorities and the banks’
shareholders. – On a more detailed level, the former suspension was restricted to a
maximum of four months. For the new suspension the longest period is six
months. The former legislation established a time frame of five years for the
banks’ recovery once the suggested means were accepted and the suspension
withdrawn. No such time frame exists anymore.
127
The new Finnish bank exit regime (established 1.1.2002) comprises all the basic,
common elements that are found in bank exit regimes. A possibility for
authorities to suspend bank activities, a separate reorganisation procedure to
rehabilitate the bank, a variety of voluntary reorganisation measures, separate
procedures for voluntary and compulsory liquidation (including bankruptcy)
constitute the regime. – Suspension of bank activities derive from the Law
concerning Temporary Suspension of the Activities of a Deposit Bank and it is
MoF-initiated and FSA-administered. Only the MoF has the right to initiate
court-administered formal reorganisation of the bank pursuant to the general Law
concerning Reorganisation of Companies. Voluntary and compulsory liquidation
of banks follows the general procedures set up in the Law concerning Limited
Liability Companies. Liquidation on financial grounds (bankruptcy) is regulated
in the Bankruptcy Code. In practice, Finland has no history of dramatic bank
failures. The banking crisis in the beginning of the 1990’s resulted in financial
assistance to many banks. Currently, a scheme for both private and Government
assistance to banks exists.
Another entity of interest to the Finnish banks’ creditors is the measures used for
genuine reorganisation. In principle, there are several types of reorganisation
measures. In an economic sense, internal arrangements, mergers, divisions,
transfers of activities etc. constitute reorganisation. In a judicial sense,
reorganisation of Finnish banks may be carried out on a voluntary basis (ie before
the authorities act), as a means to eliminate suspension of the banks’ activities and
as MoF-initiated reorganisation due to the Law concerning Reorganisation of
Companies. Two approaches coherent with this view, a) voluntary reorganisation
and b) the reorganisation procedure under the Law concerning Reorganisation of
Companies are looked into below.
                                                
127 The former Law concerning Commercial Banks 31§ listed various criteria when the suspension
should be withdrawn. One of these alternatives was decreasing the share capital. A permit to cut
the share capital could be issued by the MoF without hearing bank creditors.46
One of the most frequently used types of voluntary reorganisation is merger.
Currently, the new Law concerning Commercial Banks chapter 2 regulates
merger. With respect to the status of the merging entities, the law applies to
mergers in which a bank or an ordinary limited liability company is merged with a
bank. According to the new legislation the merger procedure follows the Law
concerning Limited Liability Companies chapter 14. These provisions state that
merger requires approval by the register authorities. In turn, a condition for
approval is the hearing of creditors.
128 The FSA may object to a merger by
informing the register authorities thereof.
129 Earlier, the former Law concerning
Commercial Banks and the Law concerning Limited Liability Companies both
regulated mergers relating to banks. Only in the case that both merging companies
were banks, the Law concerning Commercial Banks was used. In all other cases,
the Law concerning Limited Liability companies was applied. The former
legislative procedure under the old Law concerning Commercial Banks required
MoF (not register authorities) approval for bank mergers. Creditors were not
heard at any stage.
130 The procedure under the Law concerning Limited Liability
Companies has not changed. Still, the FSA had no right to object to such mergers
during that time. – In practice, merger may be carried out in many ways. The Law
concerning Limited Liability Companies 14 chapter 1§ recognises two main
alternatives, ie the absorbing merger and the combining merger. The absorbing
merger indicates that two companies merge in a way that one of the companies
endures. The combining merger creates a new company of the two merged
companies.
The new provisions for bank division and transfer of activities are included in
the new Law concerning Commercial Banks chapter 3 and 4, respectively. The
law introduces new, deviant definitions on both division and the transfer of
activities. Division is defined as an arrangement where the compensation for the
assets transferred is made directly to the shareholders of the delivering bank (and
the bank’s own capital is restructured). The term transfer of activities is restricted
to the situation where compensation is paid directly to the delivering bank. As a
result of these separate definitions, both division and the transfer of assets may
cover a part of the bank or the whole bank. – According to the new Law
concerning Commercial Banks 8§ the Law concerning Limited Liability
Companies chapter 14a applies to bank divisions. Division requires the approval
of the register authorities. The FSA may object to the division. As in merger,
creditors should be heard.
131 Despite the definitional differences, the transfer of
assets is procedurally similar to division. Only creditors of claims transferred
                                                
128 The Law concerning Limited Liability Companies 14 chapter 13–14§§.
129 The Law concerning Commercial Banks 5§.
130 Mergers were formerly regulated in the preceding Law concerning Commercial Banks 25§.
131 See also the Law concerning Commercial Banks 5 and 9§§.47
should be heard. Still, in accordance with the Law concerning Limited Liability
Companies, the delivering bank will be liable for the claims transferred on a
secondary basis.
132
Only the MoF may initiate bank reorganisation due the Law concerning
Reorganisation of Companies. The Law concerning Reorganisation of
Companies, originally introduced in 1993, is a general law applicable to ordinary
companies. The bank exit reform of 2002 extended the scope of the law to include
banks also. Until the end of 2001, no such formal procedure for bank
reorganisation existed. Banks were reorganised on a voluntary basis, ie in
accordance with shareholder decisions (often requiring authority approval). The
Law concerning Reorganisation of Companies applies to banks only in the case
that the activities of the banks are suspended.
133 The law provides for a detailed
scheme for the reorganisation of problem banks. The procedure is court-based,
directed by creditor voting and aims to create conditions for the continuance of
bank activities by cutting creditor claims. To start the reorganisation procedure,
the MoF should apply to the court. The condition for the initiation of the
procedure is the threatening or factual lack of ability for the debtor to pay his
debts. Alternatively, the bank’s and at least two creditors acceptance, whose
claims represent at least one fifth of the bank’s known obligations, is required.
The procedure should be closed if lasting improvement of the bank’s affairs is not
reached.
134 The procedure generates a buffer for legal action against the bank for
obligations preceding the initiation of the procedure. As soon as possible, a plan
for recovery should be made. The plan may affect both unsecured and secured
creditors of the bank. The plan may result in changes of the repayment schedule
for claims against the bank, the decrease in costs payable to creditors or the
decrease in the borrowed amount repayable to creditors. Still, secured creditors
always receive their capital in full. Organisationally, an administrator and a
creditors’ committee should be appointed in order to administer the procedure and
represent creditors. The FSA appoints the administrator and the MoF, the FSA,
the Bank of Finland and the Depositor Guarantee Fund should be represented in
                                                
132 Law concerning Commercial Banks 12–13§§. – Before 1.1.2002 division and the transfer of
activities were both regulated in the former Law concerning Commercial Banks 25§ and the Law
concerning Limited Liability Companies 14a chapter. In a definitional sense, the term division
earlier corresponded both to the situation where the total assets and liabilities of a bank were
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the MoF according to the former Law concerning Commercial Banks 25§ and the Law concerning
Limited Liability Companies 14a chapter 4§. When dividing banks, the legislation did not call for
a hearing of creditors.
133 Law concerning the Temporary Suspension of the Activities of a Deposit Bank chapter 4.
134 The Law concerning Temporary Suspension of the Activities of the Bank 13§ and the Law
concerning Reorganisation of Companies 6–7§§.48
the creditors’ committee.
135 The court should confirm the plan for recovery. One
of the following three criteria should be met in order to make the confirmation of
the plan possible. First, the plan may be confirmed if all creditors approve the
plan. Second, the plan may be confirmed if the majority of each group of creditors
approve the plan or third, the plan may be confirmed if certain specified
conditions are met. These conditions focus on the internal relations between
creditors. Moreover, factors hindering the confirmation, if eg the plan infringes
creditors’ rights, are listed in the law’s 53 and 55§§.
136
The reform of the Finnish bank exit regime also had a significant impact on
the eventual liquidation of Finnish banks. In case of liquidation, the Finnish
bank exit regime acknowledges three types of liquidation, ie voluntary
liquidation, compulsory liquidation and bankruptcy. As a result of the 2002 bank
exit regime, voluntary and compulsory liquidation is regulated in the general Law
concerning Limited Liability Companies chapter 13. Certain provisions in the new
Law concerning Commercial Banks chapter 6 only specify the procedures when
applied to banks. The differences between voluntary and compulsory liquidation
appear by focusing on definitions used. If the conditions for liquidation specified
in the law or in the articles of the association are met, then that is defined as
compulsory liquidation. Liquidation that is not compulsory is voluntary. Due to
the main rule, the shareholders’ meeting decides on the liquidation of the
company. In certain cases or if the criteria for compulsory liquidation exist, and
the shareholders do not act, then the court or the register authority should decide
on liquidation.
There are three main types of grounds for compulsory liquidation specified in
the Law concerning Limited Liability Companies. First, if shareholders have
misused their position in the bank, the court may if grave reasons exist, decide on
the liquidation of the bank. Second, if the bank does not have competent
governing bodies, the register authority should decide on the liquidation. Third, if
the bank has not delivered its financial statement to the register authority in one
year’s time starting from the end of the bank’s financial year, this establishes an
obligation for the authority to decide on liquidation.
137 According to the Law
concerning Commercial Banks 19§ the MoF should request liquidation of a bank,
if the bank’s licence is withdrawn. There are several grounds for the withdrawal
of a banking licence. From the bank creditors’ perspective the most important
ones are the ones concerning the financial condition of the bank. On this point, the
                                                
135 The Law concerning Reorganisation of Companies 8–28, 39–48 and 57–66§§ and the Law
concerning Temporary Suspension of the Activities of a Deposit Bank 14§.
136 See also the Law concerning Reorganisation of Companies 49–52§§ and 54§. – Until the end of
1992 the Finnish jurisdiction also provided for composition pursuant to the Composition Law
(148/1932) and compulsory composition due to the Bankruptcy Code.
137 The Law concerning Limited Liability Companies chapter 13 3–4a§§, respectively.49
Law concerning Credit Institutions (1607/1993) 80§ comprises provisions on
capital adequacy for banks. These provisions entitle the FSA to set a timeframe
during which the bank has to restore its solvency level or initiate the withdrawal
of the bank’s licence by the MoF. If the bank’s licence is whitdrawn by the MoF,
it should initiate the bank’s liquidation. – In short, the implications of a started
liquidation procedure are that administrators will be appointed to administer the
affairs of the bank, realise its assets and pay its debts. The different stages will
follow the principles set out in the Law concerning Limited Liability Companies.
The Law concerning Commercial Banks 20§ states that for banks, the MoF should
appoint the administrators. – The bank itself or its creditors may also initiate the
bank’s bankruptcy pursuant to the Bankruptcy Code (31/1868) at the court. The
main criterion for the initiation of bankruptcy proceedings is “other than
temporary inability to pay one’s debts”. In the case bankruptcy is initiated by a
creditor, the court has to inform the MoF about the petition. The MoF may eg
decide on a temporary suspension of the bank’s activities based on the Law
concerning Temporary Suspension of the Activities of a Deposit Bank if the bank
or a creditor initiates bankruptcy.
138
Earlier, alternative routes for the liquidation of Finnish banks existed.
Liquidation was possible both according to the previous Law concerning
Commercial Banks and the Law concerning Limited Liability Companies. The
laws established two totally different liquidation procedures for banks. Moreover,
bankruptcy as a liquidation alternative was regulated in the Bankruptcy Code. The
liquidation rules in the former Law concerning Commercial Banks only
recognised the procedure as a compulsory one, whereas the Law concerning
Limited Liability Companies recognised both obligatory and voluntary liquidation
procedures. In sum, this meant that the bank was confronted with four alternative
liquidation procedures.
139
                                                
138 The Law concerning Commercial Banks 20–22§§.
139 According to the former Law concerning Commercial Banks, there were only a few situations
that initiated the liquidation procedure. The first situation was when the bank had not succeeded in
taking certain reparative measures. The other situation was when the bank had not responded to
interim actions taken by the MoF. The third situation was when the bank’s licence had been
withdrawn. – The decision about entering the liquidation procedure was made by the
shareholders’ meeting. If the bank had not called for a shareholder’s meeting or the shareholder’s
meeting had not fulfilled its obligations according to the law the MoF was entitled to start the
liquidation procedure on the initiative of the FSA.50
The reform of the Finnish bank exit regime affected the position of bank
creditors. The introduction of a formal reorganisation scheme created a
procedure that may cut creditor claims and affect also secured creditors to a
marginal extent. – In case of financial assistance to banks there are two actual
channels that may provide the bank with capital. First, an eventual membership
in a guarantee fund may result in assistance. Second, banks endangering the
stable functioning of financial markets may receive assistance direct from the
Government’s Guarantee Fund. – Only the MoF decides on the commencement
of compulsory, court-based reorganisation. – The supervision of Finnish banks
includes both extensive reports and onsite inspections. Technically, regulations
on supervision do not deviate much from international standards.
   Creditors may initiate debtor bankruptcy pursuant to the Bankruptcy Code. – In
practice, the MoF may request compulsory liquidation if the banks’ capital
adequacy is too low.
      Depositor claims and claims received through the subrogation of depositor
rights are not in a priority in the realisation of debtor assets. – No explicit
constructions securing the “going-concern” value of the bank during the
reorganisation exist.
Finally, there are a group of other actions that are not listed above and may
sometimes be used for the reorganisation of the bank. These are decreasing the
share capital, bank-initiated withdrawal of the licence and changing the terms of
the licence. The provisions concerning the decreasing of share capital partly
changed as a result of the reform of the bank exit regime. Currently, decreasing
the share capital follows the general procedure set up in the Law concerning
Limited Liability Companies chapter 6. No special rules apply to banks anymore.
Shareholders decide on the decrease. Depending on the aim of the decrease, the
register authority’s permit may be required. Conditions for the issuance of a
permit is the hearing of creditors. In the case creditors oppose, the register
authority may issue the permit if the creditors have received court-approved
payment or security for their claims.
140 The reform also introduced bank-initiated
withdrawal of the licence as a new reorganisation measure. The MoF decides on
the withdrawal. The register authority’s permit is needed and a creditors’ hearing
should be summoned.
141 The provisions applicable to an eventual change of the
terms of the banking licence were not amended by the reform. Changing the terms
of the banking licence may be seen as an extreme alternative for the
                                                
140 Earlier, decreasing banks’ share capital was regulated in the former Law concerning
Commercial Banks 8 and 31§§ and the Law concerning Limited Liability Companies chapter 6. In
most cases, decreasing the share capital required MoF approval. The decision on decreasing the
share capital could be made to cover losses. Similarly, it may have been a means to eliminate the
preconditions for authority action against the bank. As an exception, decreasing the banks’ share
capital in order to cover losses did not require MoF approval or hearing of the bank’s creditors.
141 The Law concerning Commercial Banks chapter 5 14 and 16§§.51
reorganisation of a bank. By restricting the bank to exercise certain activities the
authorities may in some situations create preconditions for the redevelopment of
the bank. Still, the terms may be changed only if the prevailing conditions when
the license was issued have altered in a significant way.
142
3.3 The reorganisation and liquidation of banks in Tokyo
(Japan)
The Japanese bank exit regime has gradually been reformed as the crisis in the
Japanese financial sector has continued. Since the beginning of the 1990’s, more
than ten bank specific or general laws have directed bank reorganisation and
liquidation. Large amounts of capital have been injected into the financial
system. Originally, the Ministry of Finance (MoF) was in charge of the
supervision of Japanese banks but further on, the Deposit Insurance
Corporation’s (DIC) mandate in administering bank exit was increased and the
FSA established. The most important measures taken to improve the bank exit
regime have comprised various types of reorganisation means. In 1986, the DIC
was entitled to provide financial assistance to banks on certain grounds. In 1997,
the DIC was given the right to initiate both reorganisation and liquidation
procedures. In 1998, new DIC administered reorganisation measures were
introduced. These measures include the appointment of a financial administrator
to the bank, the establishment of “bridge banks” and temporary nationalisation of
failed banks.
The legal framework for the reorganisation and liquidation of Japanese banks has
been characterised by fundamental changes since the beginning of the 1990’s. In
short, it is possible to identify three periods of varying reorganisation and
liquidation procedures for banks. The changes in the procedures are consequences
                                                
142 The change of the terms of the banking license is regulated in the Law concerning the Financial
Supervision Authority (503/1993) 16§. – An additional aspect of interest when discussing bank
exit is the eventual lender of last resort (LLR) function that the national Central Bank may have. In
Finland, the new Bank of Finland Law (214/1998) states that loans to banks require collateral.
This was not the situation before 1998. Problem banks are usually short of collateral, a fact
limiting the Bank of Finland’s LLR function. Capital injections into the banks are made through
the Voluntary Guarantee Funds (requires membership) or through the Government’s Guarantee
Fund. Capital injections from the Voluntary Funds may be in the form of loans or subsidies. The
Voluntary Funds may also issue guarantees for bank borrowing. Capital injections from the
Government’s Guarantee Fund may be made only to banks facing problems that endanger the
stability of financial markets. This latter type of assistance may be in the form of subscribing bank
shares, issuing guarantees for bank loans or other financial assistance (ie traditional loans and
subsidies).52
of the crises confronting the Japanese financial markets. Furthermore, the changes
are linked to a continuing enhancement of the powers of the Deposit Insurance
Corporation (DIC) provided in the Deposit Insurance Law. One could say that the
response of the Japanese government to the financial sector problems has been
largely two-fold. Considerable amounts of public funds have been injected into
the system and the reorganisation and liquidation legislation has been renewed
according to US standards.
143 – In order to transmit a picture of the reorganisation
and liquidation principles of interest to the banks’ creditors provisions are
analysed diachronically. First, the period up to 1996 is described. Then the period
from 1996 to 1997 is assessed. Finally, the situation after the 1998 legislation is
covered.
The aspects of importance to the bank’s creditors in the period up to 1996,
can be presented in a number of ways. As a result of the fact that the possibilities
for the authorities to handle bank problems were improved during the period
without deteriorating creditor rights the following aspects should receive closer
attention. Moreover, all aspects significantly affected bank creditors’ position.
The aspects are a) the authorities changed mandate, b) applicable reorganisation
and liquidation procedures and c) the injection of public funds into the financial
system. – When it comes to the authorities’ changed mandate the authorities
involved comprise the DIC and the Ministry of Finance (MoF). For many years
the DIC was a minor office with 10 employees largely subsumed within the
operations of the Bank of Japan (BoJ). The MoF’s supervisory approach, ie the
“convoy” style of banking administration, the BoJ “lender of last resort” functions
and existing general rehabilitation and bankruptcy legislation were seen as
sufficient guarantees for eventual crises. Following the recommendations of the
Committee for Financial System Research (CFSR) the Deposit Insurance Law that
had been enacted in 1971 restricted DIC’s powers to the pay off of insured
deposits in the event of bank failure. In other words, the DIC had no mandate to
initiate or administer the reorganisation or liquidation of banks. Reorganisation
and liquidation of banks were possible under a) the Banking Act chapter V and VI
covering voluntary mergers/acquisitions and voluntary liquidation, b) the Law
concerning Amalgamation and Conversion of Financial Institutions and c)  the
general reorganisation and liquidation laws applicable to any company. Following
further deliberations of the CFSR, the Deposit Insurance Law was amended in
1986 to reflect the more important role deposit insurance was likely to have in the
future. As a result, the powers of the DIC were increased to provide financial
assistance to facilitate mergers or acquisitions of failed institutions.
144 Financial
assistance involved money grants, lending and debt guarantees when a bank
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became or was likely to become insolvent and another healthy financial institution
merged with it, bought its business, obtained its shares or otherwise took over its
assets and liabilities. The amount of financial assistance was limited to the
hypothetical cost of paying off depositors, ie authorities should choose the least
cost alternative. Financial assistance to banks required MoF approval.
The other main element in the system before 1996 was the existing
reorganisation and liquidation procedures applicable to banks. As a result of
DIC’s increasing powers and the possibility of giving banks financial assistance
the relevance of these (mainly general) provisions steadily decreased. Still, they
were and are an alternative for the resolution also of Japanese banks. – In
principle, reorganisation of a bank is possible pursuant to the Corporate
Reorganisation Law, the Commercial Code and the Composition Law. In
addition, banks may reorganise outside these procedures through voluntary
mergers, acquisitions etc. Liquidation of a bank is regulated in the Japanese
Bankruptcy Law and the Commercial Code. Certain supplementary provisions are
found in the Banking Law. While reorganisation means and other types of
liquidation are covered in section 5.5 the kind of liquidation that mostly concern
bank creditors, ie bankruptcy, is analysed below. In the case of bankruptcy, there
are three criteria that should be met in order to initiate the proceedings. These are
a)  the debtor should be unable to pay his debts, b) the debtor has suspended
payments of his debts and c) the debtor’s liabilities exceed his assets. When it
comes to the procedure, both creditors and debtor may file a petition for
bankruptcy. When a petition for bankruptcy is filed, the court can render
adjudication on the petition by examining the documents submitted. Additionally,
a court can order preservative measures at the time the petition is filed. In any
case, measures do not block action by secured creditors. When the court declares
the debtor bankrupt, the court appoints a trustee. The trustee takes over the
management of the debtor’s affairs. The trustee’s job is to convert all of the
debtor’s assets into cash and then distribute the proceeds to the creditors.
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In addition to supervision and laws concerning reorganisation and liquidation
of banks the Japanese banks’ creditors were also affected by other measures taken
by the authorities. These measures, aiming to secure the stability of financial
markets, comprised injections of public funds into the banks and other financial
institutions. From 1991 until 1996, based on the 1986 amendment of the Deposit
Insurance Law, the Bank of Japan Law and the Financial Stabilisation Law funds
were injected into banks, credit co-operatives and jusen companies (housing loan
corporations, ie bank subsidiaries, not banks themselves). Capital provided by the
DIC to banks and credit co-operatives rose to JPY 2,2 trillion during the period.
Moreover, the Bank of Japan supported the banks and credit co-operatives with
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JPY 1,4 trillion in temporary finance. Local governments and other financial
institutions also gave support. The jusen crisis was a separate chapter. Starting in
1991 and ending in 1995 with many companies insolvent the final cost to
taxpayers was approximately JPY 1,0 trillion. In this case, the financial sector
shared the losses to at least the same amount.
146
The period from 1996 to 1997 constitutes another era of distinct bank
reorganisation and liquidation measures in Japan. During this period judicial
conditions for authority-initiated and -administered reorganisation and liquidation
measures were further improved. The changes in procedures were a result of the
Law concerning Special Treatments to Reorganisation Procedures for Financial
Institutions and amendments to the Deposit Insurance Law in 1997. – As for the
reorganisation of Japanese banks, the introduction of the new legislation
established a possibility for the DIC to initiate reorganisation procedures.
Procedures concerned were regulated in the above-mentioned general company
rehabilitation laws. In detail, the new legislation entitled the DIC to initiate the
reorganisation procedures and represent depositors, ie exercise depositor rights,
during reorganisations. The amendments to the Deposit Insurance Law in 1997
expanded the powers for the DIC by enabling it to provide financial assistance for
bank mergers between two ailing banks. According to the previous amendment to
the Deposit Insurance Law in 1986 financial assistance to merging banks was
possible only to assist the merger of a troubled bank into a healthy one. Of
importance to the reorganisation of banks was also the statement made by the
Japanese Government in 1996 to protect all deposits for the next five years
(extended to 2002 in 2001). This commitment was given in the light of the
inadequate information disclosure made by banks and the current fragility of the
financial system. In 1986 the amendments to the Deposit Insurance Law had
introduced financial assistance by the DIC to problem banks as a new
reorganisation measure. Initially, the amount of financial assistance was limited to
the potential pay off cost to depositors. As a result of the Government’s
commitment in 1996 the former limit was abolished. Financial assistance to
problem banks could now equal the total stock of deposits.
147
From 1998 onwards the problems of the Japanese financial sector have
continued, despite major injections of public funds and substantial changes of the
legislation. In 1998 two major laws were introduced, the Financial Reconstruction
Law and the Financial Function Early Strengthening Law. In 2001 these
temporary laws were incorporated into the Deposit Insurance Law. – The
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Financial Reconstruction Law was formulated to provide principles for
compulsory liquidation of financial institutions, concrete measures for the
reorganisation of institutions and certain organisational reforms. – In case of
compulsory liquidation the law set out the principle that insolvent financial
institutions (including banks) are to be liquidated.
148 The law also provided
information on aspects that should be considered in the settlement of financial
institution liquidation. These aspects included the disclosure of bad loans,
clarification of the responsibilities of shareholders and the management and
protection of deposits etc.
The law went on, however, to provide that various mechanisms to handle the
reorganisation of banks should be established to support the credit system and
protect depositors. In practice this meant the introduction of new authority
administered reorganisation measures, means mainly constructed in accordance
with US standards. Three types of measures were introduced for failed banks or
banks in danger of failing. These were a) the appointment of a financial
reorganisation administrator, b) the establishment of a “bridge bank” and
c) temporary nationalisation of failed banks. – When it comes to the appointment
of a financial reorganisation administrator, the main duties of the administrator
were to operate and manage assets of the failed bank and transfer the bank’s
business to other banks. The current law lists the criteria for the appointment of
the administrator.
149 These comprise the situations when the assets of the bank are
insufficient to satisfy obligations or the condition of the bank is such that it has
ceased or will cease to repay against deposits. Furthermore, two alternative
conditions should be met. The first one is that the business operations of the bank
should be seriously impaired. The other is that without a merger, the
discontinuation of the business operations in their entirety or the dissolution of the
institution would have a serious negative effect on the normal supply of funds in
the region or pose a serious inconvenience to customers. The law also sets out the
duties of the administrator more precisely.
150 According to the provisions the
administrator shall have the same authority as the president of the bank with
respect to its business operations and assets. The administrator shall conclude
management of a bank by effecting a transfer of business operations or
implementing other measures within one year from appointment. Upon
occurrence of unavoidable circumstances the time limit may be extended by an
additional year. – Another reorganisation measure applicable to banks constituted
the establishment of a “bridge bank” to carry on the operations of the failed bank.
The idea of a bridge bank is to take over certain healthy functions of the failed
bank in order to smoothly continue these functions and sell the healthy business
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when a candidate appears. Bridge banks are mostly needed when a succeeding
buyer bank does not appear within a prescribed period. – As a final reorganisation
measure for banks temporary nationalisation was also introduced. This latter
option meant that the DIC obtained the bank’s shares and placed it under special
public management. Two criteria were introduced to enable for the DIC to
purchase the shares of the troubled bank. First, the bank should be insolvent or
nearly insolvent. Second, the authorities should determine that a systemic risk is
posed by the bank’s failure. If both of these conditions were met the DIC might be
given the powers to acquire the shares of the bank, at a price determined by the
authorities. Public management of the bank was to be terminated when the bank
was rehabilitated and a private successor was found (eg through merger or
acquisition of the business) or the bank’s shares were reprivatised.
The Financial Reconstruction Law also brought about organisational changes
in the administration of the reorganisation and liquidation of banks. The
organisational changes dealt with the main decision making process and more
practical matters. To decide on the reorganisation measures the Financial
Reconstruction Commission (FRC) was established in 1998. The FRC was
established under the Prime Minister’s Office and its decisions in reorganisation
matters were required to consider FSA examinations of banks. In 2001, FRC
activities were transferred to the Prime Minister’s Office. To handle practical
matters in connection with the reorganisation of banks the Resolution and
Collection Corporation (RCC) was founded in 1998. The RCC was created
through the merger of former resolution and collection banks. The RCC is a
subsidiary of the DIC and it was given the right to purchase assets (ie non-
performing loans) from troubled banks in order to improve the banks’
condition.
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The position of the Japanese banks’ creditors may be seen as being fairly strong,
resulting from the continuing flow of assistance into the banking system. Though
the Japanese bank exit regime recognises liquidation, in practice it seems to be
an option only for small banks. – In reality, the specific reorganisation
procedures for banks are authority-initiated. The procedures are developed in a
way that interests of bank creditors are not endangered. Mainly shareholders are
affected by the reorganisation measures. – Banking supervision is the
responsibility of the FSA. Until 1998, the Ministry of Finance (MoF) was in
charge of the supervision. Supervision is characterised by ambitions to get away
from the former “convoy” style of bank sector administration.
   In theory, bank creditors may request liquidation of a bank pursuant to the
general Bankruptcy Law. The debtor being unable to pay his debts, the debtor
suspending payments on his debts and the debtor’s liabilities exceeding his assets
constitute criteria for liquidation.
    Depositors are not in priority in the realisation of the debtor’s assets. In the
case of a pay-off of depositors, subrogation of rights will occur. The Deposit
Insurance Corporation (DIC) may also otherwise represent depositors in the
reorganisation of a bank. In a sense, bridge banks and the nationalisation of
banks may be seen as measures aimed to protect the “going-concern” value of
the banks. Such measures will mostly benefit bank creditors.
The Financial Function Early Strengthening Law introduced emergency measures
to re-capitalise banks and other financial institutions not necessarily insolvent.
Public funds were used to accelerate the disposal of bad loans by enabling the
banks to further write off bad loans and provide sufficient reserves in a capital
adequacy sense. The law places banks in four categories according to their capital
adequacy levels. Pursuant to the legislation, the Prime Minister’s Office (from
2001) may, upon banks’ applications, decide on the purchase of stock or
subordinated bonds from or the grant of subordinated loans to banks. In practice,
the purchase or loan is administered by the RCC. The re-capitalisation system lists
the different capital adequacy levels, the specific re-capitalisation measures
applicable to each level and further conditions that the bank should meet. All
recapitalisation measures require a “plan for restoring sound management”
detailing how business will be streamlined and accountability established. The
banks are also required to furnish and publish reports on their implementation of
the plan. – Since 1996 to 1997, under the former Financial Stabilisation Law,
funding to banks was lower than during the previous years. Capital injections to
banks from 1998 to 2001 based on the Financial Function Strengthening Law58
exceeded JPY 10 trillion. Still, the legislation contemplated the use of larger sums
to protect depositors and the health of the Japanese banking sector.
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4 Bank depositors and various national deposit
protection schemes
4.1 The protection scheme applicable to New York banks
The aim of the 12 U.S.C. chapter 16 concerning the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC) is to protect the depositors of an insured bank. In accordance,
the reorganisation and liquidation of a bank in financial distress is directed in a
manner that considers the interests of the depositors and the FDIC. The US
Deposit Protection Scheme is the most important of the means aimed to secure the
interests of the depositors in problem situations. In sum, the scheme includes the
activities of four parties. The protection scheme constitutes the Bank Insurance
Fund (BIF), is financed by the banks, administered by the FDIC and guaranteed
by the Federal Government. In order to receive a general picture of the scheme
four topics are considered below. These are a) the scope and level of cover, b) the
pay-out mechanism, c) the funding of the scheme and d) resolution of disputes.
153
As for the scope and level of cover, the term deposit is defined in 12 U.S.C.
chapter 16 s. 1813l. According to the main rule, deposit is defined to mean “the
unpaid balance of money or its equivalent received or held by a bank for which it
is obliged to give credit”. Insured deposit is in turn defined as “the net amount due
to any depositor for deposits in an insured bank”.
154 The US federal insurance
cover is not restricted to certain types of depositors, eg private persons and small
businesses. The 12 U.S.C. chapter 16 s. 1821a states that the FDIC is obliged to
insure the deposits of all insured banks as provided in the act. The net amount
payable to any depositor of an insured bank should not exceed USD 100.000.
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When determining the maximum amount payable, the FDIC should aggregate the
amount of all deposits of a person in the insured bank.
The payment of insured deposits consists of several stages. – First, as
mentioned in section 3.1, payment of insured deposits is only one of the options
the FDIC may choose. The FDIC may protect depositors by a) paying off
deposits, b) arranging for them to be transferred to or assumed by another bank,
c) administering the bank and/or d) assisting the bank financially. In choosing
which of these options to use, the FDIC is required to use the method that will
result in the least cost to the insurance fund.
155 Moreover, the FDIC is specifically
prohibited from taking any steps to protect uninsured depositors if such actions
would increase losses to the insurance fund. The only exception to these least cost
provisions is in emergency situations where compliance with the provisions
“would have serious adverse effects on economic conditions or financial
stability”. Several stringent formal criteria for deciding on such an exception
exist. – Second, according to 12 U.S.C. chapter 16 s. 1821f concerning
chronological aspects, “payment of deposits in an insured bank shall be made by
the FDIC as soon as possible”. This means that there are no explicit time limits in
the legislation for the payment of insured deposits. – Third, the 12 U.S.C. chapter
16 s. 1821d introduced in the mid 1990’s states that any depositor claim against
the insured bank is a priority claim in relation to unsecured creditors. Such a
provision represents a remarkable transfer of funds from unsecured creditors to
depositors. Furthermore, any financial assistance by the FDIC to the bank may be
subordinated in relation to the rights of depositors and other creditors.
156 – Fourth,
the subrogation of depositor rights to the FDIC is another important feature in the
payment of insured deposits. As a consequence of the FDIC’s payment of insured
deposits all rights of the depositors will be transferred to the FDIC. The FDIC will
have a priority position in relation to unsecured creditors in the realisation and
distribution of the bank’s assets.
157
The funding of the deposit protection scheme was thoroughly reformed by
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA) of 1991.
The FDICIA required the FDIC to establish a risk-based deposit insurance
assessment system.
158 Under this system, rates were to be linked to the probability
that the insurance fund would incur a loss from a particular bank. In its risk-based
assessment system, the FDIC puts individual banks into one of nine risk
categories, based on a bank’s placement into one of three capital subgroups and
one of three supervisory subgroups. The three capital subgroups correspond to
whether a bank is well capitalised, adequately capitalised or undercapitalised
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according to the current capital standards. The three supervisory subgroups are
based on a bank’s last examination rating, other relevant supervisory and financial
information and emerging risk characteristics. In practice, FDIC assessment rates
have ranged from 0 percent for banks in the top capital and supervisory subgroups
to 0,27 percent of total assessable deposits for banks in both the bottom capital
and supervisory subgroups. The borrowing authority of the FDIC is regulated in
the 12 U.S.C. chapter 16 s. 1824. These provisions state that avenues for
refinancing comprise borrowing from the Treasury, borrowing from the Federal
Financing Bank and borrowing from BIF members. Borrowed capital required for
insurance purposes should not at any time exceed USD 30 billion. In any case, the
US Government guarantees insured deposits to the above-mentioned USD
100.000 limit.
159
The 12 U.S.C. chapter 16 s. 1821f states that the FDIC may establish internal
procedures for the resolution of disputes relating to insured deposits. More
specifically, claims relating to any insured deposit or any determination of
insurance coverage with respect to any deposit may be covered by these
procedures. Regardless of the fact whether the FDIC has established such
procedures, final determination of deposit claims made by the FDIC shall be
reviewable by the court in accordance with 5 U.S.C. chapter 7.
Depositors of insured US banks are well protected. – The US Deposit Protection
Scheme covers deposits to USD 100.000 per depositor and insured bank. The
provisions do not distinguish between different types of depositors. Large
companies, small companies and private persons are in this respect all equal
under the law.
      The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) should pay off insured
depositors of failed banks as soon as possible. No other time limit exists. In
principle, the payment of deposits is only one of the FDIC’s options. The FDIC
may, as an alternative, arrange for a merger or an acquisition, take control of the
bank or provide the bank with financial assistance. When depositors are paid off,
subrogation of depositor rights to the FDIC occurs. Depositor claims have
priority relative to unsecured creditor claims.
      The Deposit Protection Scheme requires the banks to finance the scheme.
Capital is placed in the Bank Insurance Fund (BIF). The Federal Government
guarantees the insured deposits in case the fund becomes insolvent.
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In the UK, the current Financial Services and Markets Act (FSMA) part XV sets
out the principles for the Financial Services Compensation Scheme (FSCS). This
scheme comprises sub-schemes concerning deposits, investments and insurance.
The FSMA obliged the FSA to establish a scheme manager and regulations for the
scheme.
161 The scheme manager established was the Financial Services
Compensation Scheme Limited (FSCS Ltd). Regulations for the compensation
scheme were recently published. The FSA still has the administering role in the
conduct of operations in response to problem banks. In forming a view of the UK
deposit protection scheme a) qualifying conditions for compensation, b) limits for
and implications of payments and c) certain related issues are considered
below.
162
Qualifying conditions for compensation may be analysed by focusing on a
number of features of the provisions in question. Rules concerning the scope of
FSCS Ltd activities, eligible claimants, protected claims, definitions of bank
default etc. all constitute conditions. On the whole, the FSCS Ltd will only pay
claims if a bank is unable or likely to be unable to meet claims against it because
of financial circumstances. The more frequent term used in the legal text is
“banks in default”. Compensation is paid due to application. Regulations also
recognise criteria that should be met for a claimant to be considered as an eligible
claimant. Eligible claimants are claimants that are not large firms, collective
investment schemes, directors or managers of the bank, owners or auditors of the
bank etc. For the deposit to be protected, the deposit should be made in the UK or
at a branch of a UK bank in an EEA state. Moreover, the deposit should not be a
bond issued by a bank, a secured deposit or a non-nominative deposit, ie a deposit
made without disclosing the depositor’s identity. When considering the fact
whether a bank is in default, the regulations provide certain guidelines. First, a
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bank is in default when the FSCS Ltd has determined it to be in default. Second,
the FSCS Ltd may determine a bank to be in default when it is, in the opinion of
the FSCS Ltd or the FSA unable to satisfy protected claims against it or it is likely
to be unable to satisfy protected claims against it. Third, the FSCS Ltd may also
determine a bank to be in default if it is subject of UK proceedings concerning
a)  creditors’ voluntary winding up, b) appointment of a liquidator or an
administrator, c) compulsory winding up or administration or d) approval of a
company voluntary arrangement.
163
Claims meeting the qualifying conditions for compensation will be subject to
further regulations concerning the payment of compensation. These provisions
comprise both limits for and implications of compensation. The most important
features of the deposit protection scheme in this respect are the following. Outer
limits for FSCS action is set by the fact that the FSCS Ltd is required to use its
resources in the most efficient and economic way. The scheme states that the
FSCS Ltd may pay compensation, it does not oblige the FSCS Ltd to pay
compensation. Payment of compensation is linked to FSCS Ltd subrogation of
depositor rights according to FSCS Ltd judgement. In other words, the FSCS Ltd
may make any compensation conditional on the depositor assigning the whole or
any part of his rights to the FSCS Ltd on such terms that the FSCS Ltd thinks fit.
The FSCS Ltd must pay a claim as soon as reasonably possible after it is satisfied
that the qualifying conditions have been met and it has calculated the amount of
compensation due to the claimant. In any event, payment should be made within
three months of the above-mentioned date, unless the FSA has granted the FSCS
Ltd an extension. In this case, payment must be made no later than six months
from that date. The FSCS Ltd may also postpone paying compensation on certain
narrow grounds specified in the regulations.
164 The amount of compensation for
deposits (ie net claims) is limited to 100 percent of deposits up to GBP 2.000 and
90 percent of the next GBP 33.000. For the excess deposit (over GBP 35.000) no
compensation will be provided. This indicates that the maximum compensation
payable is GBP 31.700. If the FSCS Ltd is satisfied that compensation is payable,
but considers that immediate payment in full would not be prudent because of
uncertainty as to the amount of depositors net claims, the FSCS Ltd may decide to
pay a lesser sum or to make payment on account. The FSCS Ltd may also decide
to make a payment on account or to pay a lesser sum if depositors will receive
compensation in respect of the claim from a (any) third party. When it comes to
the payment of interest, the FSCS Ltd may pay interest on the compensation sum
in such circumstances that it considers appropriate. A depositor’s claim is the sum
of the protected claims of that person against the bank as an independent judicial
entity (ie despite the number of deposit accounts in different branches). A
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depositor’s net claim is the claim less the amount of any liability that the bank
may set off against the claim. If two or more persons have a joint beneficial claim
against the bank, and there is no satisfactory evidence as to their respective shares,
the FSCS Ltd must regard each person as entitled to an equal share.
165
Finally, there are some other related issues of interest when considering the
position of depositors under the UK protection scheme. Banks finance the FSCS
in accordance with the principles set out in the regulations (chapter 13). These
regulations entitle the FSCS Ltd to impose two types of levies. A management
expenses levy, and a compensation costs levy. In the first three full years of the
operation of the scheme, the FSCS Ltd may impose an establishment levy as part
of the management expenses levy. The FSCS Ltd has discretion as to the timing
of the levies imposed. Another central feature of the FSCS is the fact that the role
of the FSCS Ltd is restricted to paying off depositors only. FSCS funds may not
be used to assist banks. Similarly, the FSCS Ltd has no role in administering
problem banks.
166 In comparison with the US scheme significant differences exist
on this point. In the US, the FDIC has several options to handle bank failure.
Moreover, the UK Government does not provide any guarantee for deposits. In
principle, compensation for deposits is planned to be limited to collected FSCS
funds. The FSCS compensation fund consists of a number of sub-funds covering
deposits, investments and different types of insurance. The regulations allow
division of sub-funds into smaller entities covering banks with similar kinds of
activities. In addition to depositor compensation, compensation for investments
may actualise in connection with bank failures. This occurs if the bank has
handled the investment and there is a claim on the bank stemming from the
investment at the time of the bank failure. Currently, investments are compensated
entirely up to GBP 30.000 and to 90 percent for the next GBP 20.000. Procedures
for judicial review of FSCS Ltd decisions on compensation to depositors also
exist.
167
                                                
165 FSA regulations chapter 2–3, 7 and 9–12.
166 A special characteristic of the FSCS scheme is the fact that though the FSCS may not provide
banks with financial assistance as an alternative to paying off depositors, it may provide assistance
to an insurance undertaking in order to enable it to continue insurance business (FSA regulations
chapter 3.1.3.).
167 The previous UK deposit protection scheme was regulated in the former Banking Act part III
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The UK deposit protection scheme is a part of the UK Financial Services
Compensation Scheme (FSCS) and partly exceeds EU standards. – The deposit
protection coverage is dependent on the character of the depositor, ie the cover
applies to private persons and small companies. The compensation to be paid is
100 percent of deposits up to GBP 2.000 and 90 percent of the next GBP 33.000.
   The FSCS Ltd should pay claims as soon as reasonably possible in the case of
bank default. Subrogation of depositor rights against the bank may be a condition
(due to FSCS Ltd discretion) for the payment of compensation. The UK deposit
protection scheme does not enable the FSCS Ltd to assist banks financially.
Funds may be used only for the pay off of depositors.
   The banks finance the UK deposit protection scheme. The deposit protection
scheme constitutes a sub-fund under the FSCS. In principle it is possible to
further divide the sub-fund into smaller entities comprising similar banks. The
UK Government does not guarantee the depositor protection scheme.
4.2.2 Frankfurt (Germany)
Depositors of German banks are currently protected by two deposit protection
schemes. With the coming into force of the Deposit Guarantee and Investor
Compensation Act on August 1
st 1998, a statutory and compulsory Deposit
Guarantee and Investor Compensation Scheme was introduced for the banks.
Hitherto, depositors, and certain other creditors, of German banks were protected
by the voluntary Deposit Protection Scheme set up by the Association of
German Banks. Since 1998 the voluntary Deposit Protection Scheme has been
complementary to the statutory scheme. In detail this means that not only the
deductions made by the statutory scheme to each depositor are compensated by
the voluntary scheme. Deposits exceeding the limits in the statutory scheme and
various depositors not entitled to compensation from the statutory scheme will
receive compensation in accordance with the provisions of the voluntary
scheme.
168 – In order to cover both schemes the analysis will focus on certain
features of the schemes. These features comprise a) the scope of compensation,
b)  the compensation procedure and c) resources available to the compensation
schemes.
The scope of compensation for the German statutory scheme may be
described by concentrating on the definition of the term deposit, the depositor’s
character and the amount of compensation. – According to the Deposit Guarantee
and Investor Compensation Act s. 1 the term deposit means any credit balance
which results from funds left in an account or from temporary situations deriving
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from normal banking transactions of an institution and which it must repay under
the legal and contractual conditions applicable. These also include debts
evidenced by a certificate issued by an institution, but not bearer or certain other
bonds and liabilities in respect of own bills. – In the statutory scheme the
character of the depositor is central for the right to compensation. No right to
compensation is granted to credit or financial institutions, insurance enterprises
and investment companies and foreign UCITS.
169 Similarly, government, land and
local authorities as well as managers, certain owners, auditors and creditors of and
enterprises within the same group of companies are excluded from compensation.
Moreover, relatives of the above-mentioned persons, creditors with advantageous
contracts that have caused the bank’s financial difficulties and creditors of claims
relating to money laundering will not receive compensation. The claim of the
person entitled to compensation scheme is barred under the Statute of Limitations
after five years. Disputes about the reasons and amount of the claim to
compensation may be settled under the Code of Civil Procedure. – The amount of
compensation shall take into account any set off and counterclaims of the bank.
170
There is no claim to compensation to the extent that deposits or funds are not
denominated in EUR or the currency of an EEA-state. The amount of the claim to
compensation is limited to 90 per cent of the deposits and the equivalent of EUR
20.000. The claim to compensation includes also the interest accrued until
settlement of the claim. The limit to compensation shall apply to the creditor’s
aggregate claim on the institution, irrespective of the number of accounts and the
location where the accounts are held. In the case of joint accounts the limit
provided shall be based on each account holder’s share. If the creditor has acted
for the account of a third party, the limit provided shall apply to the third party.
Provisions concerning the compensation procedure require the Financial
Supervisory Authority (FSA) to act not later than 21 days after receiving notice
that a bank is unable to repay its deposits.
171 The FSA shall determine that
compensation is payable immediately. The depositor receives a direct claim on
the compensation scheme. The ruling shall be notified and made public.
Objections to and appeals against the ruling have no postponing effect. The
compensation scheme shall immediately notify the creditors of the bank that
compensation is payable and take appropriate measures to compensate the
creditors within three months of the date when it was determined that
compensation is payable. The claim to compensation shall be submitted in writing
to the compensation scheme within one year from the date of notification that
compensation is payable. The compensation scheme shall immediately check the
claims submitted and pay them not later than three months after the establishment
                                                
169 The Deposit Guarantee and Investor Compensation Act s. 3.
170 The Deposit Guarantee and Investor Compensation Act s. 4.
171 The Deposit Guarantee and Investor Compensation Act s. 5.66
of eligibility and the amount of claims. In special cases the period may be
extended by up to three months with the approval of the FSA. To the extent that
the compensation scheme pays the claim to compensation of an eligible person,
the latter’s claims on the bank are transferred to the compensation scheme
(subrogation of depositor rights).
In practice, the Deposit Guarantee and Investor Compensation Scheme
comprises two schemes, one concerning deposits and the other concerning
investments. – Currently, the one concerning deposits is administered as an
entrusted scheme by the Association of German Banks and the Association of
Public Banks under the supervision of the FSA. There are two types of resources
available to the statutory scheme concerning deposits, ie contributions and loans.
The funds for paying compensation are raised by contributions from the banks.
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Banks must cover their deposits through membership of the scheme. The banks
are required to pay annual contributions and the scheme may set a non-recurring
payment for banks paying contributions for the first time. If funds available for
paying compensation suffice contributions may be lowered or suspended. The
funds accumulated for compensation shall be invested, with a view to diversifying
the risk, in a way that ensures the maximum security and adequate liquidity of the
assets while earning a reasonable yield. The scheme shall collect special
contributions and take up loans if this is necessary to carry out the compensation
procedure. The Ministry of Finance (MoF) regulates the details of the scheme.
The Federal Government does not guarantee the scheme. – The scheme
concerning investments has been set up at the Reconstruction Loan Corporation
(Kreditanstalt fur Wiederaufbau, KfW). In line with the EU Investor
Compensation Directive compensation is paid for unpaid claims rising from
investments in the event of the institution’s (including banks) default that handled
the investments. Compensation is limited to 90 per cent of the liabilities arising
from investment business and the equivalent of EUR 20.000.
As mentioned initially, the voluntary Deposit Protection Scheme for the
banks at the Association of German Banks will continue to be operated alongside
the statutory scheme. The voluntary Deposit Protection Scheme constitutes the
voluntary Deposit Protection Fund. The purpose of the fund is to give assistance,
a) in the interest of depositors, b) in the event of imminent or actual financial
difficulties of banks, c) particularly when the suspension of payments is
imminent, d) in order to prevent the impairment of public confidence in private
banks.
173 All measures likely to be of assistance may be used. – As for the scope
of compensation, the voluntary scheme will protect all liabilities of banks to non-
banks for each creditor up to a protection ceiling of 30 per cent of the liable
                                                
172 The Deposit Guarantee and Investor Compensation Act s. 8.
173 By-laws of the Deposit Protection Fund s. 2.67
capital of the bank concerned.
174 The liable capital consists of the total sum of
core capital and additional capital measured at the time of the last published
annual accounts. Liabilities in respect of which the bank has issued bonds payable
to bearer and certain other liabilities are not protected. Also not protected are
liabilities to managers of the bank, certain owners, relatives to or third persons
acting on the account of the above-mentioned persons. In computing protected
liabilities all liabilities to one creditor are added together and counterclaims of the
bank are deducted even if these are not yet due. Within the limits of the protection
ceiling, payments also cover interest claims. However, the Fund makes payments
only for interest at market rates.
The By-laws of the Deposit Protection Fund comprise few provisions on the
compensation procedure, ie the actual payment of the compensation to depositors
and other creditors. No time limits for payment of compensation are defined in the
By-laws. Specific provisions exist concerning the absence of any right to enforce
intervention or payments by the Fund.
175 Furthermore, the Fund may only provide
compensation insofar as deposits are not covered by another protection scheme as
provided for under the Deposit Guarantee and Investor Compensation Act. –
Participation in the voluntary Deposit Protection Fund is linked to membership of
the Association of German Banks. According to the main rule, banks that are
members of the Association are obliged to participate in the Fund.
176 There are
several conditions for the participation in the Fund (sufficient liable capital, A-
rating according to the Association’s own rating procedure, membership of the
Auditing Association of German Banks etc.) as well as specified criteria for the
exclusion of a bank from participating in the Fund. The Fund’s resources stem
from participation fees.
177 The banks pay a yearly contribution to the Association
depending on certain balance sheet items and the banks’ ratings. In addition,
newly admitted banks make a non-recurrent payment. The Association may
suspend the payment of the annual contribution if the assets of the Fund have
reached a reasonable level. The By-laws of the Fund do not include any
provisions on the refinancing of the Fund. There is no Government guarantee for
the Fund.
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174 By-laws of the Deposit Protection Fund s. 6.
175 By-laws of the Deposit Protection Fund s. 6.
176 By-laws of the Deposit Protection Fund s. 2a.
177 By-laws of the Deposit Protection Fund s. 5.
178 There are two other features of relevance to the depositor (and especially to the deposit
protection schemes). The first is the fact that claims against German banks arising from deposits
are not priority claims in an eventual realisation of the bank’s assets. The second is the
establishment of the Liquidity Consortium Bank (Liquiditäts-Konsortialbank) in 1974. In order to
prevent liquidity crises in the wake of bank failures, the Central Bank and all groups in the
German banking industry joined forces to set up the bank. The bank grants, as and when
necessary, liquidity assistance to banks of unquestioned soundness.68
The German deposit protection system consists of two different schemes. There
is the statutory scheme and the voluntary scheme. The voluntary scheme is
complementary. If the funds of the voluntary scheme are sufficient, the voluntary
scheme will provide far better terms for compensation than the statutory one.
      The statutory scheme is required to compensate non-financial institution
depositors for 90 percent of their deposits up to a limit of EUR 20.000. The
scheme is to pay compensation in three months from the establishment of the
claims. As a result of compensation paid, subrogation of depositor rights will
occur. The statutory scheme may not provide banks with direct financial
assistance. The funds collected may be used only to pay off depositors. The
statutory scheme is refinanced through contributions by the banks and eventual
borrowing. The German Government does not guarantee the statutory scheme.
      The Association of German Banks operates the voluntary scheme.
Compensation is paid only to member bank depositors and creditors. The scheme
may compensate depositors and non-bank creditors of banks up to 30 percent of
the liable capital of the bank in question. Claims in the forms of bonds are not
protected. No time limits for payment exist. The detailed use of scheme funds is
not regulated. In principle, funds may be used for paying off depositors, assisting
banks directly, financing mergers etc. The voluntary scheme’s resources stem
from participation fees. The Government does not guarantee the voluntary
scheme either.
4.2.3 Helsinki (Finland)
The Finnish depositor-related rules may be analysed in many ways. One way to
handle the dilemma is to choose the risks that confront the depositors as a starting
point. As a result, one may distinguish between three aspects when analysing the
regulation, ie a) the risk of depositor’s capital loss, b) the liquidity aspect and
c) the level of uncertainty confronting the depositor.
179
The risk of depositor’s capital loss may be estimated by analysing the
regulations concerning cash reserves and depositors’ capital loss. These
provisions are included in the Law concerning Credit Institutions (1607/1993)
chapter 7 and 6a, respectively. The regulations state that a deposit bank has to
have a cash reserve that amounts to 10 percent of its liabilities and be a member of
a deposit guarantee fund.
180 The deposit guarantee fund guarantees each
depositor’s deposits up to EUR 25.000 per deposit bank (FIM 150.000). In case
when the deposits relate to the selling of depositors’ dwellings, the deposit is, if
certain criteria are met, guaranteed to its full amount. The obligation for the
                                                
179 The Finnish bank exit-reform in 2002 only resulted in minor changes for the depositors of
Finnish banks. The Law concerning Credit Institutions (1607/1993), directing the Finnish deposit
insurance system, was mostly unaffected by the reform.
180 The Law concerning Credit Institutions chapter 7, 67§ and chapter 6a, 65§.69
deposit guarantee fund to guarantee the deposits emerges if the deposit bank has
not returned deposits as a consequence of the bank’s liquidity or other financial
problems and the problems are not (according to the FSA) temporary.
181 The
deposit guarantee fund refinances its activities by supportive fees collected from
deposit banks. The deposit guarantee fund may borrow capital if its own assets are
not sufficient to cover its liabilities. The rules of the deposit guarantee fund should
include provisions on the members’ obligation to lend capital to the deposit
guarantee fund when capital is needed to cover the liabilities of the fund. The
assets of the deposit guarantee fund are independent of the member banks’
assets.
182
Another aspect of importance to the depositor is the liquidity aspect. The
moment when the depositor may receive his money if the bank is faced with
problems is of concern to the depositor. In this case the Law concerning Credit
Institutions differentiates between a) commencement of the fund’s liability to pay
out the funds and b) payment of the funds. The commencement of the fund’s
liability to pay out the funds is dependent on the FSA’s decision. The initiative for
the decision may come from depositors, the bank in question or any other source.
The FSA has to decide whether the criteria for the commencement of the deposit
guarantee fund’s liabilities are met. The provisions concerning the payment of the
funds state that the guarantee fund should make an announcement to the
depositors and pay out the capital in three months time from the date of the FSA
decision. As an exception, if the bank’s liquidation has started earlier, the period
should be calculated from this earlier date. In the case of special conditions, the
FSA is entitled to postpone the pay out of funds on the initiative of the guarantee
fund. Postponement may be granted three times, a maximum of three months each
time. If payment has not been made in due time, the depositor receives a legal
claim against the guarantee fund.
183
Still, there is some uncertainty affecting Finnish depositors. This uncertainty
may be analysed by constructing a number of scenarios. In principle, there are
three scenarios representing uncertainty for Finnish depositors. The EUR 25.000
limit and also the fact whether the bank is a member of a guarantee fund (not the
deposit guarantee fund) are relevant when making assumptions about the
uncertainty. First, there is the situation of the deposit exceeding the limit and the
bank being a member of a voluntary guarantee fund. In this case the regulations
concerning voluntary guarantee funds in the Law concerning Credit Institutions
chapter 6 are applied. According to these regulations the guarantee fund may
grant supportive loans or subsidies to a deposit bank in financial distress, if the
loans or subsidies are necessary to uphold the activities of the bank. The decision
                                                
181 The Law concerning Credit Institutions chapter 6a, 65i and 65j§§.
182 The Law concerning Credit Institutions chapter 6a 65c–h and 65n§§.
183 The Law concerning Credit Institutions chapter 6a 65i and 65k§§.70
must have Ministry of Finance (MoF) approval. The guarantee fund’s assets con-
sist of the fees that the member banks have paid the guarantee fund.
184 If needed,
the guarantee fund may in turn receive supportive loans and guarantees from the
Government’s Guarantee Fund according to the Law concerning the
Government’s Guarantee Fund (379/1992). An additional requirement is that the
supportive loans and guarantees are necessary to secure the stable functioning of
the financial markets. The Government’s Guarantee Fund may refinance itself to a
total balance of EUR 3,5 billion. The Finnish Government decides on supportive
loans and guarantees from the Government’s Guarantee Fund. – In other words,
the risk for capital loss to the extent that the deposit exceeds EUR 25.000 may be
smaller when the deposit bank is a member of a guarantee fund.
185
The second scenario is the situation where the deposit exceeds the limit and
the deposit bank is not a member of a guarantee fund. In this case no supportive
loans or subsidies can be issued by an eventual guarantee fund. In order to secure
the activities of a deposit bank and the stable functioning of the financial markets
the Government’s Guarantee Fund may directly invest in the bank’s shares, issue
guarantees for the bank’s loans or give subsidies to the bank.
186 The bank’s
financial distress is not a sufficient motive for support as was the case with
voluntary guarantee funds. In this second case support may be granted only if the
bank’s problems affect the stable functioning of financial markets. This means
that the risk for the loss of the deposit to the extent it exceeds EUR 25.000
increases. The third scenario is when the deposit is below the limit and the deposit
guarantee fund is not sufficient (despite its borrowing) to cover the total amount
of deposits. Until 1998, the statement made by the Finnish Parliament in 1993 to
guarantee the functioning of the banking system in any situation would have
resulted in supportive action by the state to protect depositors. The statement was
revoked in 1998. No legal obligation to act exists for the state anymore. It is
difficult to estimate how such a situation would be handled in practice.
                                                
184 The Law concerning Credit Institutions chapter 6 59 and 61§§.
185 The Law concerning the Government’s Guarantee Fund 11, 14 and 15§§.
186 The Law concerning the Government’s Guarantee Fund 1§.71
The Finnish deposit insurance system is fairly straightforward. Depositor
protection is provided through deposit guarantee funds. Fund membership is
compulsory for banks. The deposit guarantee funds should not be mixed up with
voluntary guarantee funds aiming at securing the activities of banks by providing
financial assistance. – The Finnish deposit insurance system covers avista and
time deposits up to EUR 25.000 per depositor and bank. When a bank faces
financial problems that are not classified as temporary by the FSA the depositor
receives a legal claim against the deposit guarantee fund.
   The time limit for the payment of compensation to depositors is calculated
from the FSA’s above-mentioned decision. Payment of compensation should be
made in three months from that date. Payment results in fund subrogation of
depositor rights. As in other EU countries, depositor claims are in no priority
relative to other claims. Deposit guarantee funds may not be used to assist banks.
   Deposit guarantee funds are refinanced through supportive fees from the banks.
Funds may borrow capital if assets are insufficient to cover liabilities. Deposit
guarantee funds are not explicitly guaranteed by the state.
Though the provisions directing the Finnish deposit insurance system were mostly
unaffected by the bank exit-reform in 2002 some consequences of the reform for
depositors may be detected. First, the new Law concerning Commercial Banks
(1501/2001) excludes depositors from the creditor hearing during voluntary
reorganisation of banks (in accordance with the Law concerning Limited Liability
Companies 734/1978). Second, the new law prohibits a depositor, who should be
fully compensated by a deposit guarantee fund, to initiate bankruptcy for the bank.
Moreover, depositors do not have to lodge their claims in bank bankruptcy and
pursuant to the Law concerning Temporary Suspension of the Activities of a
Deposit Bank (1509/2001) a bank is not entitled to receive deposits during the
suspension without MoF approval.
187
4.3 The depositor and the reorganisation and liquidation of
banks in Tokyo
As described in section 3.3 the role of the Deposit Insurance Corporation (DIC)
has steadily increased as the crisis in the Japanese financial sector has continued.
Still, DIC’s original mandate was limited to collecting insurance premiums and
paying off insured depositors of failed banks. Ironically, insured depositors have
never been paid off in Japan. Problem banks have always been dealt with in some
other manner. Anyway, as a “backup” legislation diminishing systemic risk the
provisions concerning deposit insurance are important. Eventually, one could
                                                
187 The Law concerning Commercial Banks chapter 2 6§ and chapter 6 22–23§§.72
claim that they are so fundamental that the authorities have never dared to apply
them. – In order to analyse the provisions in the Japanese Deposit Insurance Law
to the extent that these concern the payoff of insured deposits the text below is
structured in the following way. First, main characteristics of the system are
covered. Then, the question how payment is made in practice is looked into more
closely. Finally, the resources that constitute the system are considered.
188
Describing  the main characteristics of the Japanese deposit insurance
system, there are some important aspects that should receive attention. These
characteristics relate to the extended scope of compensation and DIC’s role as a
representative of depositor rights. – The question of the extended scope of
compensation is a characteristic of the Japanese system that distinguishes it from
most other deposit protection schemes. The extension was made in 1996. The
extended scope of compensation means that the DIC not only pays insurance
money to the depositors up to the specified level, it also purchases principal and
interest in excess of that specified level. Purchase of excess principal and interest
will be made at a prorated value. The prorated value is the amount of deposit on
the day of the bank’s failure multiplied by a rate determined in light of the
expected amount to be repaid from bankruptcy procedures. In other words, the
DIC assumes the role of the depositor (subrogation of depositor rights) also in
excess of the amount of the deposit insured. In strategic terms this means that the
problem concerning the future of the bank, ie the liquidation of the bank, more
clearly becomes the problem of a narrow group of insiders, the DIC, the bank’s
traditional creditors and the shareholders. Another factor of relevance when
considering extensions of the scope of compensation relates to the changes in the
level of compensation. In the Japanese legislation the term deposit refers to yen-
denominated deposits, time deposits, instalment contributions, funds receivable
under money trust agreements and funds receivable through the issuance of
securities.
189 As a result of JPY inflation, the level of deposit cover has been
increased. In 1971 the level of cover was set at JPY three million per depositor.
The 1986 amendments to the Deposit Insurance Law led to an increase of the
level up to JPY 10 million.
190 In 1996, due to the financial sector crisis, the
                                                
188 The Deposit Insurance Law, introduced in 1971, was amended in 1986, 1996, 1998 and 2001.
The 1986 and 1996 amendments resulted in changes for the payment of insured depositors. – As
referred to above the original mandate of the Japanese DIC was limited to the pay off of insured
depositors of failed banks. As a consequence of the reforms of the legislation concerning
reorganisation and liquidation of financial institutions the powers of the DIC were steadily
increased and it became one of the main players in the administration of the crisis in the Japanese
financial sector. This development did not weaken the DIC’s role as a protector of the depositors
in the eventual pay off of insured depositors. The transformation of DIC’s role towards an active
administrator of crises only made its possible role as a pure payer more unlikely.
189 The Deposit Insurance Law s. 2.
190 The Deposit Insurance Law s. 54.73
Japanese government promised to protect the full value of all deposits for a five-
year period. In 2001 this period was prolonged to 2002.
In principle, DIC’s role as a representative of depositor rights may be
analysed in many ways. To sum up, there are three dimensions that one should
focus on when describing DIC’s role. From 1971 to 1996 DIC received, in the
hypothetical case of a pay-off of insured depositors, the depositors’ rights against
the debtor bank to the extent payment based on insurance was made to the
depositor (traditional subrogation rights). Pursuant to the 1996 amendment of the
Deposit Insurance Law the subrogation rights also covered principal and interest
in excess of the level of compensation (transferred rights in connection with
extended cover). Finally, according to the 1996 amendment the DIC was allowed
to exercise depositor rights (represent depositors) in the reorganisation of banks.
This last amendment was also significant because the transfer of rights to the DIC
did not require the pay off of insured depositors nor final documentation of the
bank’s insolvency.
191
The question “How is payment made in practice to insured depositors?” is
another central issue when considering the Japanese deposit insurance system.
The most important aspects relating to this issue concern the criteria for the
initiation of payment, the time period during which payment to depositors should
be made and measures taken in order to strengthen depositors position in the case
of a pay-off. One of the main criteria for the initiation of payment to depositors, ie
the establishment of DIC’s obligation to pay, is the inability of a bank to refund
deposits. Inability to refund may be the consequence of the bank’s inadequate
liquidity or insolvency. Inability to pay may in some circumstances be difficult to
prove. In theory, the fact that the bank does not meet its obligations to depositors
is only an indication of inability. Another feature of the Japanese deposit
insurance system concerns the formal opening of bankruptcy proceedings. The
Japanese Deposit Insurance Law states that the initiation of bankruptcy
proceedings generates an obligation for the DIC to pay off insured depositors.
This automatic mechanism has been criticised. One tendency in the development
of bank exit legislation has namely been to secure conditions for the continuance
of bank activities. This has been done to protect the value of the bank while
searching for an appropriate solution to the bank’s problems.
The time period during which payment to depositors should be made is
defined in the Deposit Insurance Law.
192 According to the current legislation the
                                                
191 Another feature of the Japanese system is the common fact that financial institutions engaged in
investment services in accordance with the Securities and Exchange Law are required to
participate in an investor protection scheme. Consequently, banks offering investment services
should maintain a parallel protection scheme covering losses that stem from the default of the bank
(ie broker) handling the investments.
192 The Deposit Insurance Law ss. 53 and 56.74
DIC shall make a determination whether to pay claims within one month of claim
occurrence. This period may be extended by one additional month by the Prime
Minister’s Office. Before the 1986 amendments to the Deposit Insurance Law
determination was to be made within one month from claim occurrence without
possible extensions. Several measures to improve the position of the depositor in
the case of a pay-off have also been taken. In 1986, pursuant to the major reforms
of the law, payment procedures were improved by simplifying the a) depositor
identification process and b) introducing a suspense payment system allowing for
payments of up to JPY 200.000 to meet living expenses. In 1996, the position of
the depositor was further improved. The launch of the above-mentioned deposit
purchase system under which the DIC would provide depositors with the amounts
of money (above the JPY 10 million limit) which were expected from the bank’s
bankruptcy improved the liquidity of bank depositors. Depositors did not have to
wait for the conclusion of court procedures anymore.
The resources that constitute the deposit insurance system are the final
main element of the system. As for the DIC’s role, DIC was established as a
special corporation in 1971 in accordance with the Deposit Insurance Law for the
purpose of administering the deposit insurance system. The DIC had an initial
capital of JPY 5,5 billion from the Japanese Government, the Bank of Japan (the
BoJ) and private financial institutions. A Management Committee administers the
DIC and as referred to above the duties and obligations of the DIC have steadily
expanded since 1971. When considering the resources of the DIC, two factors
should be taken into account. First, DIC finance to the financial sector comprises
both financial assistance and depositor pay-off. Second, assistance to the financial
sector has been and may also be directed through other channels than the DIC.
Many banks have used BoJ lender of last resort-capital to defeat liquidity
problems. Moreover, in the former crises banks have eg been partly rescued by
creditors (mainly other banks) relinquishing claims.75
The role of the Japanese deposit insurance system has changed significantly over
time. All banks are obliged to take part in the system. The Deposit Insurance
Corporation’s (DIC) original mandate was limited to the paying off of
depositors. As a result of crises DIC powers have been increased. – The limit for
depositor compensation has been JPY 10 million since 1986. Still, the Japanese
Government has currently promised to protect the full value of deposits under all
circumstances.
   The DIC shall decide whether to pay compensation to depositors within one
month of claim occurrence. The condition for payment is the fact that the bank is
unable to refund deposits. Payment to depositors is followed by DIC subrogation
of depositor rights. Depositor claims do not have priority in the realisation of the
bank’s assets. As an alternative to paying off depositors, DIC may provide banks
with financial assistance.
   Membership fees, borrowing and injections of public funds have been used to
finance the deposit insurance system.
The refinancing of DIC financial assistance to banks and eventual pay-off of
depositors has been handled by different kinds of contribution fees and borrowing
with and without government guarantees. – The level of contribution fees payable
by the banks to the DIC has been raised several times.
193 In 1986 the fees were
raised from 0,008 percent to 0,012 percent and in 1996 from 0,012 percent to
0,048 percent. An additional temporary fee was introduced in 1996 as the
Japanese Government guaranteed all deposits for the coming five years. This fee
rose to 0,036 percent of deposits. Internationally, the ratio of insurance fund
reserves to covered deposits has been low in Japan. – Another avenue to secure
the refinancing of the DIC’s mandate is borrowing. The DIC may borrow with or
without government guarantee. DIC borrowing has been restricted in several ways
over the years. In 1986, borrowing from private financial institutions was
explicitly sanctioned. As a result, borrowing limits from the BoJ were raised from
JPY 50 billion to 500 billion. The current limit is JPY four trillion. Unfortunately,
in 1997 the DIC was forced to borrow from private financial institutions to repay
BoJ capital. Today, the DIC may borrow from the BoJ, financial institutions or
other parties on certain grounds listed in the Deposit Insurance Law ss. 42,68 and
                                                
193 Contribution fees are currently calculated as an average of the deposit stock during the previous
fiscal year. Before 2001 fees were calculated based on the amount of deposits at the end of March
each year.76
126. In 1998 DIC received the right to issue bonds and obtained government
guarantees for its borrowing.
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5 Bank reorganisation and liquidation relative to
bank shareholders
5.1 Bank exit in the USA
Contrary to many other financial centres the distinction between voluntary and
compulsory reorganisation and liquidation measures in the US is very apparent.
When it comes to compulsory action, the initiation of conservatorship and
receivership constitute a clear abolishion of all administrative rights of the
shareholders. But the reorganisation and liquidation of US banks may also be
carried out on voluntary grounds. Solvent banks and banks that do not meet any
judicial criteria for conservatorship or receivership may reorganise or dissolve
voluntarily. In these situations, the shareholders decide on what measures to take,
if necessary with the co-operation of parties involved.
195 – In order to analyse the
reorganisation and liquidation of US national banks from the shareholders’
perspective a) voluntary alternatives for the reorganisation and liquidation of US
banks will be studied after which b) the position of the shareholders under
conservatorship and receivership is considered.
There are several voluntary measures for the reorganisation and
liquidation of banks that US shareholders may use in a discretionary sense. The
main alternative means for reorganisation comprise a) changes in the bank’s share
capital, b) consolidations and mergers and c) acquisitions and transfers.
Liquidation may in turn be put into effect through voluntary dissolution. –
Changes in the share capital of a national bank are frequently used measures for
the rehabilitation of US banks.
196 12 U.S.C. chapter 2 s. 57 deals with the increase
of capital. The capital stock of banks may eg be increased in order to strengthen
the capital adequacy of banks and prevent banks becoming undercapitalised. In
conformity with the regulation, the banks’ capital may be increased by the vote of
shareholders owning two thirds of the stock of the bank. To be valid, the
                                                
194 To handle DIC activities a large number of financial entities have been established in
connection with the DIC. The Resolution and Collection Corporation (RCC, mentioned in section
3.3.), a subsidiary bank of the DIC and responsible for several of DIC’s detailed duties, is the best-
known example of such an entity. Several funds have also been founded to deal with individual
crises.
195 For a comprehensive presentation of the US bank exit regime see section 3.1.
196 Changes in the share capital are regulated in the 12 U.S.C chapter 2 ss. 55, 57 and 59.77
strengthening of capital requires that the capital is paid in, the increase is
registered and approved by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC).
The 12 U.S.C chapter 2 s. 59 regulates the reduction of share capital by vote of
shareholders. The share capital of banks may eg be reduced in a situation where
losses have generated a deficit in the banks’ own funds and the regulations force
banks to act. In principle, section 59 identifies two stages in the decision-making
process. The decision on reducing the capital is separated from the decision on
distributing the assets stemming from the reduction. Both decisions require the
vote of shareholders owning two thirds of the bank’s capital stock and OCC
approval. The US federal banking regulation does not call for the consent of bank
creditors when reducing the capital stock. Another feature associated with the
change of banks’ share capital is the payment of any deficiency in the capital
stock.
197 Usually the deficiency is a result of repeated losses. The provisions state
that the deficiency should be paid by the shareholders on a pro rata basis and in
proportion within three months after receiving notice thereof from the OCC. If no
payment is made during this time, the bank should go into liquidation or a
receiver should be appointed. The neglect or refusal of any shareholder to fulfil
his obligation may lead to the sale of the stock of such a shareholder at a public
auction.
Other voluntary measures to reorganise banks include consolidations and
mergers.
198 On the whole, the provisions concerning voluntary consolidations and
mergers by national banks are fairly complex. Relevant regulative dimensions
when estimating the applicability of legislative provisions include a) the type of
conversion, ie consolidation or merger, b) the status of the delivering institution or
institutions and c) the character of the receiving or continuing institution. As for
the type of conversion a consolidation of banks may be defined as a measure
whereby a bank is consolidated with another bank without creating a new judicial
entity. The owners of the delivering bank usually receive shares in the receiving
bank. A merger may be described as a measure whereby banks merge into a new
bank, ie a new judicial entity replacing the old banks. Consolidations and mergers
usually require the vote of the shareholders owning at least two thirds of the
institution’s capital stock for each institution involved together with OCC
approval.
Acquisitions and transfers differ from consolidations and mergers in that these
are generally based on traditional purchase or exchange transactions. Acquisitions
and transfers may include assets, liabilities or activities of banks. Acquisitions are
regulated in the 12 U.S.C. chapter 2 s. 215c to the extent they result in national
banks receiving control of other banks. In these cases OCC approval is needed.
                                                
197 12 U.S.C. chapter 2 s. 55.
198 The most important regulations concerning consolidations and mergers of US national banks
comprise the 12 U.S.C. chapter 2 ss. 215–215c and chapter 16 ss. 1831u and 1828c.78
The 12 U.S.C chapter 16 s. 1828c concerning acquisitions made by insured banks
and transfers from insured banks is more comprehensive. Most cases require OCC
approval. Acquisition of stock (of banks or other companies) is separately
regulated and may also at some stage involve the provisions concerning holding
companies. – Voluntary liquidation is another measure that shareholders may use
to wind up the affairs of banks.
199 In principle the legislation constitutes two
routes for the liquidation of national banks. Insured banks may follow the
receivership procedure when dissolving on voluntary grounds. As a result the
interests of the depositors are well protected. According to the provisions, an
insured bank may by resolution of its board of directors or its shareholders decide
on the appointment of a receiver. The provisions in 12 U.S.C. chapter 2 also
create an OCC-supervised voluntary liquidation scheme. No explicit rights are
given to the creditors. Voluntary liquidation requires the vote of bank
shareholders owning two-thirds of the bank’s stock.
Finally, a few words may be said about the shareholders’ position under
conservator- and receivership. The consequences of conservatorship and
receivership for the shareholders may be illustrated by focusing on the
conservator’s or receiver’s a) administering powers, b) contractual powers and
c) supportive powers. – In case of administering powers the 12 U.S.C. chapter 18
s. 1821d states that the FDIC shall, as a successor to the bank, succeed to all
rights, titles, powers and privileges of the bank’s stockholders and take over the
assets of and operate the bank with all the shareholders’ powers. As a result, all
the administrative powers of the shareholders’ are transferred to the conservator
or receiver. In case of conservatorship the withdrawal is temporary whilst in case
of receivership it is final. In both cases the financial rights of the shareholders
remain. Assets will be distributed by the receiver to the shareholders in
accordance with the priority principles directing the dissolution of the bank. –
Contractual powers are here defined to mean the powers of the conservator or
receiver to make contracts with the insured bank or its representatives. Certain
restrictions concerning this type of agreements are included in the 12 U.S.C.
chapter 16 s. 1823c. These provisions state that the FDIC may not use its authority
to purchase the shares of an insured bank. In other words, the whole risk for the
bank’s problems should be carried by the shareholders. – The regulations
concerning the conservator’s or receiver’s supportive powers are also coherent
with these latter provisions. 12 U.S.C. chapter 16 s. 1823c states that eventual
financial assistance to insured banks may be subordinated in relation to other
claims against the banks. Still, financial assistance may only be subordinated in
                                                
199 Voluntary liquidation of US national banks is regulated in 12 U.S.C. chapter 2 ss. 181–182 and
chapter 16 ss. 1821c.79
relation to depositors’ or creditors’ claims. Financial assistance may not be
subordinated in relation to shareholders’ share capital based claims.
200
The position of US bank shareholders under conservator- and receivership is
relatively weak. Shareholders lose all their administrative rights when the
compulsory reorganisation and liquidation procedures start. – When the bank
faces financial problems, OCC/FDIC action is not dependent on shareholder
opinion or decision. The authorities should choose the least-cost alternative (for
the Deposit Insurance Fund) of the following options, ie financial assistance to
the bank, paying off depositors, reorganisation or liquidation. – Under adequate
conditions, the shareholders may voluntarily initiate reorganisation or liquidation
of a US bank.
      Financial assistance to banks does not abolish shareholder value. Usually,
financial assistance to banks takes the form of subordinated or ordinary debt. In a
priority sense, FDIC assistance must not equal or be below the rights that the
shares of the bank represent in an eventual realisation of the bank’s assets. – In
theory, the criteria for the initiation of compulsory reorganisation and liquidation
are very detailed. According to the “Prompt Corrective Action” (PCA) scheme, a
ratio of tangible equity to total assets equal or less than two percent
entitles/obliges the authorities to act. – Provisions also oblige the FDIC to protect
the “going-concern” value of the bank during reorganisation and liquidation.
5.2 EU bank exit from the shareholders’ perspective – the
case of UK, Germany and Finland
201
5.2.1 UK
In analysing aspects of the UK bank reorganisation and liquidation legislation of
interest to bank shareholders there are many potential elements that may or
should receive attention. Concentrating on the procedures not analysed in section
3.2.1 the focus inevitably will be on voluntary measures initiated by the bank and
its shareholders. Still, some further viewpoints will cover shareholder position
pursuant to the compulsory reorganisation and liquidation measures presented in
section 3.2.1. – The voluntary measures comprise a) business transfers according
                                                
200 Judicial review of agency decisions relating to the interests of shareholders is possible under
and on general grounds specified in the Administrative Procedure Law (5 U.S.C. chapter 7).
201 Concerning the provisional administrator’s powers in compulsory reorganisation of problem
banks the verdict by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in the “Panagis Pafitis” case
((C-441/93):1996 2 CMLR 551) is central. The ECJ confirmed that art. 25 of the Second Company
Law Directive 77/91 disallowed a (Greek national) regulation that permitted an appointed
administrator to increase a bank’s (in the form of a stock company) capital without the decision of
the sharehold-ers’ meeting.80
to the Financial Services and Markets Act (FSMA) part VII, b) arrangements and
reconstructions based on the Companies Act 1985 part XIII, c) the reduction or
increase of share capital in accordance with the Companies Act part V chapter I
and IV and d) the members’ voluntary winding up pursuant to the Insolvency Act
part IV chapter II and III.
202
As mentioned, banking business transfers are regulated in the FSMA part
VII. According to the main rule, the provisions apply independent of the judicial
form of the transfer of banking business. A banking business transfer scheme is a
scheme where the transfer of assets includes the accepting of deposits. The
regulations state that the banking business transfer requires different kinds of
acceptances. First, a certificate as to financial resources for the transferee issued
by the Financial Services Authority (FSA) is needed. Furthermore, an order by the
court for the banking business transfers scheme to have effect is required. If the
transferee is not a financial service provider or a bank, authorisation and
permission are also required. In the case the provisions in the Companies Act part
XIII s. 427a concerning mergers and divisions of public companies (see below)
apply to the business transfer in question, the transfer is excluded from the
specific provisions in the FSMA part VII.
203
The regulations concerning arrangements and reconstructions in the
Companies Act part XIII establish a separate procedure for the reorganisation of
banks. The procedure involves the bank, bank shareholders, bank creditors and
the court. The bank, any bank creditor or bank shareholder may initiate a
compromise or an arrangement. The compromise or arrangement is a proposition
concerning the relation between the bank and its creditors. Initiation of a
compromise or an arrangement is made to the proper court. If a compromise or an
arrangement is proposed, the court should order a meeting of bank creditors or
shareholders to be summoned.
204 If a majority, representing three-fourths in value
of creditors or shareholders, agree to any compromise or arrangement, the
measures, if sanctioned by the court, will be binding. In case the bank is in course
of being wound up the measures will also bind the liquidator. The compromise or
arrangement requires the bank to inform shareholders and creditors about the
consequences of the measures before the meeting is summoned.
205 If the measures
a) relate to the reconstruction of the bank or the amalgamation of companies or
b) include the transfer of any part of the undertaking or property of the bank to
                                                
202 Discussing liquidation on shareholder initiative, one should also recall the shareholders’ right to
initiate a compulsory winding up pursuant to the Insolvency Act part IV chapter VI (and relating
provisions in the FSMA part XXIV ss. 367–371).
203 For detailed provisions, see the FSMA part III, IV and VII ss. 106 and 111 and Schedule 12
part II.
204 The Companies Act part XIII s. 425.
205 The Companies Act part XIII s. 426.81
another company the court may make certain provisions directing the measures.
206
The court is entitled to make provisions concerning the transfer of properties or
liabilities, the allotting or appropriation of shares or other interests of the
receiving company, the dissolution of the bank etc.
The special character of the arrangements and reconstructions in the
Companies Act part XIII in relation to other reorganisation and liquidation
means is evident. This fact may affect the position of shareholders (and creditors).
Comparing arrangements and reconstructions and “the proposal” regulated in the
Insolvency Act part I (presented in section 3.2.1.) differences appear. The bank,
bank shareholders or bank creditors may propose arrangements and
reconstructions according to the Companies Act, while directors initiate “the
proposal”. “The proposal” was originally introduced as a simpler and less
expensive alternative compared to the measures in the Companies Act. – The
relation between arrangements and reconstructions and the administration order
as another reorganisation measure is also of interest to bank stakeholders. The
administration order was intended to give banks a breathing space, ie buffer
against legal action, during which different alternatives for handling the banks’
problems were considered. In bank failures, the administration order has been
frequently used. The relation between the measures may be described as follows.
First, the need for arrangements and reconstructions constitute criteria for the
issuance of an administration order.
207 Second, it is explicitly pointed out that an
administration order should not prevent arrangements and reconstructions under
the Companies Act.
208 The relation between arrangements and reconstructions and
liquidation measures is also of special interest to bank shareholders (and
creditors). In compulsory liquidation procedures the shareholders would most
certainly lose their capital. In both voluntary and compulsory winding ups, a
compromise or an arrangement proposed between the bank and its creditors
entitles the court to arrange a meeting of company stakeholders to discuss the
company affairs in a manner directed by the court. The implications of the
discussions may be company reorganisation (ie securing the continuance of bank
activities) by cutting creditor claims. Such an option is highly valued by
shareholders.
209 Pursuant to the FSMA part XIV ss. 365 and 362 the FSA is
                                                
206 The Companies Act part XIII s. 427.
207 The Insolvency Act part II s. 8.
208 The Insolvency Act part II s. 27. – If during an administration order, a compromise or an
arrangement is proposed between a bank and its creditors, the FSA also receives the right to
petition the court due to the Companies Act part XIII s. 425.
209 The Companies Act part XIII s. 425.82
entitled to petition the court in both types of winding ups when arrangements and
reconstructions are proposed.
210
Another question of importance to bank shareholders is the possibilities that
reducing or increasing the share capital may offer in a reorganisation sense.
Reducing the share capital as a means of reorganisation is most often used in
situations when as a result of losses own funds are not sufficient. Considering
grounds for the reduction, the duty of the directors on serious loss of capital is
regulated in the Companies Act part V chapter V s. 142. According to these
provisions the directors shall, where the net assets of a public company are half or
less of its called-up share capital, duly convene an extraordinary general meeting
for the purpose of considering what steps should be taken to deal with the
situation.  The procedure for reducing the share capital is regulated in the
Companies Act part V chapter IV. These regulations state that a bank may,
subject to confirmation by the court and if authorised by the articles of the bank,
reduce its share capital by special resolution. In case the reduction of share capital
involves either the payment to a shareholder of any paid-up share capital or if the
court so directs, every creditor of the bank should be contacted and may object to
the reduction of the capital. If a creditor does not approve to the reduction, the
court may, if it thinks fit, dispense with the consent of that creditor if the bank is
willing to secure the creditor’s claim in accordance with the court’s directives. As
a result, the court should, if satisfied with respect to every creditor, make an order
confirming the reduction. On certain grounds, the court may object to the
reduction of capital.
211  Increasing the share capital may be used as a
reorganisation measure when there is a need of additional own funds. Some
aspects of the alteration of share capital, including the increasing of capital, are
regulated in the Companies Act part V chapter I. The general meeting of bank
shareholders should decide on the increase of the bank’s share capital. Specific
provisions on the decision making and announcement of the increase are included
in the law.
212
The members’ voluntary winding up differs from the creditors’
corresponding alternative in respect of the solvency of the bank.
213 Similar to the
creditors’ voluntary winding up, the members’ (ie shareholders) winding up starts
                                                
210 In general, receiverships as means to secure creditors are unaffected by arrangements and
reconstructions. – Another interesting aspect concerning arrangements and reconstructions is the
fact that eventual arrangements establish a right for the FSA to withdraw or restrict the banking
license. The perspective on the term arrangement has been wide in these situations. Arrangements
have covered both arrangements and reconstructions under the Companies Act part XIII and “the
proposal” pursuant to the Insolvency Act part I.
211 The Companies Act part V chapter IV ss. 135–137.
212 The Companies Act part V chapter I ss. 121–123.
213 The members’ voluntary winding up is regulated in the Insolvency Act part IV chapter II and
III and the FSMA part XXIV s. 365.83
with a resolution passed by the bank at a general meeting. The winding up is
deemed to commence at the time of the passing of the resolution. Contrary to the
creditors’ winding up, the members’ winding up requires solvency of the bank, ie
the assets should exceed the obligations. In accordance with this condition, the
legislation states that a members’ winding up should be preceded by a statutory
declaration of solvency made by the directors. Such a declaration should embody
a statement of the bank’s assets and liabilities as at the latest practicable date
before the making of the declaration. The bank’s general meeting should nominate
a liquidator to wind up the bank’s affairs and distribute its assets. If the liquidator
is of the opinion that the bank’s assets are not sufficient to cover its obligations
the liquidator should summon a meeting of creditors. Consequently the member’s
voluntary winding up is transformed to a creditors’ winding up. In case the assets
are sufficient, the liquidator should make up an account of the winding up,
showing how the bank’s property has been disposed, and call a general meeting of
the bank to consider the account.
214 In a members’ voluntary winding up, the FSA
is entitled to refer any question arising in the winding up of a bank to the court.
The court may entitle the FSA to exercise the powers of the court in respect of the
winding up.
215
Another entity of importance to bank shareholders is the position of bank
shareholders under compulsory reorganisation and liquidation measures.
Though the main characteristics of the compulsory means were presented in
section 3.2.1, a few words may be said in order to describe consequences of the
measures for shareholders. Focusing on reorganisation, shareholders’ role in “the
proposal” is secondary. Formally, “the proposal” is the affair of the bank’s
management, the creditors and the court. Shareholders may direct the
management, but only the court can overrule decisions made by the creditors’
meeting.
216 Shareholders may make a petition for an administration order
creating a buffer for legal action against the bank. During this time an adequate
solution to the bank’s problems may be presented. There is a risk that such public
actions affect the “going-concern” value of the bank.
217 Under receiverships and
compulsory liquidation the position of the shareholders is fairly straightforward.
There are no actual means for the shareholders to affect the procedures other than
the abovementioned arrangements and reconstructions. – On the whole, the
arrangements and reconstructions in accordance with the Companies Act part XIII
are the procedural alternatives most valuable for the shareholders of the failed
                                                
214 The Insolvency Act part IV chapter II ss. 84–87, 89–91 and 94–96.
215 The FSMA part XXIV s. 365 and the Insolvency Act part IV chapter V s. 112. – The
Companies Act also establishes a scheme for the winding up of companies registered under the
Companies Act. The scheme is comprehensive and comprises court-administered liquidation,
voluntary liquidation and court-supervised liquidation (the Companies Act part XX).
216 The Insolvency Act part I and the FSMA part XXIV s. 356.
217 The Insolvency Act part II and the FSMA part XXIV ss. 359–362.84
bank. Though both shareholders and creditors vote on arrangements and
reconstructions, the court determines what will be done.
218
Shareholders of UK banks are confronted with a bank exit regime that leaves the
important decisions to be made by the courts. Independent of the type of
compulsory reorganisation measure taken, the courts set the limits for action. In
theory, the FSA has no central, decisive role in the reorganisation and liquidation
of banks. In practice, the FSA may affect court behaviour through its right to
initiate and attend the court proceedings. – There are few possibilities for bank
shareholders to influence a compulsory liquidation of the bank. Only, the
commencement of certain reorganisation measures listed in the Companies Act
may temporarily stop the proceedings. – Reorganisation measures require the
creditors’ vote and court approval to become valid. The measures may imply
cutting creditor claims in order to secure the continuance of the bank’s activities.
   Financial assistance to banks is based on the Bank of England’s lender of last
resort (LLR) role only. Financial assistance to banks may take several forms. The
implications of the assistance on shareholder value are not given. – Compulsory
liquidation/bankruptcy should be initiated in case a) the bank is unable to pay its
debts or b) the court is of the opinion that the bank should be wound up. – No
explicit provisions protecting the “going-concern” value of the bank in
reorganisation and liquidation are included in the legislation.
5.2.2 Germany
Considering the German bank exit legislation from the shareholders’ perspective
the structure of the study can follow the logic set up in previous sections.
Consequently, one group of interesting aspects relates to the shareholders’
position under the formal (FSA-administered) reorganisation and liquidation
measures pursuant to the Banking Act (and Insolvency Act). Another group of
aspects is linked to the voluntary means through which a bank, not faced with
financial problems, may reorganise or liquidate its business. On the whole, one
could say that in some senses the position of the shareholders of German banks is
relatively strong. Criteria for intervention by the Financial Supervisory Authority
(FSA) are fairly narrow. On the other hand, there are factors creating uncertainty
especially in the case of liquidation of a bank.
219
                                                
218 Analysing the situation for bank shareholders in the case of reorganisation and liquidation
under the former Banking Act relative to current provisions in the FSMA no significant
differences appear. On the other hand, the powers of the FSA (pursuant to the current FSMA) in
relation to former Bank of England powers (due to the former Banking Act) in the reorganisation
and liquidation of banks have marginally increased (see section 3.2.1). – For viewpoints on
financial assistance to UK banks, see section 3.2.1.
219 For a more detailed analysis of the various FSA-administered reorganisation and liquidation
measures see section 3.2.2.85
Considering the shareholder’s position relative to the formal (FSA-
administered) reorganisation measures according to the Banking Act, a
distinction between the different means should be made. As defined in section
3.2.2 the formal reorganisation measures consist either of pure protective
measures or means with a constructive element. – In a general sense, the
protective measures applicable when the bank is confronted with inadequate own
funds or liquidity, dangers and insolvency primarily constitute prohibitions. These
prohibitions affect the present and future capital flows of the bank, indicating a
decrease in shareholder value. Moreover, at a detailed level, some of the
protective measures directly restrict actions by the owners of the bank. The
Banking Act part III, division 4, s. 45 states that in case of inadequate own funds
or liquidity the FSA may prohibit or limit withdrawals by the owners as well as
the distribution of profits. Protective measures against the shareholders in the case
of danger include the prohibition of owners from carrying out their activities and
the limitation of these activities.
220 Means with a constructive element create, at
least in theory, conditions for the protection of shareholder value. Means with a
constructive element only apply to banks in danger or confronted by insolvency.
More precisely, danger is defined in respect to the banks’ creditors. Danger
entitles the FSA to issue instructions on the management and to appoint
supervisors. Supervisors are entitled only to take measures in order to avert
insolvency proceedings and protect creditors. Further measures require the
approval of the banks’ governing bodies. For banks confronted by insolvency, a
judicial stay on actions against the bank may be introduced, ie a moratorium
creating a breathing space. During this temporary stay the shareholders may in co-
operation with creditors and authorities decide on how to proceed. The legislation
does not include any provisions on forced mergers etc.
221 Another question linked
to the formal reorganisation of banks concerns the shareholders’ rights in case of
financial assistance. First, the Liquidity Consortium Bank (LCB) may grant banks
liquidity assistance. The assistance is in the form of loans. Loans generate a claim
against the bank without affecting the judicial status of the shareholders. Second,
the By-laws of the Voluntary Deposit Protection Scheme administered by the
Association of German Banks do not exclude direct financial assistance to banks
in whatever form. The By-laws do not include provisions on any explicit
conditions or implications for such assistance.
222
                                                
220 The Banking Act part III, division 4, s. 46.
221 The Banking Act part III, division 4 ss. 46 and 46a.
222 By-laws of the Deposit Protection Fund s. 2. – Deposit guarantees according to the Deposit
Guarantee and Investor Compensation Act are paid directly to the depositors resulting in the
subrogation of depositor claims against the bank and no further effects on bank shareholders.
Moreover, according to the German legislation, the Government does not back banks in the case of
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The provisions concerning the liquidation of banks in the German Banking
Act affect the bank’s shareholders in many ways. To describe the matters that
arise one could concentrate on three main issues, ie a) restrictions in the powers
for shareholders to decide on liquidation, b) the absence of further FSA-
regulations on the liquidation procedure and c) the level of accuracy of existing
insolvency criteria. – The restrictions in the powers for shareholders to decide on
liquidation are a concrete result of the current law. According to the provisions
the petition for the initiation of insolvency proceedings may be filed by the FSA
only, excluding both the bank’s shareholders and creditors from initiating the
proceedings. Shareholder initiated liquidation (due to the German company-laws)
as a means to cease the bank’s activities and realise its assets may be used only for
sound banks.
223 – Pursuant to the Banking Act the FSA may issue general
instructions regarding the liquidation of a bank. No such instructions have been
issued. As a consequence, there is some uncertainty about the procedure following
the initiation of liquidation proceedings. The chosen procedure will have some
effect on the shareholders’ position. The possibility of reorganising the bank
according to the provisions of the Insolvency Act (ie after initiating the insolvency
proceedings) would be a valuable alternative for the shareholders, because in the
event of compulsory liquidation the shareholders would most certainly lose their
capital. In such reorganisation, creditor claims would be cut in accordance with
the creditor voting procedures provided.
224 – As mentioned, the German Banking
Act acknowledges two grounds for the FSA to request the liquidation of the bank
that relate to the bank’s financial problems. These are insolvency and over-
indebtedness. As the terms are not further defined, some uncertainty on the
criteria for initiating insolvency proceedings exist. The separation of insolvency
and over-indebtedness as criteria for liquidation indicate that a liquidity aspect is
linked to the term insolvency. In other words insolvency means inability to fulfil
any obligation. In turn, over-indebtedness follows a balance-sheet logic. One
would anticipate that German over-indebtedness covers the situations where the
amount of foreign capital exceeds the assets of the bank. The base for calculations
would presumably be market values.
225
Finally, there are a number of different means that may classify as voluntary
reorganisation and liquidation measures. These measures are applied to banks
without financial problems. They may be used by the banks themselves in
beforehand to avoid more formal, FSA-administered measures. In short, the
voluntary reorganisation measures consist of altering the share capital, mergers
and acquisitions. Voluntary liquidation may be carried out in accordance with the
                                                
223 The Banking Act part III, division 4, s. 46b.
224 The Banking Act part III, division 1, s. 38. – For an overview of the procedures under the
Insolvency Act and the preceding Bankruptcy Act and Composition Act see section 3.2.2.
225 The provisions are included in the Banking Act part III, division 4, s. 46b.87
liquidation rules in the German company-laws. – The applicable legislation for
reorganisation measures and dissolution is dependent on the type of the company
(the commercial bank). The Law concerning Limited Liability Companies
division 5 regulates the liquidation of GmbH-companies and the Stock
Corporation Act part I, division 8 directs AG-companies.
226 Alterations of the
share capital are not regulated in the Banking Act. Depending on the type of
company the Law concerning Limited Liability Companies division 4 and the
Stock Corporation Act part I, division 6 apply to alterations. Still, the provisions
are quite similar. An increase in the share capital for both types of companies
normally requires a majority of three-quarters of the shareholders voting in favour
of the increase. In addition, a reduction of the share capital requires that all
creditors’ claims are satisfied or secured or the creditors consent to the reduction.
Mergers and acquisitions of banks are regulated to achieve a variety of aims in
the German jurisdiction. The Banking Act introduced restrictions on bank
engagements (purchase of shares, assets or other engagements) in non-financial
companies to manage risk. Competition law, ie the Act against Restraints on
Competition applies to mergers between enterprises including acquisitions of
assets or shares to protect functioning markets.
227 Company-laws comprise
regulations to protect creditor interests in relation to an eventual sale of debtor-
assets.
                                                
226 Gesetz betreffend die Gesellschaften mit beschränkter Haftung (GmbHG) and Aktiengesetz,
(AktG), respectively.
227 Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen (GWB).88
The position of German bank shareholders during bank exit is quite strong. – The
powers of the appointed administrator during formal reorganisation only
comprise measures to avert insolvency proceedings and protect creditors. Further
measures require the approval of the bank’s governing bodies. Most Financial
Supervisory Authority (FSA) administered reorganisation measures constitute
prohibitions and limitations for bank activities. – On the other hand, the
shareholders (or creditors) have no right to initiate insolvency proceedings. The
decision is made by the FSA only. – The extent to which the Insolvency Act
applies to bank liquidation is somewhat unclear. The Insolvency Act includes
certain reorganisation procedures that may improve shareholder position and
infringe creditor rights.
   The Liquidity Consortium Bank (LCB) and the Voluntary Deposit Protection
Scheme may provide German banks with direct financial assistance. LCB-
assistance is possible for solvent banks and it takes the form of loans only.
Assistance from the voluntary scheme may be given to any member bank in any
form. No provisions concerning implications of assistance on shareholder value
exist in the by-laws of the scheme. – Insolvency and over-indebtedness constitute
the criteria for the commencement of insolvency proceedings against banks. The
terms are not further defined. – Ambitions to protect the “going-concern” value
of the bank in reorganisation and liquidation are more easily detected in the
provisions of the Insolvency Act compared to the Banking Act.
5.2.3 Finland
Focusing on the Finnish bank exit regime from the shareholders’ angle, one
would assume that, as anywhere, the degree to which the regulations secure the
capital invested is a central feature appreciated by the shareholders.
228
Consequently, one would estimate that procedures for the reorganisation of
problem banks that do not require additional investments or abolish shareholder-
value are highly valued by the proprietors. As a result of this, the Finnish bank
exit regime is presented below categorising measures due to the potential
requirements that these reflect relative to shareholders. First, a)  reorganisation
means not requiring additional capital are analysed. Then, b) rehabilitation
                                                
228 The theoretical framework in this paper is based on the assumption that the security aspect is
two-dimensional. For bank shareholders the security aspect concerns both the security that the law
and authorities provide (supervision, financial assistance, etc.) and the amount of powers that the
law transfers to shareholders in order to protect their investment.89
measures requiring additional capital are covered, where after c) the actual
closing steps of banks are considered from a shareholder perspective.
229
When it comes to reorganisation means not requiring additional capital,
these mainly comprise authority-initiated reorganisation of a bank and certain
voluntary reorganisation measures. In theory, the temporary suspension of the
activities of a deposit bank (regulated in the Law concerning Temporary
Suspension of the Activities of a Deposit Bank (1509/2001) also constitute a
means for reorganisation. Still, the bank shareholders’ judicial position is not
significantly altered during the suspension. The Financial Supervision Authority
(FSA) is entitled to appoint a representative to supervise the bank during the
suspension. Moreover, the suspension restricts the bank’s activities and creates a
buffer for legal action against the bank. In other senses, the bank shareholders’
position is not directly affected. Major problems may arise for bank shareholders
only if the bank is unable to present a plan for recovery during the suspension. In
this case, the Ministry of Finance (MoF) may withdraw the bank’s licence. The
net worth of the bank will decrease, harming creditors and shareholders.
230 –
MoF-initiated reorganisation measures may be seen as the shareholders’ lottery
ticket. These formal reorganisation means follow the procedure set out in the
general Law concerning Reorganisation of Companies (47/1993). When the
reorganisation procedure is started the net worth of the bank is presumably low, ie
the value of bank shares are marginal or negative. By renegotiating or cutting
creditors’ claims, conditions for the rehabilitation of the bank are created. The
procedure is based on voting and it is court-supervised. If the reorganisation is a
success the shareholders will benefit and the creditors will receive the cut claims.
If the reorganisation is a failure (ie a later bankruptcy occurs) the creditors may
loose parts or all of the cut claims. If no reorganisation had taken place, the
shareholders would have lost all of their capital in the bank’s bankruptcy.
231 – The
legal foundation for the voluntary reorganisation of a bank changed to a large
                                                
229 One of the main aims of the 2002 reform of the Finnish bank exit regime was to enhance the
framework of shareholder responsibility in the restructuring of problem banks. During the Finnish
banking crisis in the early 1990’s substantial amounts of taxpayers’ money were injected into
Finnish banks without any negative consequences for the banks’ shareholders. (For an analysis of
the Finnish banking crisis see Nyberg & Vihriälä 1994.)
230 The former Law concerning Commercial Banks (1269/1990) 28–31§§ also established a similar
suspension for banks. Still, there were differences between the two suspensions. First, the criteria
for the initiation of the suspensions have changed (see section 3.2.3). Second, an authority initiated
formal reorganisation procedure was introduced as an extension to the new suspension. Third, the
former law set a time frame of five years for the implementation of shareholder-initiated
reorganisation measures. This time frame is abolished in the new legislation.
231 Before 1.1.2002 the Finnish legislation did not provide for an authority-administered
reorganisation scheme (with direct and compulsory implications for bank creditors). The
reorganisation of banks was the task of bank shareholders, mainly using traditional voluntary
reorganisation means.90
extent as a result of the bank exit reform. Mergers, divisions, transfers of activities
and the decrease of share capital may be seen as reorganisation measures not
requiring additional capital from bank shareholders. Still, the terms of the
mergers, divisions and transfers of activities determine the success of the
measures and their effect on bank shareholders. – The principles for the regulation
of mergers before and after the Finnish bank exit reform are presented in section
3.2.3. Earlier, two decisional procedures existed. The procedure applied depended
on the character of the merging entities. Today, only one procedure exists. From a
shareholder perspective, the reform did not change the main characteristics of the
decisional procedure. Shareholders decided and decide on mergers in accordance
with similar voting rules. Mergers under the former Law concerning Commercial
Banks 25§ required MoF approval. Current mergers require (and former mergers
under the Law concerning Limited Liability Companies (734/1978) required) the
register authority’s approval. A condition for approval is the hearing of creditors.
Pursuant to the present legislation the FSA may object to a merger. – The
provisions concerning division and the transfer of activities are also presented in
section 3.2.3. According to the current legal definition, division is an arrangement
where the compensation for the assets transferred is made directly to shareholders.
Division may concern the whole bank or parts of the bank. When activities are
transferred the compensation is paid directly to the bank. The procedure for
deciding on division and the transfer of activities are similar to merger. The
register authority’s approval is needed and the FSA has the powers to object to the
division or the transfer.
232 The judicial frame for the decrease of share capital as a
reorganisation measure also changed due to the reform. As for any company, the
bank’s shareholders decide on the decrease. The decision about decreasing the
share capital is usually made by simple majority. If the decision violates the
interests of any shareholder or group of shareholders, the acceptance of each of
these shareholders is needed. The way the decrease of share capital is made may
have some effect on the redevelopment of the bank and the future capital flows to
shareholders. Still, one has to remember that decreasing the share capital may
often remain a temporary measure. Success may require constructive structural
action. Depending on the aim of the decrease, the register authority’s permit is
required.
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The second best choice for shareholders of a troubled bank is the
reorganisation measures requiring additional capital. In principle, these
alternatives comprise two main options: a traditional increase of the share capital
and the possibility of capital injections more generally. In practice, capital
                                                
232 Earlier, division required MoF acceptance. The former definition of division also comprised the
transfer of activities.
233 Applicable provisions concerning an eventual decrease of share capital before and after
1.1.2002 are listed in section 3.2.3. Formerly, MoF approval was required for certain decreases.91
injections into Finnish banks (given that they are not in the form of ordinary or
subordinated debt) will most probably have the judicial form of an increase (or
bargain) of share capital (shares). – The traditional increase of share capital is
regulated in the Law concerning Limited Liability Companies chapter 4.
Increasing the share capital may be used to prevent authority action or as a
response to authority action taken against the bank. The decision about increasing
the bank’s own capital is made by the shareholders’ meeting. There are two
alternatives to carry out the increase: by issuing new shares or increasing the
value of old shares against payment by old or new shareholders. In theory,
company funds may also constitute an increase. The decision about increasing the
share capital is made by simple majority. If the decision changes the shareholders’
relative position or requires a change of the articles of the company a 2/3 majority
is needed. The appropriateness of this measure from the shareholders’ angle is
partly dependent on the terms for increasing the bank’s own capital.
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The other measures involving additional capital in order to solve banks’
problems are capital injections more generally. To sum up, troubled Finnish
banks may receive capital from the voluntary guarantee funds and from the
Government’s Guarantee Fund. Voluntary guarantee funds are regulated in the
Law concerning Credit Institutions (1607/1993) chapter 6. Assistance from the
Government’s Guarantee Fund to banks or banks’ guarantee funds is in turn
directed by the Law concerning the Government’s Guarantee Fund (379/1992). –
In principle, the assistance to banks from voluntary guarantee funds may take the
form of supportive loans, subsidies or guarantees. Implications for bank
shareholders depend on the form of the assistance. Membership of the fund is a
condition for assistance. Other criteria for assistance are that the bank is in
financial distress and the assistance is needed to continue bank activities.
235 –
Assistance from the Government’s Guarantee Fund differs due to the receiver of
the assistance. The Government’s Guarantee Fund may issue supportive loans or
guarantees to voluntary guarantee funds. Conditions for aid are that the assistance
is needed to secure the activities of banks, the stability of the financial markets
and that guarantee fund resources are insufficient. The Government’s Guarantee
Fund may also assist banks directly. The Government’s Guarantee Fund may
invest in bank shares, issue guarantees for banks’ loans and give subsidies to
secure the stable functioning of financial markets. The assistance may include
                                                
234 The Law concerning Limited Liability Companies chapter 4 1–2§§ and chapter 9 13–14§§. –
Increasing banks’ share capital was formerly regulated both in the preceding Law concerning
Commercial Banks 28–31§§ and the Law concerning Limited Liability Companies chapter 4.
According to the former Law concerning Commercial Banks the increase of own funds could be
used as a reparative measure (28§), as a response to authority suspension of bank activities (29–
31§§) and as an exit from an already started liquidation procedure (54§).
235 The Law concerning Credit Institutions 61§.92
conditions both for the voluntary guarantee funds and the assisted banks.
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According to the current Law concerning the Government’s Guarantee Fund
12a§, if capital injections into banks are made through subscription of shares
issued, the banks’ losses should be covered by the old share capital before support
is given. The law’s 12b§ provides an alternative in the form of nationalising the
shares against full payment to the shareholders.
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The reorganisation of Finnish banks is linked to the general procedure specified
in the Law concerning Reorganisation of Companies. Under this formal
procedure, bank creditors and the court should approve action taken by a
provisional administrator to rehabilitate the bank. The aim of the procedure is to
secure the continuance of bank activities by cutting bank creditors claims.
Implications for bank shareholders are marginal. – What comes to liquidation,
bank shareholders may decide on voluntary liquidation of a solvent bank. The
MoF may order a bank whose licence has been withdrawn, into compulsory
liquidation. Several grounds for register authority-initiated and court-initiated
compulsory liquidation also exist. Moreover, Finnish banks may face
bankruptcy. – The MoF may decide on the reorganisation of a bank if the bank’s
activities have been suspended, as an alternative to liquidation. The probability
that the MoF would take such steps against a failed bank is quite high.
   From 2002 onwards, bank losses should be covered by old share capital before
Government assistance is given. An alternative is to nationalise banks against
full payment to shareholders. Banks may also receive assistance in the form of
subsidies from voluntary guarantee funds. – Financial criteria for the initiation of
compulsory liquidation procedures do not exist. The solvency level, i.e. capital
adequacy, is linked to the withdrawal of bank licenses and an eventual
liquidation. The main criterion for the initiation of bankruptcy is “other than
temporary inability to pay one´s debts”. – On the whole, the Finnish bank exit
legislation is not very concerned with the “going-concern” value of the bank.
The actual closing of Finnish banks may be carried out through voluntary or
compulsory liquidation or bankruptcy. The legal framework for the different
liquidation procedures is presented in section 3.2.3. According to the main rule
bank shareholders decide on liquidation. In certain cases or if criteria for
compulsory liquidation are met, the court or the register authority should decide
                                                
236 The Law concerning the Government’s Guarantee Fund 1, 11 and 12§§.
237 The provisions concerning these types of reorganisation means was slightly different under the
previous Law concerning Commercial Banks. First, financial assistance to banks required a
decision by the bank shareholders’ meeting in several cases (29–31§§). Second, the issuance of a
guarantee to cover eventual loss of own capital was separately regulated in the former law. Any
party could issue the guarantee. The issuance of a guarantee to cover the loss of own capital
required a decision by the shareholders. Third, during the old regime shareholders’ judicial
position was not affected by capital injections from the Government’s Guarantee Fund.93
on liquidation. There are no explicit financial criteria for compulsory liquidation
of a bank in the current legislation. Still, as a result of insufficient own funds, the
banking licence may be withdrawn. If the licence is withdrawn, the MoF should
order the bank into liquidation. In turn, grounds for bankruptcy are well defined
and both the bank and its creditors may file a petition for bankruptcy.
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5.3 Reorganisation and liquidation of problem banks in
Japan
Though the reforms of the Japanese financial sector have been substantial and the
powers have been expanded for the Deposit Insurance Corporation (DIC) to deal
with the reorganisation and liquidation of banks the position of the Japanese
banks’ shareholders has been fairly well protected. This is particularly true in
comparison with the US regime. On the other hand, certain subsequent
amendments to the legislation have altered the strong tradition of shareholder
protection. The best-known example of a major change in values was the
introduction of temporary nationalisation as a reorganisation measure in 1998.
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– To receive a picture of the implications of the varying Japanese legislation on
the banks’ shareholders position one should distinquish between the period before
and after 1998. Similarly, one may distinguish between compulsory (ie authority
or creditor initiated) rehabilitation and liquidation measures against the bank and
bank-initiated reorganisation and liquidation. Considering these terms, the
analysis may be structured in the following way. First, a) compulsory action
before 1998 is described where after b) compulsory action from 1998 onwards is
covered. Then, c) bank-initiated reorganisation and liquidation are analysed.
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Starting with compulsory action before 1998, eventual measures affecting
the banks were initially taken by the bank’s creditors, not the authorities. This was
due to the fact that the Japanese Deposit Insurance Law provided the DIC with no
means to reorganise or liquidate banks confronted with financial problems.
Similarly, no other legislation provided such powers to any authority. As referred
to above in section 3.3. DIC’s original functions were restricted to the pay-off of
depositors in the 1971 version of the Deposit Insurance Law. In principle, the pay-
off of insured depositors did not affect the bank’s shareholders. The DIC only
                                                
238 For viewpoints on the rules concerning bank liquidation at the time before the bank exit reform
see section 3.2.3.
239 For viewpoints on shareholder structure and corporate governance issues relating to Japanese
banks see Kanaya & Woo 2001 p. 23ff.
240 The Japanese Bankers’ Association (Zenginkyo) 2001 pp. 44–73 lists the most important legal
reforms directing Japanese banks and also covers the general implications of the reforms on bank
shareholders.94
received subrogation rights relative to paid off depositors. In other words,
compulsory action against banks at that time was a question of creditor initiated
measures. As reorganisation, according to the Japanese legislation, required the
consent of the bank, only creditor-initiated liquidation (ie bankruptcy
proceedings) constituted compulsory action. Creditor initiated bankruptcy
proceedings for commercial banks under the Japanese jurisdiction were possible
due to the Bankruptcy Law and the Commercial Code. The shareholders’ position
in both procedures was straightforward. The number of criteria for the initiation of
the proceedings was three. The criteria comprised a) the debtor’s lack of ability to
pay his debts, b) the debtor’s suspension of payments of his debts and c) the
excess of debtor’s liabilities over his assets. In most cases the result of bankruptcy
proceedings for the banks’ shareholders would have been clear giving the criteria
for the initiation of the proceedings. The shareholders would not have received
any funds in the realisation of the bank’s assets and distribution of the proceeds.
The only means left for the shareholders before and under the bankruptcy
procedures would have been creditor-binding reorganisation and composition. In
theory, this would have been possible due to the Corporate Reorganisation Law,
the Composition Law and as compulsory composition under the Bankruptcy Law.
– In practice, Japanese problem banks were dealt with quite differently during this
period. Problem banks were merged with healthy entities on conditions developed
by the Ministry of Finance (MOF) and the financial sector. This meant that the
shareholders’ position depended on the terms of the mergers.
241 – In 1996, when
the Deposit Insurance Law was amended, DIC was entitled to apply to the court
for the initiation of both compulsory bank reorganisation and liquidation
proceedings. The fact that DIC was given the right to initiate reorganisation
increased the possibility for problem banks to reorganise. DIC initiated
reorganisation might have been seen as a signal to bank creditors to approve the
reorganisation scheme and accept cuts in their claims. From a shareholder
perspective, the reorganisation of an insolvent bank would have been a valuable
option, since Japanese reorganisation did not endanger the position of
shareholders.
In 1998, the theoretical position of the Japanese banks’ shareholders partly
changed.  The Financial Reconstruction Law affected the bank shareholders’
position. – The law established the financial reorganisation administrator-scheme
to deal with failed banks or banks in danger of failing. Financial reorganisation
administrators were appointed to banks that met certain criteria. Assessment was
based on Financial Services Agency (FSA) examinations. The criteria for the
appointment of the administrators are (since 2001) listed in the Deposit Insurance
Law s. 74. The main duties of the administrator comprised the operation and
                                                
241 For a more comprehensive analysis of the period in question see Milhaupt 1999 pp. 11–16 and
23–24.95
management of assets of the failed bank and the transfer of the bank’s business to
other banks.
242 Provisions stated that the administrator was given the same
authority as the president of the bank with respect to its business operations and
assets. According to the main rule measures should be taken within one year of
the appointment of the administrator. However, the fundamental measures
required for reorganisation of the bank were mainly the responsibility of the board
and the shareholders’ meeting. As a consequence the administrator was forced to
co-operate. The outcome of co-operation with the shareholders of a bank that is in
danger of failing is easily estimated. As the shareholders would lose their money
in the case of bankruptcy, they all vote for reorganisation. – While the
administrator-scheme in some senses reflected a continuity of shareholder
protection, temporary nationalisation of failed banks (also introduced in 1998)
may be interpreted as the end of Japanese shareholder protection. Temporary
nationalisation meant that the DIC obtained the bank’s shares and placed it under
special public management. The fact that the bank was insolvent or nearly
insolvent and there was a systemic risk posed by the bank’s failure constituted the
conditions for action. Initially, the Financial Reconstruction Commission (FRC)
set the terms for the nationalisation, ie the FRC decided on the price payable to
shareholders. Since 2001, decisions have to be taken by the Prime Minister’s
Office. Especially in cases when the bank is nearly insolvent problems may arise.
From a judicial perspective, the rights of the shareholders may easily be infringed
in the determination of share value.
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Furthermore, the implications of bank-initiated means (ie bank or
shareholder-initiated or -approved reorganisation and liquidation measures) on
shareholder rights are an interesting subject. It is clear that few threats to
shareholders may appear through measures that are initiated or approved by the
shareholders. On the other hand, the voluntary means represent several avenues
for improving the shareholders’ position. Very often, the possibility to improve
the bank’s status through reorganisation is connected with an increased risk for
the bank’s creditors to suffer capital loss. In order to analyse the effects of bank-
initiated means on shareholder position the different means are listed below. First,
reorganisation measures that do not infringe creditor rights are addressed. Second,
reorganisation measures affecting the bank‘s creditors’ position are described.
Finally, the main characteristics of voluntary liquidation are presented. – In case
of  bank-initiated reorganisation measures not infringing creditor rights
applicable means comprise a) voluntary mergers and acquisitions, b) changing the
share capital, c) reorganisation according to the Commercial Code, d) DIC
financial assistance and e) DIC purchase of stock and subordinated bonds.
                                                
242 Deposit Insurance Law ss. 77 and 90.
243 A presentation of the Japanese legal reforms in 1998 is found in Hall 1998 (b) pp. 12–14 and
Milhaupt 1999 pp. 25–28.96
Voluntary mergers and acquisitions by banks are regulated in the Japanese
Banking Law chapter V and require the approval of the MoF. In addition, the Law
concerning Amalgamation and Conversion of Financial Institutions and the
Antimonopoly Law (competition law) are applicable to voluntary bank mergers
and acquisitions. Alteration of share capital is covered by the Commercial Code.
Increasing the share capital improves the creditor position but capital decrease
may harm creditors. While creditors consent is required pursuant to the Japanese
Commercial Code creditors’ rights are not infringed. Reorganisation pursuant to
the Commercial Code (company arrangements) also requires the consent of all
creditors. Consequently it does not endanger creditor rights. In 1986 DIC’s
mandate was enlarged to comprise also financial assistance to problem banks in
order to facilitate mergers or acquisitions. Assistance was in the form of subsidies,
loans or guarantees. In the case assistance covered subsidies no special
requirements in relation to the banks’ shareholders existed. As a result, a
foundation was laid for the transfer of substantial amounts of taxpayers’ money to
bank shareholders. Still, the detailed conditions under which the mergers or
acquisitions were made determined how shareholders were affected. The
Financial Function Early Strengthening Law of 1998 introduced capital injections
to banks in the form of DIC’s purchase of common and preferred stock and
subordinated bonds. The terms according to which purchase was made were
dependent on a scheme based on the level of the banks’ capital adequacy. The
capital was supplied upon application by the banks. In practice, all purchases
improved the position of bank shareholders, creating at least temporary conditions
to continue the banks’ activities. The Financial Function Early Strengthening Law
also enabled DIC to grant banks subordinated loans, not only purchase
subordinated bonds.
There is also a number of bank-initiated reorganisation measures affecting
creditor rights. By limiting creditor rights the possibility of rehabilitating the bank
was increased. Creditors’ rights were mainly infringed by accepting majority
votes in deciding on rehabilitation. Certain reorganisation measures also blocked
the action, ie realisation of assets, by secured creditors. – The Japanese
Reorganisation Law introduced court-based reorganisation as a rehabilitation
alternative. This type of reorganisation automatically prevented secured creditors
from realising the security. Secured and unsecured creditors and preferred and
regular shareholders were required to vote on the reorganisation plan through a
“cram down” procedure. The requisite majority for approval varied with each
class. After creditor and shareholder acceptance, the court had to approve the
plan. – The Composition Law introduced a composition procedure (ie creditors
relinquishing parts of their demands) as an avenue for promoting the future
existence of the bank. This procedure did not affect the secured creditors’ position
and they were able to possess the same rights of separation that they could in
debtor bankruptcy. Japan’s Composition Law does not contain detailed criteria for97
the acceptability of the composition plan. Still, unsecured creditors holding at
least three-fourths in amount of the allowed claims must approve the plan.
Similarly, more than one-half in number of unsecured creditors who attend the
creditors’ meeting should support the plan in addition to the court. – “The
compulsory composition” offered by the Bankruptcy Law chapter IX broadened
the arsenal of creditor-binding rehabilitation means. In other words, compulsory
composition was compulsory in relation to the bank’s creditors. A bankrupt debtor
may propose a compulsory composition at any time during bankruptcy. Creditors’
majority as well as the court’s support is required for the approval of the
composition. Companies seldom use compulsory composition. In this sense, filing
for bankruptcy is seen as final.
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Japanese bank shareholders’ position is not as strong as it used to be. –
Currently, authority-initiated reorganisation of Japanese banks is carried out in
accordance with the financial reorganisation administrator-scheme. The scheme
gives the administrator the powers of the bank’s president. The administrator is
forced to co-operate with bank shareholders and creditors. – Japanese banks may
be liquidated on a voluntary or compulsory basis. The bank itself, its creditors
and the Deposit Insurance Corporation (DIC) may initiate the liquidation or
bankruptcy. – Experience indicates that reorganisation is a very probable
alternative to bank liquidation in Japan.
   Earlier, financial assistance had no effect on bank shareholder position. DIC
was entitled to facilitate mergers between the bank in question and other banks.
Only the terms of the mergers directed the outcome for bank shareholders. The
introduction of temporary nationalisation as a reorganisation means clearly
weakened the position of bank shareholders. The authorities set the price to
which the bank was purchased. – The criteria for the initiation of bankruptcy
proceedings against the bank were three: the inability to pay debts, the
suspension of debt-payments and the excess of liabilities over assets. – The
introduction of the “bridge bank”-scheme to handle bank mergers and
acquisitions may be seen as the best example of provisions aiming to secure the
“going-concern” value of the bank. Securing the bank’s “going-concern” value
in the realisation of bank assets is important also to bank shareholders.
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of the Commercial Code has to be approved by the authorities (the Banking Law chapter VI s. 37).
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6 Conclusions
In principle, concluding remarks on the viewpoints presented in this paper could
reflect several aims. Still, since this paper is restricted to a comparison of the legal
rules and practices of bank exit, the conclusions drawn here will be legally
oriented. The concluding remarks concentrate on extreme alternatives in the
security and the powers that the bank exit regimes provide the different bank
stakeholders in the various financial centres. In other words, a selective
summarisation of the security and powers received by bank creditors, depositors
and bank shareholders is presented below.
Analysing bank creditor security and powers, the variation represented by
the different regimes is high. The most central security and power issues relate to
the fact that a) banks are supervised differently, b) they may or may not receive
financial assistance, c) the bank exit regimes eventually comprise means aimed to
preserve banks “going-concern” value during reorganisation and liquidation,
d) bank creditors may or may not initiate bankruptcy and e) creditor claims may
be cut in bank reorganisation in many financial centres. – What comes to banking
supervision, the one extreme is the New York/US (and Tokyo/Japanese) “Prompt
Corrective Action” scheme (PCA) combined with risk-classification systems. The
scheme obliges the authorities to act. Before carrying out on-site inspections the
authorities should identify the particular risks of the bank in question.
Accordingly, the areas inspected should relate to the risks identified. On the other
hand, the jurisdictions of most European financial centres only entitle the
supervising agencies to act. The means applied to failing banks are to a larger
extent subject to authority discretion. – According to the various bank exit
regimes, financial assistance to banks derives from several sources. One feature
of the deposit insurance system in the EU is that deposit insurance funds may not
be used to assist banks, only to pay off insured deposits. Both Helsinki/Finland
and Frankfurt/Germany have some kind of formal or informal channels to support
banks. In London/UK, the procedures to support banks are largely undefined. In
New York, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) may provide
insured banks with assistance from the insurance fund. The FDIC has to choose
the least cost alternative (ie assistance relative to paying off insured deposits) for
action. Moreover, US creditors (only) are worse off in the realisation of the bank’s
assets since their claims are subordinated depositor claims. The Tokyo regime
resembles the New York regime. In Japan, funds from the banking industry, the
Bank of Japan (BoJ), local governments etc. have also been used to aid ailing
banks.
The most developed formal means to protect banks’ “going-concern” values
are found in the US bank exit regime. In addition, the US jurisdiction announces
the aim of conservatorship (ie reorganisation) to be the protection of the bank’s99
“going-concern value”. Bridge banks and new banks constitute such means. These
measures are most important for bank creditors. The European and Japanese
perspective on failing banks is quite contrary. In Europe and Japan the emphasis is
on the continuance of bank activities. – Another area of interest when analysing
differences in the position of bank creditors in various financial centres is creditor
powers in the initiation of bank bankruptcy. Though one would consider this to be
an option for any bank creditor, this is not possible pursuant to the laws applied in
Frankfurt and New York. In Germany insolvency proceedings against banks may
be initiated by the Federal Banking Supervisory Office (FBSO) only. In the USA,
both reorganisation and liquidation are authority-initiated and administered.
Creditors have no rights to influence the procedures, and grounds for judicial
review of authority decisions and actions are restricted. In London, Helsinki and
Tokyo, creditor-initiated bankruptcy is an option (at least in principle). – The last
main feature of the bank exit regimes relevant to bank creditors is the eventual
cutting of creditor claims in the reorganisation of problem banks. In Helsinki, this
was not a realistic alternative until the 2002 bank exit reform. Due to the reform,
formal procedures for cutting creditor claims were introduced. The procedures
aim to create conditions for the continuance of bank activities and do not affect
shareholder position. The London court-based system opens up the possibility of
similar measures. The Frankfurt and Tokyo regimes have no history of such
measures taken, though in theory they include such means. The system in New
York stresses shareholder responsibility for the bank failure and does not allow
for creditor rights to be infringed in such a manner.
The second group of bank stakeholders affected by an eventual bank exit is
the depositors of the banks. In order to describe the variety of security and
powers provided by the bank exit regimes to depositors, the following main topics
are looked into. These are a) the amount of compensation provided by the deposit
protection schemes, b) eventual scheme requirements concerning depositor
character, c) time limits for the pay-off of depositors, d) the type of scheme
manager powers relating to the pay-off, e) eventual depositor claim priority over
ordinary creditor claims in the realisation of bank assets and f) the eventual
existence of government guarantees for the schemes’ obligations. – In case of the
amount of compensation provided to depositors the differences between the
schemes are significant. The voluntary German scheme may provide cover up to
30 per cent of the liable capital of the ailing bank in question. US depositors are
protected in full up to USD 100.000. In Europe, EU-directives create minimum
standards for national protection. The amount protected should be at least EUR
20.000. The compensation for the amount protected should not be below 90 per
cent. In Japan, the actual protection limit is JPY 10 million (~ EUR 87.000).
Compensation is paid up to 100 per cent. In addition, the Japanese scheme may
pay off deposits exceeding the limit to the extent that funds will be available from
the liquidation of the bank. In 1996, the Japanese Government promised to protect100
the full value of deposits under all circumstances. This promise is still in effect. –
Some deposit protection schemes also comprise requirements concerning
depositors as conditions for the pay-off of deposits. In the event of failure of
London banks, deposits made by larger companies, certain persons linked to the
bank in question, other financial institutions etc. are not protected. In New York, a
depositor being a company does not constitute or abolish deposit protection. Still,
the judicial form of the claim against the bank is central when estimating the
scope of deposit cover anywhere. – In some financial centres there are time limits
for the pay-off of depositors, in others payment is based solely on authority
discretion. EU-directives establish a time frame of three months for the payment
of compensation to depositors calculated from the decision concerning the
compensation. This time frame may be extended. In New York, payment should
be made “as soon as possible” by the FDIC. In Tokyo, specific procedures that
enable the Deposit Insurance Corporation (DIC) to pay immediate compensation
to meet living expenses have been introduced.
Regarding  scheme manager powers, the regulatory regimes of certain
financial centres enable scheme managers to pay compensation, whilst other
oblige managers to pay once the authority decision concerning the bank’s
insolvency has been made. EU-directives require that national procedures for the
judicial review of decisions on the payment of compensation will be established.
In those financial centres where direct financial assistance from deposit insurance
funds to banks is an alternative to the pay off of depositors (ie New York and
Tokyo) scheme managers are entitled to pay compensation to depositors. The
German voluntary scheme is extraordinary in the sense that it explicitly poses no
obligation for the scheme manager to pay off depositors (or provide any other
support direct to banks or others) under any circumstances. – Of importance,
especially to depositors whose claims exceed the compensation limits, is the fact
whether  depositors are in a priority relative to ordinary creditors in the
realisation of the debtor bank’s assets. On this point, only the US bank exit regime
represents such a set up. All the other jurisdictions consider depositors and
ordinary creditors equal under the law. The payment of compensation also results
in scheme manager subrogation of depositor claims in all financial centres. In the
US, claims transferred to the FDIC are likewise in priority relative to ordinary
creditors. – Finally, only in New York (and for the time being in Tokyo) deposits
are guaranteed by the Federal Government. In New York, deposits are
guaranteed for deposit fund insolvency up to the compensation limit. As
mentioned, the Japanese Government currently guarantees all deposits. In EU
financial centres, the deposit cover is (at least in theory) restricted to deposit
insurance funds.
The last group of bank stakeholders whose position has been analysed in this
paper is the bank shareholders. The security and powers provided by the bank
exit regimes for bank shareholders may be analysed by focusing on three areas.101
These are a) the probability of the bank receiving subsidies, b) the possibility of
cutting creditor claims in order to secure the continuance of bank activities and
c) the powers of the provisional administrator in bank reorganisation. In all areas
the jurisdictions of the various financial centres represent quite varied
arrangements. – The probability of the bank receiving subsidies, ie such financial
assistance that would directly benefit bank shareholders, is the most valuable
option for the shareholders. In most financial centres, financial assistance is
usually considered to be in the form of ordinary or subordinated debt. Eg in New
York, shareholder responsibility for the bank’s condition is emphasised in all
situations. This fact has restricted such financial support to banks that would
directly increase shareholder value. In Tokyo and Helsinki, banks have received
subsidies, though the new reorganisation means involving public funds are
constructed to promote shareholder responsibility. In London and Frankfurt, the
forms for public bank assistance are not defined. – The second best option for
bank shareholders is the cutting of creditor claims in order to create conditions for
the continuance of bank activities. This alternative is usually executed through a
formal reorganisation procedure. From a shareholder perspective, this type of
reorganisation may be seen as a lottery ticket, since without reorganisation the
bank would most certainly be liquidated and the shareholders would lose their
investments. The jurisdictions of all financial centres, except for New York,
comprise such measures. The motives not to introduce such measures are the
same as for restricting direct subsidies to banks. – The last area significant to bank
shareholders is the eventual powers of the provisional administrator during bank
reorganisation. This has been a hot topic in the European context as a result of the
Panagis Pafitis-verdict by the European Court of Justice (ECJ). To sum up, the
powers of the US authorities in relation to bank shareholders are extensive in
comparison with European standards. The integrity of bank shareholders is
emphasised in the EU and is currently strongest in Germany. The powers of
Japanese provisional administrators resemble the ones of German administrators.102
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